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To what extent do elite and social group cues affect the public’s willingness to embrace their 
leader’s actions during domestic and international security crises? Studies traditionally have 
focused on top-down elite cue-driven models to study how the public’s attitudes are influenced 
during international and domestic security crises, largely disregarding the bottom-up effects 
social peer groups can have on individuals’ attitudes. This is problematic as the public is 
regularly exposed to cue messages from elites and social peer groups, both of which are 
expected to help determine how successful leaders will be in mobilizing public support on a 
tactical level. To address this dissertation, conduct three studies drawing on prospect theory 
and audience costs evaluating to what extend elite and social group cues are able to moderate 
the American and Indian public’s willingness to support or oppose the use of force in the 
context of humanitarian interventions, trade disputes, international and domestic security crises. 
Relying on ten survey experiments, the results from the three studies present robust evidence 
that the tactical use of elite and social group cues is not particularly effective as these 
information signals are unable to consistently induce preference shifts among the public during 
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To what extent do elite and social group cues affect the public's willingness to embrace their 
leader's actions during domestic and international security crises? Using the theoretical 
frameworks of prospect theory and audience costs, this dissertation studies under what 
conditions and to what extent elite and social group cues moderate the public's willingness to 
support the use of force in the context of humanitarian interventions, trade disputes, 
international and domestic security crises. Studies traditionally have focused on top-down elite 
cue-driven models to examine how the public's attitudes are influenced to support or oppose 
their leaders' actions during international or domestic security crises, largely disregarding the 
bottom-up effects from social group cues. This is problematic as the public is regularly exposed 
to cue messages from elites and social peer groups, both of which are expected to help 
determine how successful leaders will be in mobilizing public support on a tactical level. The 
number of studies investigating the comparative effects of elite and social group cues across 
policy issues and countries is limited at best, despite some preliminary evidence showing that 
social group cues' ability to influence the public's attitudes just as well as elite messages in the 
US and China. Thus, this dissertation builds upon the literature by conducting three original 
studies investigating the ability of elite and social group cues to induce preference shifts to 
2 
 
produce benefits for the leader during crises involving risky interventions and the country's 
reputation for resolve. Drawing on prospect theory, the first study tests to what extend elite and 
social group cues in the form of endorsements moderate the American public's willingness to 
support or oppose humanitarian interventions. The study relies on five survey experiments 
fielded among U.S respondents. In contrast, to other studies and policy areas, the findings 
suggest that in the context of humanitarian interventions and trade disputes, prospect theory's 
framing effects seem to overwhelm the endorsements cues by elites or social groups, even after 
controlling for respondents' party affiliation and core political dispositions.  
The second study addresses two gaps in the literature 1) it examines for the first time the 
microfoundations of audience cost theory in two major non-western democracies, India, and 
Nigeria, and 2) it captures to what extent elite and social group cues moderate public approval 
of their leaders' actions during security crises among non-western publics. The study draws on 
four original survey experiments in India and one in Nigeria, finding that respondents are 
willing to punish leaders who back down against the opposing country, as their preferences are 
not significantly affected by cues from elites or social groups. Hence, bringing doubt about the 
ability of these communication strategies to induce changes in the public's attitudes during 
domestic and international security crises.  
The third study contributes to the terrorism and public opinion literature by demonstrating that 
a broadly defined theoretical framework of audience costs can be successfully applied to 
domestic security crises. Drawing on survey experiments in India and Nigeria, the results 
suggest that despite the tactical use of positive elite and social group endorsement cues to sway 
the public in the desired direction, leaders are susceptible to reputational costs if they back 
down to attempt negotiations when facing domestic armed actors during the escalation phases 
of domestic security crises. The findings bring new insights into leaders' incentives to use force 
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despite the dangers of overreacting and improving the local populace's support for the domestic 
armed actor.  
Overall, this dissertation improves our understanding of the microfoundations and 
mesofoundations, determining the public's willingness to support the use of force in the broader 
context of prospect theory and audience costs. Additionally, the dissertation presents evidence 
that the tactical use of elite and social group cues is not particularly effective as these 
information signals are unable to consistently induce preference shifts among the public during 











CHAPTER TWO: DETERMINING SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN 







What is better at determining the public support for humanitarian interventions: prospect 
theory’s framing effects or elite and social group cues? Few issues have sparked such intense 
debates as the American public’s willingness to support risky humanitarian interventions 
defined as the use of military force across borders to prevent the loss of life and human rights 
violations.1 From a policy perspective, the public plays an important role in the government’s 
foreign policy decision-making. However, due to the potential human costs2, constituents need 
to be convinced to support them as it is often the case interventions in civil conflicts present 
little to no serious threats to the intervening country’s national security or strategic interests.3 
More frequent than others, the US public has been faced with the decision to support or oppose 
humanitarian interventions across the world, from Central and South America, South-East Asia, 
Africa, to Europe (Boettcher, 2004; Guisinger & Saunders, 2017). For instance, in 2011, the 
United States participated in the international coalition against the autocratic Libyan 
 
1 See Boettcher (2004). 
2 Measured in the lives of civilians and soldiers, see (Gartner, 2008; Kriner & Shen, 2014; Johns & Davies, 2019). 
3 See (Finnemore, 1996; Kreps & Mahey, 2018; Jentleson & Britton, 1998; Toms & Weeks, 2013) 
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government, citing humanitarian reasons and, in particular, the responsibility to protect.4 
Humanitarian interventions involve risk for the intervening country due to the possibility of 
failure, the expected military, and civilian casualties (Garrett, 1997; Natsios, 1997; Boettcher, 
2004). Human suffering is often caused by the affected country’s oppressive regime or the 
general inability of the government to maintain the rule of law, resulting in the collapse of 
authority (Garret, 1997). However, despite the expected costs, the literature finds consistent 
support among the public’s willingness to use  force to preserve or improve the welfare of the 
“others” (Wheeler, 2000).5 An example of this phenomenon is the American public’s initial 
support for the humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo (Sobel, 1998; 
Eichenberg, 2005). Because of policymakers’ need to generate public support through mass 
communication strategies, scholars have explored how the different framing of the issue by 
political parties and broader social groups6 influences subjects’ attitudes about the proposed 
humanitarian intervention.7 If public support is nonexistent, election-conscious governments 
may be more reluctant to undertake them.8 This brings attention to the study’s central question, 
which communication strategy – prospect theory’s framing effects or endorsement cues are 
better able to induce preference shifts among the American public’s willingness to support 
risky humanitarian interventions to help “others” in regions non-central to their country’s 
national security interests.9  
 
4 https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/03/libya-and-responsibility-protect  
5 Although not in an intervention context, Osmundsen and Petersen (2020) find that the public is generally 
willing to accept risky policies to preserve or improve the welfare of others despite the lack of clear risk for their 
own personal wellbeing. 
6 As pointed manifested mainly through subjects working circles, school, and social media communication. This 
paper utilized the self-referenced social group. For a similar usage, see Mann and Sinclair (2013) and Kertzer and 
Zeitzoff (2017).   
7 As the reality is that people are exposed to both frames and endorsement cues at the same time (Drunckman & 
Kifer & Parkin, 2009) 
8 In contrast, to Boettcher (2004) and Sullivan (2008) I do not refer to any of the stages of the intervention after 
the initial decision to act/do no act as a function of the among of public support. Perhaps the best example is when 
due to lack of public support the US abstained from intervening is the case of the Rwandan Genocide. The paper 




Traditionally studies have examined prospect theory’s framing effects and elite and 
social group cues’ ability to influence the public’s decision to support or oppose interventions 
and other foreign policies in isolation. To address this gap in the literature, I conducted a study 
using 387 undergraduate university students and 1622 respondents from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk, examining the competing theoretical explanations of prospect theory’s framing effects 
and cues through their interaction in the context of humanitarian interventions.  
The results from the study make two contributions. First, the study performed a novel test of 
the competing effects of elite and social group cues and prospect theory’s framing effects on 
moderating the public’s willingness to support or oppose humanitarian interventions10 and 
trade disputes. The results of the study provided strong support for the framing effects while 
not finding consistent support for the elite and social group cues.11 As a result, the study’s 
findings cautiously suggest that in the context of humanitarian interventions, the framing 
effects seem to overwhelm the endorsements cues by elites or social groups.  
Second, the study presents evidence in support of the claim that the American public still 
broadly supports limited humanitarian intervention in regions secondary to their country’s 
national interests in the changing geopolitical environment characterized by more frequent 
occurrences of big-power competition rather than unilateral or multilateral interventions to 
stabilize countries in crisis. The study’s findings suggest that humanitarian interventions, even 
with limited numbers of US troops on the ground, retain substantial levels of support, at least 
among the American public, despite that the country is in the process of rethinking its role in 
international security by renegotiating security agreements and role in international 
organizations.12 Thus, giving credence to the claim that the “bipartisan liberal internationalist 
 
10 See Drunckman, Hennessey, Charles, and Webber (2010) 
11 Defined as an endorsement by political parties (elites),see Bullock (2011) and subjects with the same political 
ideology using the key term – people with your political views/social peers - (social group cues) see Mann and 
Sinclair (2013), Bond, Settle, Fariss, Jones, and Fowler (2017), and Kertzer and Zeitzoff, (2017).   
12 https://www.washingtonpost.com  
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consensus”13 is likely still relevant in shaping the public and the elite’s foreign policy decision-




The public often receives information about their country’s foreign and domestic policies both 
through cues and frames (Druckman & Kifer & Parkin, 2009; Bechtek & Hainmueller & 
Hangartner, 2015). The framing effects operate through emphasizing specific considerations 
of an issue, which are then brought to the forefront to form individuals’ opinions (Boettcher, 
2004; Leeper & Slothuss, 2018). These considerations direct the subjects to modify the relative 
importance14 they attach to given facets part of the issue leading to preference shifts (Wood, 
2000; Druckman 2001b; Druckman & Nelson, 2003). Studies have demonstrated frames can 
be used to emphasize particular aspects during political rallies by far-left or far-right groups 
such as public safety or free speech where the former tends to induce negative perceptions, 
while the latter positive responses and perception by the public.15  
The study focuses on foreign policy frames based on prospect theory’s framing effects.16 
Prospect theory postulates that risky behavior tends to be asymmetric relative to an individual’s 
reference point. The theory’s main behavioral pattern depends on the framing effect. The 
framing effect is observed when two equivalent statements make decision-makers more likely 
to choose different plans of action (Rabin, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The central 
 
https://www.dw.com/en/trump-confirms-us-troop-cut-in-delinquent-germany/av-53824305  
13 (Ikenberry & Parmar & Stokes, 2018; Evers & Fisher & Schaaf, 2019). 
14 The term weight is also used regularly in communication studies.  
15 See Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) 
16 For a brief discussion of alternative frames of foreign policies, see Baum (2009) and Foyle and Van Belle (2010).  
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claim is that individuals’ risk-taking behavior is primarily determined by the framing of the 
issue in the domain of gains or losses. For instance, Berejikian and Zwald (2020) demonstrate 
that simple semantic changes in the description of the scenarios trigger significant preference 
shifts among respondents’ risk tolerance during international deterrence crises. Similarly, a 
public statement17 focusing on the potential casualties of the intervention will tend to direct 
attention toward the costs rather than the rewards thus affecting the individuals’ choice (Whyte, 
1993).   
Prospect theory’s framing effect is well established and regularly used to help explain the 
public’s preference towards war and military intervention (Minz & Geva, 1998; Farnham, 1992; 
Gause & Fieldman, 1998; Huth & Benett & Gelphi, 1992; Levi & Whyte, 1997; Boettcher, 
2004; Berejikian & Zwald, 2020). Studies have demonstrated across cultures and dozens of 
experiments that people tend to be risk-averse if they are more likely to win – the domain of 
gains; whereas, if the situation is perceived to be more likely to end in losses, people tend to 
become risk-acceptant (Starmer, 2000; Haerem & Kuvaas & Bakken & Karlen &, 2011; Eraker 
& Sox, 1981; McDermott, 2004; Mercer, 2005; Vis, & Van Kersbergen, 2007; Fanis, 2004; 
Vis, 2011). These studies find that when the costs are measured in human lives, respondents 
tend to be more risk-acceptant in their behavior compared to when costs are financial in contrast 
to the Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1981) classic individual gambling/economic decision 
in prospect theory experiments (Wang, 2011).   
Following Boettcher’s (2004) approach, I relax the definition of framing effects when applying 
prospect theory decision problems to better approximate real-world foreign policy issues on 
which the study is focused. Specifically, the study introduces more uncertainty into the 
expected costs18 by presenting them as non-equivalent intervals. The reason is that most risky 
 
17 That can also be a social media post.  
18 Measured in the expected loss of lives and jobs.  
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political choices the public is faced with include costs framed as non-equivalent intervals and 
not exact numbers and estimates. Similar to McDermott (2004) and Boettcher (2004), I expect 
that subjects will experience preference reversals expressed through the changes in their 
willingness to accept the risk-averse or the risk-acceptant course of action across the 
intervention scenarios. Thus, according to the classic framing hypothesis, it can be expected 
that by just semantically emphasizing the probability of casualties (domain of losses), 19 
subjects will be more likely to choose the risk-acceptant plan of action. In contrast, emphasizing 
the potential of saving lives (domain of gains), subjects will be induced to select the risk-averse 
plan of action for the intervention.   
 
(H1) Hypothesis 1: In the domain of gains, participants are more likely to choose the risk-
averse plan20 of action across the scenarios.   
 
(H2) Hypothesis 2: In the domain of losses, participants are more likely to choose the risk-
acceptant plan21 of action across the scenarios.  
 
Elite and Social Group Cues 
   
Testing prospect theory’s baseline hypothesis in isolation is necessary but to directly answer 
the main research question; the study explores the frames’ ability to moderate participants’ 
 
19 In the case of humanitarian crises, the domain of losses refers to the expected civilian and military casualties if 
the intervention takes place.  
20 Plan A 
21 Plan B 
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willingness to support humanitarian interventions when interacting with elite and social groups 
cues.22 There are several different types of cues, all with different functionality in shaping 
individuals’ attitudes (Druckman & Hennesey & Charles & Webber, 2010). Cues can be visual, 
party identification, elite cues, social groups endorsements, body language, and others 
(McLeod & Shah, 2008; Sniderman & Brody & Tetlock, 1991). In broad terms, the cue 
literature identifies them as information filters enabling individuals to make draw conclusions 
and make decisions without engaging in costly learning to acquire more detailed information 
on issues that might not be important for their wellbeing social status and considered remote 
from our daily life (Downs, 1957; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Carprini & Keeter, 1996; Rucker 
and Petty 2006; Mann & Sinclair, 2013). This study focuses on party (elite) and social groups 
cues in the form of endorsements as these types are prevalent in the public foreign policy 
debates prior to escalation and interventions. An additional reason is that cues in the form of 
endorsements have been shown to have a pivotal role in domestic23 and foreign policy settings 
as respondents’ attitudes are affected by them (Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Popkin, 1994; Lupia 
& McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Guisinger & Saunders, 2017; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 
2017). Prime examples are situations in which the political parties endorse a particular policy 
with a public statement. 
Subjects’ proclivity to conform to cues from elite and social groups with which they share 
political ideology has been supported extensively (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 
2017). Respondents’ psychological affinity and tendency to conform with ideologically similar 
groups is even stronger in complex international issues such as the decision to support or 
 
22 And  military interventions for regime change or for the protection of security interests. Furthermore, studies 
have shown the respondents rely on others to shape their preferences and choices in the domestic and foreign 
policies, see Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Popkin, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998; 
Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). 
23 Downs, (1957); Lau and Redlawsk (2006); Lupia (1994); Lupia and McCubbins (1998). 
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oppose humanitarian interventions (Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Mann & 
Sinclair, 2013).  
People tend to see international politics as disconnected, hard to grasp, and unable to affect 
their daily lives (Bechtel & Scheve, 2013; Tingley & Tomz, 2014; Millinix, 2015; Guisinger 
& Saudners, 2017). The public lacks strong incentives to stay informed about issues such a 
humanitarian intervention which makes their decisions susceptible to cues from political 
parties 24  and social groups.25  Understanding the cue effects’ interaction with the framing 
effects is of particular importance to policymakers and social groups because today’s 
information-saturated environment constantly exposes individuals to political messages 
through traditional media, social media, community meetings, and at their workplace. As a 
result, elite and social group cues make it possible for the average individual to collect 
information on the issue, process it, and make a decision to support or oppose the proposed 
policy (Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). For example, foreign policies are often framed, 
by the elite and social groups, in terms of losses or gains to serve their political interests while 
harnessing individuals’ tendency to prefer news channels or social media that share their 
worldview (Munson & Resnick, 2010; King & Pan & Roberts, 2017; Berejikian & Zwald, 
2020).26   
To test to what extent elite and social group cues might moderate the public support of 
humanitarian interventions, I postulate three hypotheses. I expect that respondents’ level of 
support for the proposed humanitarian interventions will be more likely to conform with the 
 
24 The elite cues 
25 Including the public and self-referenced groups (Arnese & Johannesson & Linde & Dahlberg, 2018)  
26 It is normal for the public to be exposed to competing messages, presented in semantically different frames 
and covering current foreign policy issues (Zaller, 1992; Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997; Ching & Druckman, 2007; 
Jerit, 2009; Kertzer & Brudger, 2017).  
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elite or social group cue27 they are exposed to, regardless, whether the decision problem is 
framed in the domain of losses or the domain of gains.   
 
(H3) Hypothesis 3: Subjects’ decision to support or oppose a risk-acceptant or risk-averse plan 
of action for the humanitarian intervention is more likely to conform with the elite cue28 they 
are exposed to, regardless of the loss or gain frame. 
 
(H4) Hypothesis 4: Subjects’ decision to support or oppose a risk-acceptant or risk-averse plan 
of action for the humanitarian intervention is more likely to conform with the social group cue29 
they are exposed to, regardless of the loss or gain frame. 
 
It can also be expected that individuals’ self-identified party affiliation will make them more 
likely to conform with partisan elite or social group cues, regardless of how the expected 
outcomes of the humanitarian intervention are framed.   
 
(H5) Hypothesis 5: Partisans will be more likely to change their level of support or opposition 





27 See Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) and their study demonstrating  that in the foreign policy attitudes, social group 
cues might even have a bigger effect on respondents’ position than elite cues.  
28 Party endorsement of the plan is represented by either the Republican or the Democratic Party.  
29 Group Endorse cue informing participants about the position taken by the majority of their compatriots in the 
particular situation.  





The study’s empirics rely on two survey experiments designed to examine the interaction 
between prospect theory’s framing effects and the elite and social group cues effects on the 
level of public support for humanitarian interventions. The first experiment consists of 
approximately 387 undergraduate students from a large public university in the United States 
that participated between the months of October and December 2019. The second experiment 
relies on 1622 respondents recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk during January 2020. 
Respondents were randomly assigned to either the domain of gains or the domain of losses.31 
In addition, respondents are randomly assigned to receive either the elite cue or the social group 
cue subjects in both experiments were presented with the five scenarios in a randomized order. 
The design of the two experiments can be seen graphically in Figure 1. To start, respondents 
were asked about their political dispositions, then they were informed that the scenarios they 
are to  read about are ongoing:  
 
 “In the next lines, you will read about five decision scenarios that the US government currently 
faces. You will be asked to choose a plan of action for each of them. Please read them carefully.” 
 
Next, following on Levy (1997), Boettcher (2004), Linde and Vis (2017), and Vis and Kuijpers 
(2018), subjects were presented with five decision problems described in a short text. Three of 
the scenarios described realistic humanitarian crises. By introducing the different scenarios, the 
study controls for the type of humanitarian crisis, its location, ethno-religious constitution of 
 




the population in danger, expected casualty ratio, and the probability of success because these 
factors are expected to affect the public’s willingness to take risks and support humanitarian 
interventions.32   
First, the experiments varied the location of the affected country for the three decision problems 
– Cameroon (West-Central Africa)33, the hypothetical country of Aboria (broadly representing 
the crisis in the Sudanese’s region of Darfur)34, and Venezuela (South America)35 because the 
public’s behavior could be influenced by country specific effects.36 Second, the experiments 
varied the type of crisis. The first type is when we can observe systematic repression against 
civil society groups (see Garret, 1999). This type of crisis is represented by the street clashes 
in Venezuela, where the humanitarian crisis has evolved into a power struggle between 
President Nikolas Maduro and the opposition leader Juan Guaidó. 37  The second type of 
humanitarian crisis is a general breakdown of central authority, producing a de facto anarchy 
in large parts of the country.38  For instance, the ongoing political situation in Cameroon 
between the French-speaking majority and the English-speaking minority is presented as a 
humanitarian crisis.39 Similarly, after the long-term Sudanese president Bashir announced a 
state of emergency due to protests, the government has lost control over large parts of the 
troublesome region of Darfur, and the situation has become even more anarchic as the UN-lead 
African peace force have reportedly redrawn much of its peacekeeping personal. The fictional 
country Aboria represents the situation in Sudan with the goal of observing whether 
respondents will show similar risk-acceptant or risk-averse behavior in a hypothetical situation. 
 
32 See Boettcher (2004). Furthermore, it is important to note that media frames are not used in this study.  
33 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45723211  
34 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47330423  
35 https://www.bbc.com/news/live/world-latin-america-47344348  
36  For instance, Boettcher (2004) clearly finds that the American public is more likely to support a risky 
humanitarian intervention in Bosnia compared to other regions.  
37 As of May 2019.  
38 see Garret (1999). 
39 See https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45723211  
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Therefore, the experiments include one scenario representing a repressive regime in the case 
of Venezuela and two depicting countries that have lost control over large regions which are 
now experiencing anarchic conditions in Cameroon and the country of Aboria.  
Third, the study varies the ethnoreligious background of the actors in the humanitarian crisis. 
For instance, there is evidence from Russia’s humanitarian interventions that, indeed, ethnic 
similarity could have a significant effect on the likelihood that the public will support a full-
scale intervention to protect their kin.40 Lastly, to control for the possibility that the effects of 
the new scenarios’ frames are not domain specific,41 the study includes two additional decision 
problems. The first one explores Americans’ choice of trade policy in the ongoing US-China 
trade dispute, whereas the second utilizes the classic Asian Disease situation, enabling a cross-
domain comparison. 
After reading the introductory text, participants were randomly assigned to the five scenarios.42 
Half of the subjects were presented with the plans framed in terms of losses43, whereas the 
other half as gains44. The elite and social group cues were incorporated into the treatment texts 
by including endorsements from democratic, and the republican parties such as The 
[Republican/Democratic] party has endorsed $PLAN A/B. Similarly, some of the participants 
were informed about the position that their politically like-minded co-partisans have 
taken: [Social Cue] the latest public opinion poll shows that the majority of people with your 
political views have strongly supported $PLAN A/B. For instance,  
[Decision problem Cameroon]  
 
40 See Allison (2013), Chatterjee (2015), and Niedermaier (2008).   
41 For an extensive discussion on the issue of different policy domains and the framing effects, see Boettcher 
(2009). 
42 Figure 1 outlines the design of the two experiments.  
43 Domain of losses 
44 Domain of gains 
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A congressional committee is discussing the situation in Cameroon (a country in Central 
Africa). The Cameroonian population is divided between two groups: the English-speaking 
minority and the French-speaking majority. Recently the majority has taken control of most of 
the positions of power in the country, resulting in rising tensions to which the military has 
responded with reprisals against villages part of the English-speaking minority. Due to the 
anarchic situation, an estimated 20,000 lives are at risk. Two plans of intervention are 
considered, each involving the deployment of 1000 U.S. troops.,   
 
Blank // [Social Cue] In the latest public opinion poll shows that the majority of people with 
your political views have strongly supported $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] The 
[Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B 
  
[Gains alternatives.] 
If plan A is selected,  
About 900 U.S. troops will return home safely, and many as 15,000 Cameroonian civilian lives 
will be saved.  
 
If plan B is selected,  
There is a 67% chance that all U.S. troops will return home safely, and 20,000 Cameroonian 
civilians’ lives will be saved.  But also, there is a 33% chance that about 850 U.S. troops will 




[Losses alternatives.]  
If plan A is selected,  
About 100 U.S. troops will not return home safely, and as many as 8,000 Cameroonian civilian 
lives will be lost.  
If plan B is selected,  
There is a 67% chance that all US troops will return home safely, and no Cameroonian 
civilians will be lost.  But also, there is a 33% chance that about 150 U.S. troops will not return 
home safely, and around 15,000 Cameroonian lives will be lost.  
 
Following each scenario, participants in both experiments were asked to select one out of the 
two possible plans of action on a five-point scale – strongly support plan A; somewhat support 
plan A; Neither Plan; Somewhat Support Plan B, and Strongly support plan B.45 The student 
participants were also asked to provide a short-written answer for the last scenario they have 
been assigned to and explain the reasoning behind their choice. The full vignettes and an extract 
of the open answers are provided in the appendix.  
 
 










No Cue (Control Group) 
Republican party Support 
Risk-Averse A
Republican party Support 
Risk-Acceptant B 
Democratic party Support 
Risk-Averse A
Dependent Variables: 
Support for plan A,B or 
neither; Support for 
Interventions; perception 
of threat to national 
security
Democratic party Support 
Risk Acceptant B
Social Group Support Risk 
Averse A
Social Group Support Risk 
Acceptant B
Domain of Losses 




Figure 2: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the United States has a moral 




Figure 3: Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does not intervene, its national 





Results and Analysis 
 
 
The study’s main finding is that prospect theory’s framing effects using the domain of losses 
or gains outperform the elite and social groups’ cues in influencing the publics’ willingness to 
take risks and support humanitarian interventions and trade disputes. This means that 
individuals presented with crisis scenarios in the domain of losses, describing how many lives 
will be saved, are significantly more likely to support the riskier plans of humanitarian 
intervention compared to those confronted with the crisis in the domain of gains indicating the 
number of lives expected to be saved. The framing effects’ statistical significance remains 
largely consistent across the humanitarian interventions and the US-China trade dispute 
scenario. Second, the study’s results on Figures 2 and 346 suggest that Americans still hold 
substantial support for limited humanitarian interventions due to moral (50%) and security 
reasons (45%) despite the changing geopolitical environment, the rise of isolationist views, and 
apprehension to involve US troops in regions secondary to the country’s national security 
interests.  
Tables 1-5 demonstrate the results from the experiments using proportion tests, which are one 
of the traditional methods for analyzing experiments grounded in prospect theory. The tests 
derive their utility by measuring for significant differences between the proportion of 
respondents in the domain of losses who select the riskier plans of interventions compared to 
those in the domain of gains. Based on the results from both experiments, it can be concluded 
that the frame induced statistically significant preference shifts across most of the scenarios. 
The level of support among respondents presented with the scenarios framed in the domain of 
 
46 The questions were asked only to the Mechanical Turk respondents.  
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losses compared to those in the domain of gains increases with 30.8% on average across the 
two experiments, 26.6% in experiment one, and 34.6% in experiment two.  
Experiment one’s results shown in Tables 1-5 reaffirm the strength of the framing effects 
averaging at 25.3% for the humanitarian interventions and 28.5% for the Trade war and Asian 
disease scenarios. In contrast, the results provide inconsistent evidence in support of the 
expectation that elite and social group cues will induce preference shifts among the respondents 
across the scenarios regardless of the framing. Similarly, the results from experiment two on 
Tables 1-5 offer robust evidence in support of the framing effect across the humanitarian 
intervention scenarios averaging 36.3%, the US-China trade war (32%), and the classic Asian 
disease (26.5%). Consistent with the first experiment, the results from the second study do not 
provide robust evidence that respondents are susceptible to elite and social group cues in the 
form of endorsement across the scenarios.47 On the other hand, the study’s results reconfirm 
the potency of the basic framing effects across the five decision scenarios, despite the that the 
costs across the three humanitarian scenarios and the US-China trade war were framed as non-
equivalent intervals.  
In summary, the study finds robust evidence in support of hypotheses one (H1) and two (H2), 
stating that participants exposed to the domain of gains are more likely to select the risk-averse 
plans of action when contrasted to those in the domain of losses. Contrary to these findings, 
the study’s results do not provide robust evidence in support of hypotheses three (H3) and four 
(H4), emphasizing that respondents’ decision to support the risk-averse or the risk-acceptant 
plan of action will be significantly moderated by the elite and social group cues they are 
exposed to, regardless of the loss of gain frames. Hence, the combined results of the study offer 
 




consistent support for prospect theory's framing effect on respondents' willingness to use force 
in interventions, but at the same time cautiously outlines the weaker moderating effects that 
elite and social group cues are having on the public's attitudes across the scenarios when 
interacting with the former.  
To further evaluate the robustness of the main findings, the study subsets the results by party 
affiliation to capture the potential heterogeneous treatment effects.48 As a result, the study does 
not find consistent evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects based on respondents’ 
partisanship and the source of the cues. The overwhelming majority of the framing effects 
remain significant and substantively unchanged. In contrast, the predicted partisanship effect 
on respondents’ susceptibility to the elite and social group cues proves to be inconsistent and 
insignificant in determining the participants’ choices of risk-averse or risk-acceptant plans of 
action across the scenarios. The article also controls for location and type of humanitarian crisis 
and finds no evidence of consistently different framing effects among the three scenarios of 
humanitarian interventions. For instance, the scenario with the hypothetical country of Aboria 
experiencing ethnic clashes and an autocratic leader unwilling or unable to control these clashes 
generate framing effects of a similar degree as the government oppression central to the 
Venezuelan case. Similarly, the results fail to reveal significantly different levels of support for 
the majority-minority centered violence in the Cameroonian humanitarian crisis. The results 
from the US-China trade war and Asian disease scenarios also do not indicate heterogeneous 




48 See the Appendix IV.  
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Table 1: Aboria Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social Group Cues 









No Cue Experiment 1 48% 71% 23% (50, .04) 




Experiment 1 60%49 81% 21% (48, .06) 
Experiment 2 32% 58% 26%*** (40, 12) 
Democratic Party 
Endorses B 
Experiment 1 60%50 70% 10% (37, 17) 
Experiment 2 37% 75% 37%*** (50, 24) 
Republican Party 
Endorses A 
Experiment 1 68% 68% 0% () 
Experiment 2 27% 68% 42%*** (55, 29) 
Republican Party 
Endorses B 
Experiment 1 0% 92% X51 




Experiment 1 37% 76% 39%** (65, 12) 




Experiment 1 50% 90% 40%** (65, 15) 
Experiment 2 38% 58% 20%** (34, .06) 
Note: Table reports results from tests of proportions. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown in 
parentheses. *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01; A stands for risk-averse plan/course of action, while B stands for the 
risk-acceptant plan of intervention/course of action. The dependent variable is again binary one (1) standing for 
B and 0 – standing for plan A, because of which the two-sample test of proportions could be used to capture the 
multiple important treatment effects. The higher the percentage indicates that a higher proportion of respondents 
have chosen the risk-acceptant B plan of intervention/course of action; whereas a lower percentage of support 





49 An example of a preference reversal but in the opposite direction of the cue of the democratic party which 
endorsed the risk-averse plan and not the risk-acceptant which the respondents have chosen.  
50 An example of preference reversal as even respondents in the domain of gains in their majority have selected 
the risk-acceptant plan of action. 




Figure 4: Aboria Experiment 2 Main Effects 
Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants’ choice of the risk-averse or the risk-
acceptant plan of intervention. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals among 
participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with a baseline group: Domain of Gains. The estimates 





Table 2: Venezuela Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social Group Cues 




Domain of Losses 
% Choosing the 
Risky Plan 
Framing Effect 
No Cue Experiment 
1 
58% 95% 37%*** (59, 16) 
Experiment 
2 






67% 79% 12% (37, 13) 
Experiment 
2 








52% 92% 39%**(62, 17) 
Experiment 
2 






65% 91% 26%**(49, .03) 
Experiment 
2 






80% 77% .04 (20, 28) 
Experiment 
2 







46% 79% 33%(59, .08) 
Experiment 
2 






75% 82% .08% (32, 17) 
Experiment 
2 






Figure 5: Venezuela Experiment 2 Main Effects 
 
Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants’ choice of the risk-averse or the risk-
acceptant plan of intervention. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals among 
participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with a baseline group: Domain of Gains. The estimates 




Table 3: Cameroon Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social Group Cues 









No Cue Experiment 1 32% 80% 49%*** (74, 
24) 





Experiment 1 46% 40% 6% (25, 37) 
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Experiment 1 28% 71% 43%** (69, 17) 






Experiment 1 29% 58% 29%**(57, 0) 




Experiment 1 54% 78% 23%*** (55, 
28) 
Experiment 2 29% 70% 42%*** (55, 
28) 
Group Endorses A Experiment 1 37% 58% 20% (50, .09) 
Experiment 2 15% 61% 46%*** (59, 
34) 
 
Group Endorses B Experiment 1 45% 75% 30%* (59, .01) 







Figure 6: Cameroon Experiment 2 Main Effects 
Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants’ choice of the risk-averse or the risk-
acceptant plan of intervention. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals among 
participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with the baseline group: Domain of Gains. The estimates 




Table 4: Trade War US-China Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social 
Group Cues 











No Cue Experiment 1 22% 62% 40%** (65, 15) 




Experiment 1 37% 50% 13% (41, 15) 
Experiment 2 25% 49% 25%*** (38, 12) 





Experiment 1 26% 62% 36%** (63, 10) 




Experiment 1 28% 70% 41%** (67, 15) 




Experiment 1 24% 48% 24%* (50, .03) 




Experiment 1 17% 68% 50%*** (75, 27) 




Experiment 1 14% 72% 58%*** (80, 35) 






Figure 7: US-China Trade War Experiment 2 Main Effects 
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Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants’ choice of the risk-averse or the risk-
acceptant plan of imposing tariffs on Chinese exports to the US. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 
percent confidence intervals among participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with the baseline 
group: Domain of Gains. The estimates are based on logistic regression models with controls reported in the 




Table 5: Asian Disease Preference Shifts by Frame Controlling for Elite and Social Group 
Cues 









No Cue Experiment 1 32% 43% 12% (40, 16) 




Experiment 1 35% 47% 12% (42, 17) 




Experiment 1 26% 70% 43% (70, 16) 




Experiment 1 42% 64% 22% (50, .05) 




Experiment 1 50% 62% 12% (42, 18) 
Experiment 2 25% 50% 25%*** (38, 12) 
Group Endorses 
A 
Experiment 1 23% 53% 30%* (58, 14) 




Experiment 1 35% 70% 35% ** (65, .04) 






Figure 8: Asian Disease Experiment 2 Main Effects 
Note: The effects of the frames, elite, and social group cues on participants’ choice of the risk-averse or the risk-
acceptant plan tackling the deadly disease. The plot shows the effects in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence 
intervals among participants in the non-students Mechanical Turk Sample with the baseline group: Domain of 
Gains. The estimates are based on  logistic regression models with controls reported in the Appendix A.4.  
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the interaction between the framing effects and the cues from elites and 
social groups in determining the public’s willingness to accept risk in humanitarian 
interventions. Its main findings demonstrated that prospect theory’s framing effects outperform 
elite and social group cues in the form of endorsements by more consistently inducing 
preference shifts with a substantive margin among Americans’ willingness to support 
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humanitarian interventions and trade disputes even when the expected costs are framed in non-
equivalent intervals. The findings can be divided into several points.  
First, the study’s findings demonstrate when interacting prospect theory’s framing effects 
outperform those of the elite and social group cues52 and consistently shapes the public’s 
willingness to support the risk-averse or risk-acceptant plans of humanitarian intervention. All 
this in regions secondary to their country’s national interests in the changing geopolitical 
environment characterized by more frequent occurrences of big-power competition rather than 
unilateral or multilateral interventions to stabilize countries in crisis. The study’s results 
demonstrate that both the elite and social group cues do not consistently induce preference 
shifts or significantly moderate the classic framing effects of prospect theory in the foreign 
policy context of humanitarian interventions. The framing effects’ ability to induce preference 
shifts remains robust across the US-China trade war and the classic Asian disease decision 
problems, while the cues again, with a few exceptions, fail to have a consistent effect on 
respondent’s choice of actions across the domain of gains or losses. Overall, the results reaffirm 
the strength of prospect theory’s framing effects while also cautiously indicating that elite and 
social group cues could act as moderators of the public’s willingness to support the riskier 
course of action in humanitarian interventions. One potential explanation of why the prospect 
theory’s framing effects seem to override the effects of the cues is that the former could be 
biologically driven due to humans’ evolutionary development as suggested by works of 
McDermott, Fowler, and Smirnov (2008), De Martino, Kumaran, Holt, and Dolan (2009), and 
Trepel, Fox, and Poldrack (2005). Therefore, it can be argued that the information which the 
 
52 Here defined as political parties (elites) see Bullock (2011) and subjects with the same political ideology (social 
group cues) see Mann and Sinclair (2013) and Bond, Settle Fariss, Jones, and Fowler (2017), and Guisinger and 
Saunders (2017), and Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017).    
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cues provide needs to be competing to overcome to be able to overcome the fundamental and 
biologically driven “gut feeling” about the scenarios and the presented plans of action.  
Second, due to the well-established pattern that one-sided party cues will moderate the choices 
of individuals self-identifying as democrats or republicans (Bisgaard, 2015; Bolsen et al. 2014; 
Druckman et al. 2013; Petersen et al. 2013; Millinix, 2015), the study tested the effect of 
partisanship. The resulting effects of partisanship on respondents’ susceptibility to party 
endorsements are inconsistent across the loss and gain frames. The results do not provide 
evidence in support of the expected heterogeneous treatment effects based on respondents’ 
party affiliation or political ideology. On the contrary, the results53 reconfirm the robustness of 
the framing effects’ ability to shape respondents’ willingness to support the risk-averse or risk-
acceptant plans across the humanitarian intervention scenarios and the trade dispute scenario. 
In addition, the results suggest that democrats and republicans seem not to consistently follow 
their co-partisans cues54 as expected.55  Similarly, the study does not find evidence of the 
existence of prevalent heterogeneous treatment effects on respondents’ willingness to conform 
with the cues and support risk-acceptant or risk-averse plans of intervention based on their 
political ideology.56 Consequently, these findings further indicate the framing effects’ ability 
to outperform the endorsement cues in foreign policy issues such as humanitarian 
intervention. 57  Hence, the lack of consistent partisanship effect speaks directly to the 
robustness of the results as the foreign policy literature has indicated that issues that do not 
 
53 See the Appendix.  
54 In the form of party or social group endorsements.  
55 (Bartels, 2002; Cambell et al. 1960; Goren, 2002; Jerit & Barabas, 2012) 
56 See the Appendix Tables  
57 Involving non-kin populations (Want, 2011) 
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affect individuals personally58 and are not of high salience59 respondents tend to rely more 
heavily on cues in contrast to the salient issues60.  
Finally, the study reconfirms the American public's broad support for humanitarian 
interventions in regions secondary to their country’s national interests in the changing 
geopolitical environment characterized by more frequent occurrences of big-power 
competition rather than unilateral or multilateral interventions to stabilize countries in crisis. 
The results indicate that humanitarian interventions, even with limited US troops on the ground, 
retain high levels of support among the American public despite that the country is in the 
process of rethinking its role in international security by renegotiating security agreements and 
role in international organizations.61 Hence, the findings could be of particular interest taking 
into account increasing political and ideological pressure placed upon the “bipartisan liberal 
internationalist consensus”62 signified by reviewing the sustainability and benefits for the US 
national security importance of holding the same amount of commitments and leadership in the 
international system  
The paper has several limitations that could help direct future work on the public support for 
humanitarian interventions and the interaction between prospect theory’s frames, elite and 
social group cues. Most notably, the study does not account for the theorized effect of issue 
motivated reasoning on the frames, and the cues as the former have shown to strengthen already 
held beliefs (See Kunda, 1990; Kim, 2007; Lodge & Taber, 2013). For instance, building upon  
 
58 Respondents placing high salience on an issue tend to be less influence party cues (See Millinix, 2015).  
59 (Rahn, 1993; Lau & Redlawsk 2001; Cohen, 2003). 
60 See Bechtel et al (2015) on the limits of framing and cues among salient policy issues.  
 
61 https://www.washingtonpost.com.  
https://www.dw.com/en/trump-confirms-us-troop-cut-in-delinquent-germany/av-53824305  
62 (Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2007; Snyder & Shapiro & Bloch-Elkon, 2009; Bafumi & Parent, 2012; Krebs, 2015; 
Ikenberry & Parmar & Stokes, 2018. Evers & Fisher & Schaaf, 2019). 
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studies by Lodge and Taber (2013) and Millinix (2015), researchers can further investigate the 
findings by testing how issue-motivated reasoning and completing arguments affect the levels 
of support and risk-taking behavior in humanitarian crises scenarios. In addition, the work can 
be extended by including contradicting party endorsements63 from partisan media channels 
similar to Boettcher’s (2004) approach and observing how they will affect risk-taking among 
participants. It is of particular importance as the public is less like to place high salience on 
issues of foreign military intervention, especially in regions not central to the country’s national 
security. An additional reason underlying the need for such future work is that research on 
public opinion and partisanship by Zaller (1992), Lenendusky (2012), Dancey and Goren 
(2010), Slothuss and de Vreese (2010), Drunkman, et al. (2013), Robison and Millinix (2015) 
has shown that polarized party messages, placing emphasis on the conflict between the 
competing policy solutions increase the importance of partisan affiliation among respondents. 
As a result, it can be expected that in these circumstances of potential low salience combined 
with the effects from the polarized party64 and social group cues in the form of endorsements 
might consistently moderate or even overcome prospect theory’s framing effects. Lastly, 
additional tests in different international security domains can be conducted to evaluate the 
workings of prospect theory’s framing effects when the scenarios’ costs are framed as non-
equivalent intervals, as this could suggest broader applicability of prospect theory’s framing 
effects in shaping the public’s attitudes on foreign policies.  
  
 
63 Elite polarization.  
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CHAPTER THREE: BACKING OUT OR WINNING IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 







Do national leaders suffer from audience costs in the form of lower approval ratings and a 
damaged reputation when backing down in international security crises? Do the public reward 
its leaders for their willingness to fight? Do elite and social group cues affect the public’s 
willingness to inflict audience costs upon their leader for backing during international security 
crises? Following Fearon’s (1994) work, there has been much debate and scholarly work 
regarding the various dynamics, case application, and generalizability of audience costs 
theory’s postulates.65 Scholars have proposed reasons why leaders could lose office and the 
role played by audience costs in a variety of situations.  
There has been a broad consensus from comparative case studies, observational data, game-
theoretic approaches, and survey experiments on how audience cost affects leaders’ political 
fates based on their performance in military engagements.66 Most importantly, the audience 
cost literature emphasizes that backing down in international security crises affects the 
credibility of the threats made by leaders and the reputation of their countries. Leaders are often 
presumed to make credible threats, and if they take the decision to back down after issuing a 
 
65 See Potter and Baum (2010) for more details on Democratic Peace, credible signals, and causal mechanisms 
showing audience costs contributing to democratic peace.  
66 (Cox & Gibilisco, 2018; Tomz, 2007).  
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public threat, it is expected that they will likely incur costs in terms of lower approval rating, 
damaged reputation, and reduced electoral support. 
Nonetheless, the audience costs literature has been plagued by small amounts of empirical 
evidence across several of its key claims concerning its external and internal validity central to 
its explanations of international security crises. As such, the goal of this study is to address 
some of the key deficiencies in the audience costs literature. On the question of validity across 
countries and regimes, studies like Downes and Sechser (2012) and Kurizaki and Wang (2015) 
have started to address the lack of cross-country empirical evaluation of the claim that leaders 
tend to be removed from office across regime types if they decide to back down, while leaders 
who induce compliance by the opposing country tend to be rewarded. However, gaps still exist 
in the temporal coverage of the data, which our study focuses on. Similarly, Bell and Quek 
(2017), Weiss and Dafoe (2019), and Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021) argue that limited 
external and internal validity of audience cost theory is particularly prevalent among studies 
using survey experiments as their test countries have been almost entirely Western democracies. 
The notable exception has been China,67 where studies have consistently demonstrated that 
autocratic leaders also incur audience costs if they back down in international crises68 and their 
constituents find novel ways to express their disagreement. In this paper, I seek to address this 
deficiency by using a multi-method approach to explore the validity of audience cost’s main 
claims using survey experiments to examine the theory’s cross-country validity and its 
microfoundations among Indians and Nigerians. 
Another major deficiency in the audience costs literature is that studies have tested the theory 
primarily using support for the use of force among U.S and British publics – citizens of 
 
67 See Quek & Johnston 2017-2018, Fang & Li (2020);  Huang, 2015; Truex, 2017; Li & Chen, 2020) 




countries with very high military capabilities, usually involved in conflicts outside of their 
regions (Narang & Staniland, 2018; Lin-Greenberg 2019; Clary & Lalwani & Siddiqui, 2021). 
This focus on “far away” conflicts and on countries possessing military capabilities higher than 
most other countries69, with a long tradition of military interventions, and no long-standing 
strategic rivalries involving territorial claims could misrepresent the publics’ willingness to 
impose audience costs upon their leaders in other less militarily powerful and less developed 
countries. The study builds on these limitations identified by earlier works70 by exploring the 
public’s willingness to impose audience costs upon their leaders during international security 
crises across three non-western democracies in the developing world – India and Nigeria. I 
selected India because it has active interstate rivalries, which have been shown to inflate the 
base effects of audience costs while also being the largest democracy in Asia with active 
foreign policy in the region and beyond. Importantly, the presented scenarios are realistic for 
the Indian respondents as India has had persistent security crises over the years, which keeps 
the realities of engaging in war - including possible casualties - in the collective memory of 
respondents; this lessens the effects of abstraction associated with hypothetical scenarios in 
survey experiment foreign policy studies identified scholars like Huddleston (2019). In contrast, 
Nigeria do not have active interstate rivalries, or long-standing territorial disputes with their 
neighboring countries, and both countries’ military capabilities are not on the same level as the 
United States, Britain, China, and India. However, both countries have past and present 
dynamics that make them interesting cases for the study. First, Nigeria is Africa’s largest 
democracy and an influential player of the African Union, which has a collective defense policy 
under its Peace and Security Architecture. Secondly, Nigeria is a major player in Africa’s 
 
69 This problem is partially valid for studies focusing on China as it is one of the two superpowers and a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. 
70 See Lin-Greenberg (2019) and Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021)  
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international affairs and have had a long history of intervention politics for peacekeeping 
purposes in Liberia and Sierra Leone under the subregional body ECOWAS. Nigerians are thus 
expected to have useful opinions on international politics and would be sensitive to how their 
leaders handle international crises. 
Based on these deficiencies, I argue that there are three interrelated gaps in the audience costs 
literature. Namely, the literature does not provide 1) empirical tests of the microfoundations of 
audience costs theory among the public in non-western democracies,  2) the literature offers 
scant evidence whether the public tends to approve or disapprove of their leaders’ willingness 
to fight even when they have lost the military engagement against a weaker opponent, and 3) 
to what extent elite and social group cues are able to moderate or induce preference shifts 
among the public, particularly in non-western democracies. To address these gaps, I use survey 
experiments in India and Nigeria to study the audience cost theory’s microfoundations and its 
predicted effects across the two countries in experimental settings.  
In this paper, I provide new evidence to answer three questions. First, do national leaders suffer 
from audience costs when backing down in international security crises across regime types? 
Using survey experiments, I find that audience cost theory’s main claim is valid across 
countries and regime types as leaders who back down are consistently more likely to lose office. 
These finding are important for filling the literature gaps as they present novel evidence clearly 
supporting the cross-country validity of the microfoundations of audience costs theory in India 
and Nigeria, which are major non-western democracies with current and past military interstate 
disputes71, and active involvement in international security issues. Second, do the public reward 
its leaders for their willingness to fight? This study presents novel evidence from India and 
 
71 To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no studies testing audience cost theory in India or Nigeria 
through the experimental method. 
55 
 
Nigeria to suggest that leaders tend to be rewarded for their willingness to use force against the 
opposing country regardless of the outcome of the military engagement. And third, do elite and 
social group cues affect the public’s willingness to inflict audience costs upon their leaders for 
backing during international security crises? This study tests for the first time the expected 
effects of elite and social group cues on Indians’ willingness to support or oppose their leaders 
during international security crises, the study’s results do not provide robust and consistent 
evidence that the cues are able to significantly moderate their public choices and produce 
preference shifts.  
 
Domestic Audience and Its Influence on Countries’ Foreign Policy 
 
 
This paper builds upon previous studies that aim to examine audience costs’ validity across 
countries and regime types using observational data such as Kurizaki and Whang (2015) and 
Downes and Sechser’s (2012) work, and those using survey experiments to test whether the 
microfoundations of the theory operate in a similar way among non-western publics (Quek, 
2019; Moore & Primiano, 2020; Li & Chen, 2020, Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui, 2021). First, 
I test this core statement for the theory with survey experiments among the Indian and Nigerian 
publics’ willingness to approve of leaders who engage compared to backing down. Second, 
using only the study’s experiments, I empirically evaluate the claim that the public will be 
supportive of their leaders’ willingness to fight regardless of the outcome of the military 
engagement, even if it has been a failure (Clary & Lalwani & Siddiqui, 2021). Third, I examine 
the comparative effects of elite and social group cues on Indians’ willingness to support or 





Backing Down and Audience Costs 
 
Scholars have long examined the public’s ability to influence a country’s foreign policy despite 
the wider scholarly opinion that voters possess little information and hold weak attitudes on 
foreign policy issues (Fearon, 1994; Aldrich & Sullivan & Borgida, 1989; Kertzer & Brutger, 
2016). In democracies, this dynamic is particularly important as citizens can influence leaders’ 
decisions not only by approval ratings but also through the ballot box. Fearon (1994) argues 
that democracies are more likely to suffer audience costs than autocracies, which implies that 
democratic leaders are less likely to back down (Partell & Palmer, 1999). This outcome is 
further confirmed by Kurizaki and Whang’s (2015) study, in which they find, using game-
theoretical approach, that although audience costs matter to both democracies and autocracies, 
they are higher for the former.  
Scholars such as Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021), and Quek (2017) have recently begun to 
address the major deficiency in the audience cost literature; namely, most of the studies have 
focused on studying audience costs in western developed countries with a rich history of 
military interventions and preponderance of military power compared to their adversaries 
(Tomz, 2007; Snyder & Borhard, 2011). Because of that deficiency, the question of how 
generalizable the effects of audience cost are remains largely unanswered. This study follows 
and build upon the recent studies by Quek (2017), Moore & Primiano, (2020), Li & Chen 
(2020), Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021) that aim to provide novel empirical evidence to 
test the generalizability of audience costs beyond advanced, western democracies.   
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To address this limitation in the literature of whether the public tends to approve their leaders’ 
willingness to fight even when they lose the military engagement, I compare the expected 
effects of audience costs between countries with active rivalries with those that do not have.72 
The reason is that the public in countries with rivalries is more likely to support an escalation 
of disputes by being  affected by the rally around the flag effects (Goertz, et al. 2005), which 
by itself can increase the hawkish preferences among its constituents (Stephan & Stephan 2017). 
For that purpose, I have selected India and Nigeria as the test countries. India has a long-
running strategic rivalry with two of its neighbors, Pakistan, and China, centering around 
border disputes and accusations of state sponsored terrorism.73 Because of India’s ongoing 
rivalries, we can expect that the large sections of the public will rally around the flag in 
international disputes as any threat will be perceived as serious, involving reputation, territory, 
and being close to the homeland, rather than happening on a non-contiguous territory beyond 
a large body of water. In contrast, Nigeria in its  recent history have not been involved in any 
substantial strategic rivalry with any regional country in Africa, while their military potential 
is significantly lower than that of the major powers and India’s offensive capabilities. As a 
result, I expect a smaller rally around the flag effects among the Nigerian  public. Thus, 
hypothesis one states:  
 





72 See Greenberg (2019) and especially Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui (2021) which uses the audience costs’ 
theoretical framework to capture the size of the rally behind the flag effects among Pakistan participants.  
73 See Okraska (2018) 
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Leaders’ Willingness to Fight 
 
The audience cost literature argues that war incentives determine leaders’ willingness to fight 
in international security crises (Kroenig, 2013). There is a mutually dependent relationship 
between democratic leaders and their constituents, making it difficult for the former to back 
down from earlier diplomatic positions in international disputes out of fear of domestic political 
costs, even when there is no clear escalation strategy present (Yasui & Nakai, 2016; Clary & 
Lalwani & Siddiqui, 2021). Recent studies have expanded the external validity of the rally 
behind the flag phenomena across non-western countries and found that individuals support 
escalation even if it places their country’s soldiers and economic and trade relations at risk 
(Clary & Lalwani & Siddiqui, 2021). As a result, this study seeks to expand the external validity 
of audience costs further by including other non-western democracies – India and Nigeria. I 
expect the study to replicate previous findings from non-western democracies to the effect that 
backing down from the publicly acknowledged threat is likely to produce audience costs for 
the leaders of India and Nigeria in the form of lower approval ratings and diminished reputation. 
The reason is that the act of backing down is seen by large sections of the public as 
inconsistency, and a failure of leadership to uphold the national honor, commitment, and 
reputation. Thus, the second hypothesis postulates that: 
H2: Leaders that use force and are willing to fight the opposing country are less likely to suffer 
from audience costs regardless of the outcome of the military engagement compared to those 




Elite and Social Group Cues’ Effect on Audience Costs 
 
It is also necessary to review the theoretical framework and mechanisms through which elite 
and social group cues have been shown to affect public opinion on foreign policy issues. On 
the one hand, elite cue theory postulates that people’s attitudes are shaped by leaders’ political 
positions in a top-down process (Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2016; 
Guisinger & Saunders, 2017). Elite cue givers are defined as heads of states, high-ranking 
political officials, parties, and army generals (Golby & Feaver & Dropp, 2018).74 As a top-
down elite-driven theory of public opinion, the fundamental premise is that the public is 
“rationally ignorant” across a wide variety of policy issues as they are too distant from their 
daily lives (Rosenau, 1965; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000; Berinsky, 2007, 2009; Zaller, 1992). 
The existence of this asymmetry of information between the elites and the public creates the 
demand for cues, providing relevant information for the decisions to be made (Baum & 
Groeling, 2010; Colaresi, 2007). For instance, elites’ interpretation of an event often can be 
more consequential to the public’s position than other factors (Baum & Groeling, 2009).75  
The literature identifies four mechanisms through which elite cues could shape individuals’ 
attitudes in international and domestic political contexts. First, individuals’ attitudes are more 
likely to be influenced when the cue is communicated by a person an “expert” (Golby & Feaver 
& Dropp, 2018).76 The second mechanism operates when individuals seek a “second opinion” 
as a measure of reassurance. It works well when the cue is communicated by an actor, perceived 
 
74 Recently scholars have also included foreign leaders (Murray, 2014; Hayes & Guardino, 2011) and international 
institutions (Thompson, 2006; Peace & Brewer, 2008; Chapman, 2011). 
75 There are relatively few studies on authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes that map the interaction 
between elite cues and the public’s foreign policy positions. Bell and Quek (2017) do focus on the Chinese public 
opinion about war but not in the frame of elite cues. Nevertheless, the authoritarian regime studies do offer some 
evidence that public opinion in authoritarian regimes is a factor which leaders consider when taking policy 
decisions (Rosato, 2003).   
76 Defined as a person generally considered to possess detailed knowledge on the policy issues.  
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as a nonpartisan, independent expert. 77  Third is how similar are the political views of 
respondents and the cue-giver. For instance, strong partisans tend to shift their views towards 
the position held by the relevant political party across salient questions.78 Finally, respondents’ 
attitudes might be affected if the cue-giver expresses an unexpected opinion on a policy issue 
(Chapman, 2012; Crawford & Sobel, 1982).   
On the other hand, social cue theory 79  similarly assumes that individuals are “rationally 
ignorant” on most political issues, preferring to rely on their social networks to make the 
decision (Bernheim, 1994; Turner, 1982; Fiske, 2004). Groups such as unions, ethnicities, and 
socio-economic classes, are at the center of social cue theory as their members have a 
psychological affinity towards them (Le Bon, 1896; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1944; 
Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Hackman & Katz, 2010). The recent decline 
of formal membership in social and political organizations (Putnam, 2000) could have 
magnified the effects of social networks on individuals’ attitudes on political issues (Huckfeldt 
& Sprague, 1995, Klofstad, 2007, Nickerson, 2008; Sinclair, 2012, Sokhey & McClurg, 2012). 
Thus, respondents look for information from others with similar political preferences, and they 
tend to align their attitudes to the social groups they identify with (Mann & Sinclair, 2013; 
Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1944). 
These social networks serve as the individuals’ information channels which can affect their 
attitudes on a variety of policy issues (Checkel, 1997; Fanis, 2011; Clarkson et al. 2013; Viser 
& Mirable, 2004).80  
 
77 See (Grieco, at el., 2011) 
78 See (Bartels, 2002; Baum, & Groeling, 2009; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Gaines et al., 2007; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006; Zaller, 1992; Gerber & Green, 1999). 
79 Elite Cue theory relies on the same assumption.  
80 Studies in social comparison theory provide further evidence of the group incentive to conform, even in the 




Social group cues affect individuals’ attitudes and behavior through two mechanisms. First, 
individuals tend to conform to the policy position of groups that share their political views81 
(Mendelberg, 2002; Radzisweski, 2013). The second mechanism through which social group 
cues operate consists of individuals’ search for a “second opinion”.82 For instance, people are 
exposed continuously to politically relevant social group cues through new channels and 
dozens of social media platforms, especially during election campaigns.83 
Elite and social group cues84 are often described as “heuristics85” used by the actors in the 
decision-making process to avoid the efforts necessary for the collection of a large amount of 
information that could inform the individual voters’ decisions on political issues of the day86 
(Downs, 1957; Carprini & Keeter, 1996; Sniderman & Brody & Tetlock, 1991; Gulens & 
Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Bullock, 2011). As a direct result of these incentives 
held by the individual voters, the public becomes susceptible to elite87 and social group cues88 
in shaping its level of approval or disapproval of the government’s policies. The power of cues 
in shaping public opinion and the modern day’s information environment, enabling them to be 
heard by the vast majority of citizens, makes them a target of constant interest to scholars and 
practitioners in the policy community.89 Examples of this trend can be found in India’s political 
context, including their leaders’ social media campaigns aimed at informing their party 
supporters and garner new ones.90 Some scholars would even  contend that due to the public’s 
 
81 Homophily  
82 The mechanism of searching for a second opinion is also observed in elite cues.   
83 See Gerber and Rogers (2009) and Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Panagopoulos (2013) 
84 Definition: a is traditionally defined as a message which individuals could use to make an inference and 
subsequently a decision on the discussed subject (see Bullock, 2011, p. 497). 
85 Others could use the term “cognitive shortcuts”.  
86 Many of which are considered distant from our daily lives as well as the influence of issue specific knowledge 
on respondents’ attitudes.  
87 Defined as party cues, see Zaller (1992) and Berinsky, (2009). 
88 Including the workplace, social media, and local community.  
89 For studies on the stability of fundamental political issues, see Page and Shapiro (1992) and Bell and Quek 
(2017).  
90 Sinha (2017) 
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use of elite and social group cues, they are able to make a timely decision with the available 
information whether to support or oppose the proposed policy91 (Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 
1991). Knowing that and consequently applying it to audience cost scenarios, it can be said 
that political parties and social groups will strive to target their respective audiences with 
messages endorsing or opposing the way the leader has handled the crisis.92  
Democratic regimes93 will be relatively more effective in producing audience costs for a leader 
than backing down after escalating but fail to follow through on their commitment without 
clear justification. The negative consequences could be losing seats in the national assembly94, 
losing national elections, or being forcefully removed from office (Edwards, 1997; Tomz, 2007; 
Weeks, 2008). Frequently citizens place high salience on foreign policy issues such as the 
country’s rivalry with China and Pakistan. For instance, Vaishnav (2015) argues that in the 
political context of India, the state of the economy is a major salient issue that can determine 
electoral success in the general election.95 However, the two dominant political parties - Indian 
National Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party need to balance their economy-focused 
election platforms with stances on interethnic and security issues relevant for their Indian 
constituents.96 It is reasonable then to argue that elite and social group cues might moderate the 
public’s willingness to approve or disapprove of how the national leader has handled the 
situation with the  opposing country.97 By taking the potential cue effects into account the study 
 
91 This might be of particular importance to national leaders as they need to know whether the public will support 
or oppose the given policy.  
92 For a more general discussion on how elites and social groups frame messages according to their interests see 
(Zaller, 1992; Cobb & Kuklinski, 1997; Ching & Druckman, 2007; Jerit, 2009; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Brudger, 
2017).  
93 Some scholars present an increasingly convincing experimental evidence that even in authoritarian regimes 
leaders and political elites needs, at a minimum a moderately supportive public to pursue their foreign policy 
objectives. For more details see Bell and Quek (2017) work on China.   
94 See Tomz (2009) who finds that in the American political context members of the president’s party have higher 
chance to win seats in local or federal institution of the former maintains high levels of public support.  
95 https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/03/25/a-sampling-of-public-opinion-in-india/  
96 Ibid  




can better approximate the informational environment98 respondents might face before making 
their decision to approve or disapprove of the leader’s actions. Thus, I contend that, all else 
equal, elite, and social group cues can be expected to have an effect on the public’s willingness 
to approve or disapprove of the leader’s actions against opposing country during international 
security crises.  
To empirically test the claim that elite and social group cues affect the public’s willingness to 
punish their national leader99, the study utilizes the political influence of the two major political 
parties in India to represent the former, and a social group referred to as “people like you” to 
represent the latter.100 Thus, the paper explores; 1) the effect of elite consensus101, and 2) the 
effect of approving or disapproving social group cues102 - on voters’ willingness to punish their 
national leader for being inconsistent, despite escalating, in its actions against the opposing 
country in international security crises.103  
First, the public’s level of susceptibility to elite and social group cues varies across issues 
(Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009). The lack of clear incentives for the 
 
98 Approximately half of the Indian public has access to the internet.  
https://main.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PIR_04042019_0.pdf. Furthermore, studies have shown that people 
prefer information  from groups that conform to their initial political preferences (Munson & Resnick, 2010; Park 
et al. 2009;Kaplan & Haelein, 2010).  
99 Accounting for social and elite cues this study will present more evidence for the renewed debate around the 
question whether public opinion is influenced primarily by elites or it can also be shaped by cues from politically 
likeminded social groups (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; 
Page & Shapiro, 2010;  Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017).  
100This study used the general type of social group cues referring to a “group with similar political views” see 
Gilens and Murakawa (2002) and Kertze and Zeitzoff (2017).  
101 Expressed to participants as a bipartisan support for the prime minister’s handling of the security crisis.  
102 As in Tomz’s (2007) study the level of political engagement has been shown to affect respondents’ willingness 
to punish their leaders.  
103 To the best of the author’s knowledge these questions have remained unexplored. Expectedly the majority of 
evidence in support of the existence of audience costs originate from major western democracies such as the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Canada (see Ganguly & Hellwig & Thompson, 2016) with one exception – Costa 
Rica see Hurwitz, Peffley, and Seligson (1993). Thus, studying the theory’s validity in the context of major non-
western democracies could present additional benefits in addition to theory confirmation, or improvement. This 
issue is further discussed in the research design section.   
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public to stay informed104 about the best approach to tackle security threats from rival countries 
in the region might make its attitude more susceptible to cues from the country’s political 
parties and individuals’ self-referenced social groups105. Importantly, the issue of security 
policy may not always have clear solutions, which106 might increase the uncertainty under 
which the public needs to decide whether to support or oppose certain policies. As a result of 
the protracted nature of Indian’s international rivalries in the context of renewed big power 
competition, especially with China and Pakistan, sections of the public might hold different 
views on what is the right approach to deal with these long-standing issues. Perhaps, due to 
this dynamic, the public is being polarized on the issue of approving or opposing their leader’s 
decision to back down or engage the opposing country. I contend that because of the uncertain 
results of each of the possible responses by the government, respondents’ position will be 
susceptible to cues from political parties and social groups with shared political views that can 
give some further backing to one position or the other. In such circumstances, subjects will 
tend to rely on the available cues from politically relevant groups107 to decide whether they 
should sanction their leader’s actions or support them.108 Specifically, social group cues could 
also affect the public’s willingness to inflict audience costs upon their leader through the need 
for conformity. In addition, it can be expected that subjects will also seek a “second opinion” 
to make a decision as studies dealing among western publics have repeatedly shown (Page & 
Shapiro, 1992; Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). 
 
104  Perhaps importantly because the country insurgent groups affect particular regions of India and not the 
country’s entirety.  
105 Referring to the situation in which respondents are presented with information about the positions of others 
“like you” on the given policy issue. See Mann and Sinclair (2013).   
106 For more details on the distinction between hard and easy issues and how they affect voter behavior, see 
Carmines and Stimson (1980).  
107 Recent findings suggests that the effect on public opinion from cues by non-elite social groups could have the 
same effect or even stronger than traditionally used elite cues from the country’s political parties. See Kertzer and 
Zeitzoff (2017) and Alab, Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling (2011).  
108 It is not uncommon that some domestic political issues, especially those pertaining to security could have 
received more attention by the Indian media and as a result affect the sample’s respondents by creating 
“pretreatment effects” as Druckman and Leeper (2012) point.  
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Respondents’ psychological affinity towards ideologically similar groups could be even 
stronger in complex issues such as domestic security (Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1968; 
Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 
2013). For instance, the perceived similarity of interests might lead to conformity with the 
group’s position on the issue despite the clear indication that the Indian government’s portrayal 
of its security policies to be in the national interest. Taking this into account, it is reasonable to 
argue that in the Indian political context, the average respondent’s level of approval or 
disapproval will be affected by the social groups’ message, regardless how the leader has 
decided to respond to the opposing country’s provocation. Therefore, to test the effect of 
approving (endorsing) and disapproving (opposing) social group cues, upon the public’s 
willingness to punish their leader the following hypothesis is framed:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Respondents are more likely to shift their choice to approve or disapprove 
of their leader handling of the crisis to match that of the social group cue they have been 
exposed to, regardless of the type of action against the opposing country.  
Second, the reaction of the country’s political elites has been shown to influence the size of 
audience costs that leaders might suffer (Halling, 1984; Levendusky & Horowtiz, 2012; Schulz, 
1998). Having more information at their disposal than the public, political parties109 could 
influence the public’s willingness to punish the leader (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007). The 
country’s political parties can present a message of consensus or division concerning the 
leader’s handling the situation with the opposing country. In cases of elite consensus, the public 
is presented with a strong message that their leader’s actions against the opposing country were 
adequate to protect the national interest, even in the scenarios in which the decision to back 
 
109 This effect has been established in the United States.  
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down has been made.110 Hence, strong bipartisan signals supporting the leader’s actions can be 
expected to affect respondents’ attitudes by moderating the really around-the-flag phenomena 
across the political spectrum and moderate the magnitude of audience costs that the leader is 
predicted to incur.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Respondents are more likely to shift their choice to approve or disapprove 
of their leader handling of the crisis to match that of the elite cue they have been exposed to, 
regardless of the type of action against the aggressor country. 
 
 
Research Design and Data 
 
The study’s survey experiments in India and Nigeria follow the design first pioneered by Tomz 
(2007) to capture the micro-foundations of the claims that backing down or losing the military 
engagement could all produce rewards for the political leaders. I ground the scenarios in the 
current Indian and Nigerian political contexts to better capture respondents’ willingness to 
approve or disapprove of their leaders’ handling of international security crises. The 
experimental designs provide further insights into the study’ main questions: 1) whether 
Indians and Nigerians tend to reward their leaders for using force as in major western countries, 
2) whether leaders are rewarded with higher approval ratings and reputational gains for their 
willingness to fight, regardless of the outcome of the military engagement. The experiments 
were conducted between 2019 to 2021 and proceeded as follows. First, respondents were 
presented with a battery of demographic questions and interest in politics; all adapted to the 
 
110 For work on how such a consensus among elites affects respondents’ decisions see (Baum & Groeling, 2009). 
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countries’ socio-political context. Second, respondents were asked about their political 
dispositions – militarism and internationalism. Participants were presented with an introductory 
script stating that they will read about a hypothetical but realistic situation that their country 
has faced in the past and would likely face again in the future. Then, participants were asked 
to read a short paragraph describing the belligerent actions of the opposing country.  
Next, the study randomly assigned respondents to one of the five scenarios shown in Table 6, 
describing what actions their leader has undertaken as a direct response to the opposing country 
during the crisis. In treatment group 1) The opposing country does not comply with the threat 
while the Indian or Nigerian leader decides to deescalate by backing down; 2) The opposing 
country does not comply, and the Indian or Nigerian leader decides to use force; 3) The leader 
has decided to use force against the non-compliant country, but the Indian or the Nigerian army 
conducts a largely unsuccessful military operation that is seen as a loss; 4) Scenario four 
mimics the third one but with the difference that while conducting a successful military 
operation the Indian or Nigerian army suffers significantly more casualties than the opposing 
country; 5) In contrast, scenario five informed respondents that the military has conducted an 
unsuccessful military operation, however, its forces have inflicted more casualties on the 
opposing country’s armed forces.  
Following the treatment, respondents’ answers were recorded on the study’s primary dependent 
variable on a five-point Likert scale indicating their level of agreement or disagreement with 
the leader’s decision to back down or engage the opposing country.111 Participants were also 
asked to what degree they think that their leader’s handling of the crisis has damaged their 
country’s reputation, the results of which can be seen in the Appendix. In the post-treatment 
 
111 For experiment 2 and 3 in India and with the Nigerian student sample I used 11 point scale which was then 
dichotomized into a binary scale before analysis.  
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questions, I also asked participants to record the list of emotions they have experienced with 
the purpose of capturing some of the fundamental causal mechanisms that determine the 
public’s willingness to impose audience costs upon learning how their leader has handled the 
crisis and its outcome. None of the experimental vignettes indicated the political regime of the 
opposing country. For the Indian vignettes, I used a hypothetical country but also scenarios in 
which the opposing country is Pakistan or China. For the Nigerian sample, I only used a 
hypothetical country but asked respondents to indicate the country they were thinking about.  
 
Table 6: Design of the Experiments 
Treatment 
Groups 
















Experiments four and five112 were conducted only among Indian respondents from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk platform in 2019 and incorporate the endorsement messages from elite or 
social groups cues.113 Experiment four consists of 1600 Indian respondents and follows a 2x3 
design to test the effect of the individual party endorsements that the two major political 
parties114 have on Indians’ willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader’s handling of 
the crises with the rebel group. And experiment five incorporates 1800 Indian respondents with 
a 4x2 design. The elite cues were symbolized by the two major parties in India, the Bharatiya 
Janata Party and the Indian National Congress Party. To capture the elite cues’ effect, the study 
randomly manipulated whether respondents received the treatment revealing the position taken 
by Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian National Congress Party, or the scenario in which they 
 
112 Only for India.  
113 Regularly used to capture respondents’ susceptibility to audience costs, see Davies and Johns (2013). 
114 Grounded in the context of Indian party politics.  
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are not informed about any of the parties’ positions. For example, “The Bharatiya Janata party 
have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister’s handling of the situation;// The 
Indian National Congress party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister’s 
handling of the situation”  which can be either backing down or following through by engaging 
the threat. Some respondents were also presented with a bipartisan endorsement by both the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian National Congress Party or the scenarios in which they are 
not informed about any of the parties’ positions. The elite cue informs respondents that both 
parties support the prime minister’s actions, indicating a bipartisan consensus.115 Conversely, 
a portion of the respondents receive a social group cue informing them that “ For reference in 
a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated 
that they disapprove of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.” See the Appendix for 
the list of the treatment groups in experiments four and five.    
 
The study’s four non-probability samples of Indian respondents were recruited on Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk with an average completion time of 12-13 minutes. Respondents from most 
of India’s regions participated, and their access to the study relied on four criteria: 1) be at least 
18 years of age 2) be able to read and comprehend English 3) have Indian citizenship and reside 
in the country, and 4) they need to have completed a minimum of 50 approved tasks as recorded 
in their work history116. The study’s Nigerian sample relied on English speaking undergraduate 
students currently enrolled in several of the countries’ major public universities.117  
 
115 See Appendix B.8 for the list of the full text.  
116 These measures are regularly used to decrease the possibility that the respondents in India are providing 
fraudulent answers. See Appendix for the samples’ characteristics.  
117 The Nigerian Universities were List of the Universities: University of Nigeria Southwest;  University of 
Abuja; North-Central University of Agriculture Abeokuta; Lagos State University; Niger Delta University; 
Delta State University Abraka.  
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The study relies on the work by Drunckman and Kam (2011), Berinsky, Gregory, Huber, and 
Gabriel (2012), who successfully demonstrate that using convenience118 and student samples 
allows scholars to successfully study the causal mechanisms of theories while allowing for the 
production of results generalizable among the targeted population. In addition, drawing from 
Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz’s (2006) work, this study’s inference does not depend on capturing 
the attitudes of any specialized decision making groups such as military officers, local or 
national political representatives, as these groups often can demonstrate different attitudes 
concerning security issues compared to the average participants in convenience and university 
student samples. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that  recent studies such as that by 
Yarhi-Milo and Kertzer (2018) dispute the claim by presenting evidence that the elite decision 
makers’ attitudes are often in unison with the general public after controlling for their 
ideological affiliation. Finally, as Tomz (2007) and Bakker (2017) point out convenience and 
student samples on average tend to consist of more motivated, politically active, and educated 
respondents than the particular country’s general population, which do offer benefits. Most 
notably, the easily comparable results to other studies and the mapping of the views of countries’ 
active civilians which are more likely to influence the government due to their higher education, 
currently pursuing or already possessing a university degree, and their better socio-economic 
status. For example, the vignettes presented to the study’s Indian and Nigerian respondents 
were all in English, as the small pilot studies demonstrated well developed skills in the language 










Using the results from the survey experiments, I evaluate the expected audience costs effects 
by capturing respondents’ approval levels of the leaders’ handling of the international security 
crisis. First, hypothesis one is supported as nearly identical to the western publics, Indians, as 
well as Nigerians tend to have significantly higher levels of support for leaders who substantiate 
their threats with use force against the opposing country compared to backing down; thus, 
hurting the homeland’s reputation for resolve. Second, the results also largely support 
hypothesis two as Indian and Nigerian leaders might be better able to avoid audience costs 
domestically, even if they fight and lose the military engagement compared to backing down. 
Third, the results do not offer robust support for hypotheses three and four. The reason is that 
experiments four and five suggest that the elite and social group cues are moderators of the 
public’s level of approval and disapproval but are unable to negate the main effects of audience 
cost theory in international security crises. These findings are discussed in order below.  
 
Findings: Backing Down (H1) 
The findings from this study present robust support for hypothesis (H1), stating that leaders 
who back down in international crises are more likely to suffer audience costs. Table 7 outlines 
the base treatment effects presented in percentages across the experimental conditions. The 
percentage indicates the proportion of respondents who have chosen to support their leader’s 
handling of the international security crisis. The results show that, on average, Indians are about 
19%119  more supportive of leaders who have engaged the opposing country compared to 
backing down. The biggest treatment effect of 31% was evident among those Indian 
 
119 The effect ranges from 4% to 31%.  
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respondents who were informed that the opposing country is China which provides further 
support of the claim120 that well established rivalries do inflate the magnitude of the audience 
costs effects. Similarly, 43% of Nigerians approve of their leader’s decision to engage the 
opposing country compared to 18.5% when backing down, thus recording a substantial 
audience cost effect of approximately 24.5 percentage points. Across both countries, an effect 
of such size on the leader’s approval can influence his decision-making during international 
security crises.  
Next, in Figure 9, I formally test whether the treatment effects are statistically significant using 
regression models while controlling for several demographic and political covariates. The 
baseline group is the scenario in which the country’s leader has decided to back down after the 
opposing country has not complied with any of the public threats. Models 1-2 include the 
results from the vignettes with the hypothetical country, Models 3-4 incorporate the scenarios 
with Pakistan and China, while Model 5 presents the Nigerian results. The regression results 
demonstrate robust support for hypothesis one (H1) by indicating that leaders are significantly 
more likely to suffer from audience costs when they decide to back down compared to engaging 
the opposing country. The only exception is the India-Pakistan vignette in Module 2, where the 
treatment effect does not reach statistical significance. 
 
 



























Engage Win 94.6 92.5 88.5 87.3 43.1 
 














































Note: Table 7 reports the base treatment effects in percentage across each of the scenarios. The perception 
indicates the proportion of respondents have chosen to support their leader’s handling of the international security 
crisis. The percentages in each column are rounded and because of that they may not sum to 100 because they are 
rounded. The ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown in the parentheses.  
 
 
Findings: Willingness to Fight (H2) 
To examine hypothesis two’s (H2) expected base treatment effects, I turn to Table 7, and the 
results do offer some suggestive evidence in line with the claim that leaders’ willingness to 
fight will better protect them from incurring domestic audience costs, even if the military 
engagement proves to be unsuccessful. For instance, the base treatment effects across the 
Indian and Nigerian participants range from 0 to 29 percentages points, thus suggesting that it 
might be safer for leaders to fight a losing war, even if the opponent has fewer capabilities, 
than backing down. However, as the results on Figure 1 demonstrate, if a more systematic 
analysis is applied using logistic regression models with controls, there is no robust evidence 
in support for hypothesis three’s (H2) claim that leaders’ willingness to fight can reduce the 
probability that they will suffer audience costs, regardless of the outcome of the military 
intervention. The Indian public in experiment one, across the hypothetical country and Pakistan 
scenario, does not demonstrate higher levels of support for leaders who use force and lose the 
military engagement. Still, I do find that the Indian respondents in experiment two are more 
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likely to approve of leaders who win the engagement but suffer more casualties or lose the 
engagement and incur less casualties than the opposing country. Similarly, I do not find support 
for hypothesis two (H2) among the Nigerian participants because they are significantly more 
likely to approve of leaders who use force but lose the military engagement. Hence, these 
findings largely do not corroborate the work by Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui’s (2021) work 
among the Pakistani public indicating that the public could be more risk-acceptant when 
deciding to support or oppose short term military operations, especially in the context of long-




Figure 9: Main Effects – Public Support for the Leader in Foreign Security Crises. Dependent 
variables: Leader Approval 
 
Note: The Figure presents the logistic regression results with binary dependent variables of approval. The baseline 
is the treatment scenario in which the leader has backed down and not use force against the opposing country after 
issuing a public threat. The results are presented as odds ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals while 
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controlling for respondents’ level of militarism, internationalism, political interest, age, education, income, and 
their approval ratings of the leader.  
 
 
Findings: Indians and Nigerians’ view on Reputation 
 
Closely following on Lin-Greenberg (2019), the study also captured respondents’ views on 
how their leader’s handling of the security crisis has impacted the reputation of the country. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the 
statement that their leader’s actions during the crisis have damaged the country’s reputation. 
Based on audience costs theory, I expect that Indians and Nigerians will be eager to disapprove 
of inconsistent leaders as the latter often damage the country’s reputation for resolve and the 
country’s ability to induce compliance and concessions by others.  
In Table 50 using reputation as the dependent variable 121, the results largely corroborate the 
findings by Lin-Greenberg (2019) by demonstrating that Indians and Nigerians, similar to the 
Americans, British, and Chinese, perceive leaders who are inconsistent by backing down as 
having a negative effect on the country’s reputation. For hypothesis two (H2), I find that largely 
Indians and Nigerians do not perceive an unsuccessful military response by their leader as 
diminishing the country’s reputation relative to the baseline group. The one exception is Model 
4 in experiment two in India, the results of which show support for hypothesis two (H2) as 
Indians are more likely to perceive the scenario in which their leader fights a winning war,122 
but the Indian army suffers more casualties than the opposing side, as beneficial for the 
country’s reputation. In a similar fashion, situations in which leaders lose the military 
 
121 See the Appendix B.2 to B.4.  
122 More accurately, the engagement described in the treatments resembles an interstate military dispute (MID).  
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engagement but sustain fewer casualties than the opposing side do seem to benefit the leader’s 
reputation. Hence, I posit that they largely corroborate the attitudinal patterns among Indians 
and Nigerians, both of which tend not to perceive an unsuccessful military engagement as 
capable of reducing the country’s reputation more than backing down. Nevertheless, due to the 
paucity of the available data, more empirical work capturing the microfoundations in non-
western countries is needed to clearly examine the effects of fighting, incurring casualties, 
losing, or winning in the context of audience costs.  
 
Findings: The Effects of Elite and Social Group Endorsement Cues 
 
Experiments four and five’s treatments incorporate elite and social group cues123 that have been 
shown to be able to substantially moderate the size of the classic non-partisan audience costs.124 
By introducing one-party, bipartisan, and social group cues, the study is further able to test the 
theorized non-partisan audience cost effects of hypotheses three (H3) and four (H4) in the 
context of Indian politics. The two experiments also re-test the main effect of audience costs, 
that is subjects’ tendency to approve of leaders who engage the opposing country compared to 
those who back down, while also capturing the influence of endorsement cues on the approval 
levels and reputational costs. I randomized which respondents will receive the social group cue 
referring to the politically likeminded Indian voters, the majority of whom either support or 
oppose the prime minister actions. Likewise, some of the respondents were assigned to receive 
the one-party or bipartisan endorsement,125 revealing the position taken by the party coalitions 
 
123 Endorsements. For the regression Tables see Appendix B.5 and B.6. 
124 See Levendusky & Horowitz (2012); Evers & Fisher & Schaaf (2019).  
125 Elite Cue  
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led by Bharatiya Janata Party or the Indian National Congress Party. The party endorsements 
informed respondents that both parties support the prime minister’s actions or that neither of 
them clearly supports or opposes the prime minister’s handling of the situation. Similarly, 
respondents presented with a social group cue will read that “75% of Indians with your political 




Figure 10: Experiment 4 Approval and Vote. 
 
Note: Figure 10 presents the logistic regression results with binary dependent variables of approval and vote. The 
baseline is the treatment scenario in which the leader has backed down and not use force against the opposing 
country after issuing a public threat. The results are presented as odds ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals 
while controlling for respondents’ level of militarism, internationalism, political interest, age, education, income, 
and their approval ratings of the leader. 
 
 





Figure 10 presents the main effects of experiment four. The results provide strong evidence in 
support of hypothesis one (H1) that the public will tend to impose audience costs upon their 
leaders for backing down against aggressor countries in international security crises. The 
results support hypothesis two (H2) as leaders who engage, but their military operation proves 
to be unsuccessful are still likely to be rewarded by the public with higher approval ratings, 
votes, and an improvement of their and the country’s reputation. Surprisingly, these results 
suggest that using force and losing the military engagement might be safer, for democratic 
leaders, in terms of their approval ratings, voting base, and reputation, than backing down.  
Turning to the effect of the group oppose cue127 it can be observed that it consistently reduces 
the effect size of the underlying audience costs logic across the treatment groups, but for 
Models 1 and 2, respondents are still significantly more likely to approve and vote for their 
leader.128 Nonetheless, it does seem that the social group’s opposition has reduced participants’ 
willingness to point out that the country and prime minister’s reputation to insignificance. In a 
similar dynamic, I find that the effects from the group endorse and the elite endorse cue on 
approval and voting remain significant, while it fails to convince respondents’ that the prime 
minister’s handling of the crisis has improved or damaged the country or his reputation.129 
The design of experiment five incorporates two major differences.130 First, the scenario in 
which leaders decide to stay out of the crisis by not issuing any threats is omitted. Second, in 
contrast, to experiment four’s bipartisan endorsement, respondents were presented with the 
classic elite cue in the form of a single party endorsement by manipulating the position of the 
 
127 Social group cue opposes the prime minister handling of the crisis.  
128 See Appendix .B.5   
129 See Appendix B.5 .  
130 It is important to stress that main texts of the vignettes are identical to experiment three.  
79 
 
two major parties in India, the BJP and the INC. The two elite cues allow for the 
implementation of an original test of the effect of partisanship on Indians’ foreign policy 
attitudes and to what extent they can produce preference reversals in contradiction to the 
expected non-partisan audience cost effects.131 
Turning to Figure 11 132  it outlines the main effects of experiment five. As in the other 
experiments, the results present strong evidence in support of hypothesis one (H1) that the 
public will impose audience costs upon leaders who decided to back down against aggressor 
countries in international security crises. The overall effect of the BJP endorsement133 does not 
follow the theoretical expectations and, in fact, reduces respondents’ approval of the leader’s 
handling of the crisis. Conversely, the INC’s endorsement of the prime minister’s decision to 
use force134 does not significantly affect respondents’ willingness to reward the leader with 
higher approval rates, vote, or improvement in reputation.135 
 
131 Evers, Fisher, and Schaaf (2019) 
132 For the regression results presented in odds ratios see Appendix B.6.  
133 Elite Cue – See Appendix B.6.  
134 To engage the opposing country.  




Figure 11: Experiment 5 Approval: Vote. 
 
Note: Figure 11 presents the logistic regression results with binary dependent variables of approval and vote. The 
baseline is the treatment scenario in which the leader has backed down and not use force against the opposing 
country after issuing a public threat. The results are presented in odds ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals 
while controlling for respondents’ level of militarism, internationalism, political interest, age, education, income, 
and their approval ratings of the leader.  
 
I also subset the sample based on participants self-selected political party affiliation to explore  
the potential existence of heterogenous effects. The results clearly indicate that when the 
current ruling party in India, the BJP, endorses the prime minister’s decision to engage the 
opposing country, the approval rate approximately doubles (p=0.01). 136  It also makes 
respondents much more likely to vote for their leader compared to the baseline condition of 
backing down, which provides further support for hypotheses one (H1) and two (H2) in Models 
1,2, and 3. Comparatively, the INC’s endorsement of the prime minister’s decision to use force 
 
136 See Appendix B.5 and B.6.   
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shows that across the four models, respondents’ are significantly more likely to approve, vote, 
and perceive that the handling of the crises has improved both the country and the prime 
minister’s reputation.137 Nevertheless, the size of the expected treatment effect is less than that 
generated by the BJP endorsement. Importantly, the substantive results remain the same when 
we subset and test by the BJP and INC elite cues, including only non-Tamils and/or Hindu138 
respondents. 139  Perhaps not surprisingly, running the models only on Hindu respondents 
produces an even larger effect of approval for the prime minister who has decided to engage 
the aggressor country. Thus, experiment four presents additional evidence that reinforces the 
main findings that Indian respondents are ready to impose audience costs, in the form of lower 
approval, lesser willingness to vote, and reputational damages, upon their leaders if they decide 
to back down after publicly issuing a threat.   
Since the findings in experiments four and five might be due to the characteristic of the sample, 
I evaluated the result from the models again on three subsets of the sample: non-Tamils, Hindus, 
and those participants who have passed the post-treatment manipulation check. The results 
from the three sample subsets do not differ from the main results presented in Figures 2 and 
3.140 Therefore, the results from experiments four and five suggest that elite and social group 
cues are moderators of the public’s level of approval and disapproval but are unable to negate 
the main effects of audience cost theory in international security crises among Indian 
respondents.   
 
 
137 See Appendix B.5 and B.6. 
138 Respondents who have selected Hinduism as their religious affiliation. 
139 See Appendix B.5. and B.6.  





The study’s findings make several contributions to the audience costs literature. First, it uses 
original survey experiments to explore audience cost theory’s core claim that leaders who back 
down are more likely to be punished (Schultz, 2001; Baum, 2004). As expected, the results 
demonstrate that audience cost theory’s main claim is valid across countries as leaders who 
back down are consistently more likely to lose office. These findings are important for filling 
the literature gaps as they present novel evidence clearly supporting the cross-country validity 
of the microfoundations of audience costs theory in India and Nigeria, which are major non-
western democracies with current and past military interstate disputes 141  and active 
involvement in international security issues. Hence, using new data from survey experiments 
to test audience cost theory’s postulate that leaders will suffer audience costs when backing 
down during international crises, this study corroborated the findings from quantitative, 
comparative case studies, and experimental studies that leaders tend to be penalized by the 
public for inconsistency.   
Second, the results from the survey experiments in India and Nigeria provide evidence in 
support of the argument that democratic leaders might be safer in terms of their approval ratings 
and reputation, even if they use force in an international security crisis, regardless of the 
outcome of the military engagement. From a policy perspective, it might be safer for leaders to 
fight regardless of the result of the engagement, or the incurred military casualties, as this is 
likely to increase their approval ratings and receive reputational gains compared to backing 
down. Thus, similar to Clary, Lalwani, and Siddiqui’s (2021) findings, the results from this 
 
141 To the best of the authors’ knowledge, we are not aware of any studies testing audience cost theory in India or 
Nigeria through the experimental method. 
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study cautiously suggest that the public in democracies might also reward its leaders for their 
willingness to act and fight regardless of whether the military engagement was and the 
distribution of casualties between their soldiers and the opposing side’s military personal. 
Third, building on the rich set of experimental studies, this study presented an original 
empirical test of audience cost theory’s 142  microfoundations in two major non-western 
democracies. The results confirm audience costs internal and external validity among Indian 
and Nigerian respondents, which is particularly important as for years, the majority of 
experimental evidence originated from developed western countries such as United States, 
United Kingdom, Sweden, and Canada (Ganguly & Hellwig & Thompson, 2016). Naturally, 
the results from the study also support the proposition that the fundamental mechanisms of 
audience cost work during the escalation phrases of domestic and international crises among 
Indian and Nigerian respondents are similar to what has been found in western developed 
democracies and in China. Further suggesting that leaders who make threats and mobilize the 
military but subsequently back down will be more likely to suffer from lower approval rates 
(Tomz, 2009). The study’s results demonstrated that similar to the American and the British 
public, Indians and Nigerians are equally willing to impose audience costs upon their national 
leaders in international security crises across religion, ethnicity, income, education, and party 
affiliation in a period of renewed military interstate disputes and big power competition. 
Consequently, the study provides additional insights when leaders might have incentives to use 
force and whether they can afford to escalate or not, as they will be aware of electoral and 
reputational costs of inconsistency. Backing down and not using force against the opposing 
country can be particularly detrimental for the leader's approval rating as in such crises, the 
public is likely to experience "rally-behind the flag phenomena," making any concessions to 
 
142 (Tomz, 2007; Quek, 2017; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Davies and Johns, 2013; Kertzer & Brutger, 2017; 
Evers & Fisher & Schaff, 2019).  
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the opposing side costly for the government. Thus, the study’s findings are a cautious first step 
demonstrating that the microfoundations of audience cost theory are valid and work in a similar 
way among the Indian and Nigerian publics as in major western democracies and China. 
Fourth, the study examined the effect of single party, bipartisan and social group cues on Indian 
voters’ willingness to impose audience costs on national leaders based on their decision in the 
context of international security crises. The results extend previous findings by suggesting that 
Indian respondents’ attitudes are also moderated by elite and social group cues sharing their 
political views143 in a similar manner as American and European constituencies (Dempsey, 
1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 
2010; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017; Dunckan, 2001; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; 
Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998). For example, the elite cues presented as 
bipartisan endorsements,144 shown to induce strong notions of national interest among the 
public, did reduce the expected base effects of audience costs by shifting participants’ choices 
toward the position held by their party regardless of the scenario.145 Similarly, the results from 
the social group cue demonstrate that respondents’ do look for information from groups that 
share their political preferences, and they are likely to confirm with their position (Mann & 
Sinclair, 2013; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & 
Berelson, 1944).  
Perhaps unexpectedly, the elite endorse cue moderated but failed to produce a choice shift by 
mobilizing significantly higher support among Indians for leaders who have decided to stay 
out of the conflict in contrast to the group endorse cue. A potential explanation could be that 
 
143 See (Dunckan, 2001; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Kertzer 
& Zeitzoff, 2017).  
144 Defined as party cues (see Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009). 
145 See (Bartels, 2002; Baum, & Groeling, 2009; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Gaines et al., 2007; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006; Zaller, 1992; Gerber & Green, 1999). 
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social group cues by politically like-minded nationals (co-partisans) tend to induce more 
substantial shifts in the public’s choices than even bipartisan party endorsements, which 
matches the finding by Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017).146 Nonetheless, by comparing the effects 
of elite and social group cues, it becomes apparent that only several of them successfully 
induced choice shifts among respondents147148 (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; 
Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 
2017). Despite their underperformance, elite and social group cues moderate the classic 
audience cost in international security crises. Still accounting for bipartisan-elite and social 
group cues, this study added more comparative evidence for the renewed debate whether public 
opinion is influenced primarily by elites, or it can also be shaped by cues from politically like-
minded social groups (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & 
Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). Therefore, 
despite their weaker effect than theoretically expected, the results do suggest that bipartisan 
and social group cues moderate respondents’ approval levels, willingness to vote and 
perception of an improved reputation of the country and their prime minister across the 
scenarios and, in some cases, successfully inducing preference shifts.  
Future work on the relationship between audience costs in international security crises could 
focus on several different aspects. First, as Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) and Evers, Fisher, 
and Schaaf (2019) point, scholars can test whether leaders could avoid audience costs by 
justifying their decision based on new information to the public in non-western democracies.149 
Specifically comparing countries without and counties with current or recent military interstate 
 
146 Ordinary co-partisans among the public.  
147 The mechanism of searching for a second opinion is also present in elite cues.   
148 See Gerber and Rogers (2009) and Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Panagopoulos (2013).  
149 For research exploring how leaders’ justification influences the public see (Gowa, 1999; Levendusky & 
Horowitz, 2012; Saunders, 2015). For instance, the leader could argue that the government backed down because 
that was the right strategic decision to make.  
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disputes or interventions are of especial interest for the further testing and consolidation of the 
theory’s microfoundations. Second, studies can disentangle the empirical claim that citizens’ 
pre-determined policy preferences guide their responses and whether they are willing to impose 
audience costs on their leader due to belligerency or inconsistency concerns during the crisis is 
inconsequential to their level of approval or disproval (Snyder & Borghard, 2011; Downes & 
Sechser, 2012; Chaudoin, 2014; Kertzer & Brutger, 2016). For example, one approach will be 
to test whether the dispositional differences between liberal-internationalist compared to 
conservative-militaristic leaning respondents in non-western democracies tend to impose 
audience costs upon their national leaders differently based on their belligerence or inconsistent 
concerns. Third, more work could be done to test the effects on respondents’ willingness to 
impose audience costs after being informed about the position of international institutions,150 




150 Such as the United Nations or a regional security organization – NATO, etc.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: IN SEARCH OF DOMESTIC AUDIENCE COSTS: EVIDENCE FROM 







Do national leaders suffer from audience costs for being inconsistent in domestic security crises? 
Due to the policy relevance of the issue, political scientists have long been interested in isolating 
the circumstances under which the public is more likely to inflict audience costs upon their 
leaders.152 One of the reasons for this scholarly interest in audience costs is the basic need of 
democratic governments to maintain a sufficient level of public support for their foreign and 
domestic policies (Jentleson & Britton, 1998; Toms & Weeks, 2013). Leaders are aware153 that 
their action or inaction against domestic security threats154 might create domestic audience costs 
leading to lost seats in the national assembly, experience a decrease  in popularity, lose elections, 
 
152 See Fearon (1994). 
153 There is evidence that leaders are aware of the prospects of audience cost both for them and their opponents, see 
Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012).  
154 Defined here as an insurgent group and referred to as rebels in the vignettes.  
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or be forcefully removed from office.155 Similar to foreign policy support for the use of force, the 
country’s counterterrorism policy often depends on public support to be implemented successfully. 
For instance, Indians and Nigerians are not strangers to domestic security crises since the two 
countries have been tackling multiple insurgencies with domestic and foreign backers on their 
territory after gaining independence (Mitra, 2005; Ukiwo at el (2011); Nwangwu & Onuoha & 
Nwosu & Ezeibe, 2020). Some of the still active non-state armed groups are the Maoists156, the 
NSCN157, Hizbul Mujahideen158, and Boko Haram159  among others. The Indian and Nigerian 
public repeatedly have been faced with the choice to support or oppose their leader’s actions 
against the insurgents. This exploratory study uses audience cost theory’s framework to investigate 
whether national leaders are likely to suffer from public disapproval when being inconsistent while 
attempting to start negotiations with the non-state armed actor responsible during domestic 
security crises. Thus, I argue that as in international security crises, leaders will be equally 
susceptible to audience costs when dealing with domestic security threats, such as non-state armed 
groups.160  
By testing these theoretical expectations, this study makes two contributions to the literature.  First, 
the results provide evidence in support of the notion that a broadly defined theoretical framework 
of audience costs can be successfully applied to model whether the public is likely to punish their 
leader for backing down against rebel groups in domestic security crises. Second, adding to the 
literature’s considerable number of studies that elite and social group cues heavily influence 
 
155 The last mode of regime change is primarily observed in autocratic regimes, see Weeks (2012).  
156 With a Communist Ideology  
157 National Socialist Council of Nagaland follows a mix between communist and ethnonationalist ideology.  
158 The group follows the ideology of radical Islam.   
159 Militant Islamic Organization.  
160 As in the classic Audience Cost application to international security crises. See Fearon (1994).  
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respondents’ attitudes in the form of endorsements,161 the study’s results present new data to 
suggest under what circumstances domestic politics can sway the public’s approval or disapproval 
levels of their leader’s actions against rebels’ groups, threatening the country’s domestic security.  
Empirically the study relies on two survey experiments with Indian and one with Nigerian 
respondents. Survey experiments are an established method in exploring the existence of audience 
cost as they allow the researcher to avoid the strategic selection bias, thus observing the effects of 
backing down or engaging the rebels during crises that otherwise might not have occurred due to 
leaders’ incentives to avoid inconsistency.162  
 
Domestic Security Crises and Audience Costs 
  
After Fearon’s (1994) classic work on audience cost theory, the fate of leaders who back down 
while being inconsistent has been a major focus of scholarly work. Audience cost theory postulates 
that leaders will be punished with lower approval ratings, a worsening reputation, and lower 
electoral support if they issue empty threats. Claiming generalizability across regimes, countries, 
and different political cultures, the theory predicts that the public will be less approving of leaders 
who back down because of two reasons. First, voters tend to perceive those leaders who back down 
against  foreign threats harm the country’s reputation for resolve and, as a result, are more willing 
 
161 See Dunckan (2001); Kuklinski & Hurley (1994); Lupia & McCubbins (1998); Petty & Wegener (1998); Kertzer 
& Zeitzoff (2017).  
162 See Shultz, 2001; Bam, 2004; Tomz, 2007; 2009; Trager & Vavreck, 2011; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Davies 
and Johns, 2013; Brutger 2014; Chaudoin, 2014; Kertzer & Brutger, 2016).   
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to punish them (Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007). Second, voters perceive leaders who back down after 
issuing a threat but failing to act on it as less competent, thus not deserving their support (Schultz, 
1998; Schultz, 2001b; Weeks, 2008).   
Following on the experimental literature investigating the micro-foundations of audience cost 
theory (Tomz, 2007; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Johns & Davies, 2012; Kertzer & Brutger, 
2016; Evers & Fisher & Schaaf, 2019) this study builds upon it by examining Indians and 
Nigerians’ willingness to disapprove of their leaders’ actions during periods of escalation in 
domestic security crises. As a result, I posit that in such instances of inaction 163  and 
inconsistency164, it is reasonable to expect that leaders who back down while initiating negotiations  
with the non-state armed actor will be punished by their constituents for damaging the state’s 
reputation and national honor 165  in a similar pattern observed during international crises. 
Importantly, I do not claim that the dynamic of audience cost theory affects the leaders through 
the entire duration of the conflict with the non-state armed group as they can last for years or 
decades and experience stages of intensive and low-intensity violence.166 On the contrary, the main 
argument of the study is that those two domestic political factors moderate the level to which 
Indians and Nigerians are willing to punish their leaders for backing down by being inconsistent 
and attempting negotiations with non-state armed groups 167  during the escalation phases of 
domestic security crises. Thus, the study tests the working of audience costs theory in domestic 
security crises by focusing on two factors moderating the size and direction of audience costs 1) 
 
163 Defined as – deciding not to intervene and send the army – stay out.  
164 Bluffing, see Fearon (1994). 
165 Perhaps due to the rally-behind the flag phenomena, which will make any concession to the rebels hardly being 
able to be approved by the angry public and eager to punish them, see Groeling and Baum (2008). 
166 For a detailed examination of the state’s strategies in dealing with non-state armed actors domestically, see 
Staniland (2018).  
167 Rebel groups  
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the power disparity between the government force and the non-state actors, and 2) the effects of 
elite and social group cues on the public’s willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader’s 
handling of the domestic security crisis.  
 
The Asymmetric Distribution of Military Power 
 
The first factor is that rebel groups tend to have significantly less military power than the 
government they fight (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Due to this disparity in force projection and the 
heightened levels of fear and anxiety these groups instill into the civilian population168, I contend 
that these factors are likely to increase the public’s willingness to support the use of force and 
punish leaders who decide to back down and attempt negotiations.169 Specifically, the public’s 
increased level of anger following rebel attacks against military units or civilian targets can 
increase support for the use of force as a retaliation strategy. For instance, after the deadliest 
terrorist attack in Indian administrated Kashmir170 as well as Nigeria’s northern state of Borno, the 
public pressured the leaders of both countries respond by using force, against the rebel groups 
responsible.171 It is broadly assumed that by using force the leader of both countries decreased 
their chance of suffering from lower approval rates or reputational costs. Another example is the 
 
168 See Wayne (2018) for a comprehensive review of this literature. Forthcoming https://www.carlywayne.com/policy 
169 As some terrorism scholars suggest, it is exactly the response that the public many times desires after an attack by 
a rebel group (see Kydd & Walter, 2006). Furthermore, scholars have pointed that this is often the reason why rebels 
trigger state response and attack the public’s attention but rarely receive concessions by the government/s they target 




171 Jama at-e-Islami – even with the risk of triggering a military interstate dispute with the long-term rival Pakistan.  
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2015 operation by Indian special forces attacking a training base in the border region between 
India and Myanmar, belonging to the militant group National Socialist Council of Nagaland as a 
retaliation for the latter’s attack on an Indian army convoy.172 In addition, in early 2019, the Indian 
air force conducted one of its officially confirmed airstrikes against the rebel group as retaliation 
to an early terrorist attack on its soil.173 At the time, many domestic and international observers 
have pointed out that if the strongman prime minister of India backs down and or stays out and 
does retaliate, his reputation and approval ratings might have suffered. Similarly, since 2014 the 
Nigerian government has been fighting rebel group such as Boko Haram through counterterrorism 
operations, primarily in its northern regions, and even relying on transborder cooperation with 
neighboring countries (Cannon & Iyekekpolo, 2018). In addition, for several years, the Nigerian 
government was involved in repeated periods of escalation and de-escalation followed by 
negotiations with the Niger Delta militants in the south of the country (Chinwe & Duru, 2018).  
The domestic security dynamics in India and Nigeria are not isolated cases as many other countries 
such as Columbia, the Philippines, Mali, Ethiopia, Myanmar, among others, have and continue to 
face rebel groups involving dozens of escalation and de-escalation periods through their specific 
domestic security crises. Consequently, the study contends that during domestic security crises, 
leaders are presented with two levels of escalation: 1) leaders can send costly signals by verbal 
threats stating that they will deal with the rebels and punish their members for their actions; 2) a 
higher level of escalation can be observed when leaders enact curfews while giving sweeping 




173 https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1QF11Z  
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these two levels of escalation by a country’s government is the French President’s actions after the 
Paris Attacks and the decision of the government of Sri Lanka to make numerous arrests and enact 
a curfew following the Church Bombings. As a result, it can be argued that in such situations, 
leaders who decide to back down to attempt negotiations, after making threats towards the rebels 
and mobilizing the army, will suffer audience costs in a similar fashion to those during 
international security crises.174 Therefore, hypothesis one tests the claim that when rebel groups175 
escalate their use of violence, the public is more likely to disapprove of leaders who decide not to 
use force and are inconsistent by backing down to attempt peace negotiations. 
Hypothesis 1  (H1): The public is more likely to disapprove of their leader’s decision to back down 
and attempt negotiations after mobilizing the army and making public threats, compared to the 
decision to engage the rebels.176  
 
Elite and Social Group Cues and Audience Costs 
 
Do elite and social group cues moderate the public’s willingness to approve or disapprove of their 
leaders’ handling of the domestic security crisis? 177  To answer this question, I outline the 
theoretical framework and mechanisms through which elite cues have been shown to affect public 
opinion across domestic and foreign policy issues. Elite cue theory postulates that people’s 
attitudes are often shaped by their leaders’ political positions in a top-down process (Gilens & 
 
174 An example of the recent China-India border clashed with casualties https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
53118473  
175 The non-state actor.  
176 Representing the core claim of audience costs theory but applied to domestic security crises.  
177 The vignettes, including the cue treatments, were presented only to the Indian respondents.  
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Murakawa, 2002; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017; Guisinger & Saunders, 2017). Elite cue givers are 
defined as heads of states, high-ranking political officials, parties, and army generals (Golby & 
Feaver & Dropp, 2018).178 As a top-down elite-driven theory of public opinion, the fundamental 
premise is that the public is “rationally ignorant” across a wide variety of policy issues as they are 
too distant from their daily lives (Rosenau, 1965; Lupia & McCubbins, 2000; Berinsky, 2007, 
2009; Zaller, 1992). The existence of this asymmetry of information between the elites and the 
public creates the demand for cues, providing relevant information for the decisions to be made 
(Baum & Groeling, 2010; Colaresi, 2007). For instance, elites’ interpretation of an event often can 
be more consequential to the public’s position than other factors (Baum & Groeling, 2009).179  
Social cue theory180 similarly assumes that individuals are “rationally ignorant” on most political 
issues, preferring to rely on their social networks to make the decision (Bernheim, 1994; Turner, 
1982; Fiske, 2004). Groups such as unions, ethnicities, and socio-economic classes, are at the 
center of social cue theory as their members have a psychological affinity towards them (Le Bon, 
1896; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1944; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; 
Hackman & Katz, 2010). The recent decline of formal membership in social and political 
organizations (Putnam, 2000) could have magnified the effects of social networks on individuals’ 
attitudes on political issues (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995, Klofstad, 2007, Nickerson, 2008; Sinclair, 
2012, Sokhey & McClurg, 2012). Thus, respondents look for information from others with similar 
 
178 Recently scholars have also included foreign leaders (Murray, 2014; Hayes & Guardino, 2011), and international 
institutions (Thompson, 2006; Peace & Brewer, 2008; Chapman, 2011), 
179 There are relatively few studies on authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes that map the interaction 
between elite cues and the public’s foreign policy positions. Bell and Quek (2017) do focus on the Chinese public 
opinion about war but not in the frame of elite cues. Nevertheless, studies of authoritarian regimes do offer some 
evidence that public opinion in authoritarian regimes is taken into account by leaders when deciding between policies 
(Rosato, 2003; Li & Chen, 2020; Quek, 2017). 
180 Elite Cue theory relies on the same assumption.  
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political preferences, and they tend to align their attitudes to the social groups they identify with 
(Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Campbell & Converse & Miller & Stokes, 1960; Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & 
Berelson, 1944). These social networks’ serve as the individuals’ information channels which can 
affect their attitudes on a variety of policy issues (Checkel, 1997; Fanis, 2011; Clarkson et al. 2013; 
Viser & Mirable, 2004).181  
Elite and social group cues182 are often described as “heuristics183” used by the actors in the 
decision-making process to avoid the efforts necessary for the collection of a large amount of 
information that could inform the individual voters’ decisions on political issues of the day184 
(Downs, 1957; Carprini & Keeter, 1996; Sniderman & Brody & Tetlock, 1991; Gulens & 
Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Bullock, 2011). As a direct result of these incentives 
held by the individual voters, the public becomes susceptible to elite cues and social group 
cues185in shaping its level of approval or disapproval of the government’s policies. The power of 
cues in shaping public opinion and in the current information environment enables them to be 
heard by the vast majority of a country’s citizens, makes them targets of constant interest both 
from scholars and practitioners in the policy community.186 One example of this trend in the Indian 
political context is the current prime minister’s social media campaign, in particular, to inform its 
party supporters and garner new ones.187 Some scholars would even go as far to contend that due 
to the public’s use of elite cues in the form of party endorsements, they are able to make a timely 
 
181 Studies in social comparison theory provide further evidence of the group incentive to conform, even in the absence 
of pressure to do so (Isenberg,1986; Milgram, 1974; Sinclair, 2012; Asch, 1951; Stein, 2013; Brewer & Brown, 1998). 
182 Definition: a cue is traditionally defined as a message which individuals could use to make an inference, and 
subsequently a decision on discussed subject (see Bullock, 2011, p. 497). 
183 Other would use the term “cognitive shortcuts”  
184 Many of which are considered distant from our daily lives as well as influence of issue specific knowledge on 
respondent attitudes.  
185 Most often defined as party cues (see Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009). 
186 For studies on the stability of fundamental political issues see Page and Shapiro (1992) and Bell and Quek (2017).  
187 Sinha (2017) 
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decision with the available information whether to support or oppose the proposed policy188 
(Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991). Knowing that and consequently applying it to domestic 
audience cost scenarios it is natural that political parties strategically target their respective 
audiences with messages endorsing or opposing the way the leader has handled a number of 
situations, including security crises.189  
As suggested by Levendusky and Horowitz’s (2012) study, Democratic regimes 190  will be 
relatively more effective in producing audience costs for leaders who back down after escalating 
but fail to follow through on their commitment without providing clear justification. The negative 
consequences could be a damaged reputation, losing seats in the national assembly191, losing 
national elections, or being forcefully removed from office (Edwards, 1997; Tomz, 2007)192. It is 
not unusual for citizens to place high salience on the issue of dealing with internal security threats 
such as rebels (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). For instance, Vaishnav (2015) argues that in the political 
context of India, the state of the economy is a major salient issue that can determine electoral 
success in the general election. However, the two dominant political parties, the Indian National 
Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party and their coalition partners, need to balance their 
economy-focused election platforms with stances on interethnic and security issues in the 
country. 193  It is reasonable to argue that party endorsements might condition the public’s 
 
188 Which might be of particular importance to national leaders as they need to know whether the public will support 
or oppose the given policy.  
189 For a more general discussion on how elite cues frame message according to their interest see (Zaller, 1992; Cobb 
& Kuklinski, 1997; Ching & Druckman, 2007; Jerit, 2009; Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Brudger, 2017).  
190 A number of scholars have presented increasingly convincing evidence that even in authoritarian regimes, leaders 
and political elites need, at a minimum, a moderately supportive public to pursue their foreign policy objectives. For 
more details, see Bell and Quek’s (2017) work on China.   
191 See Tomz’s (2009) finding that in the American political context, members of the president’s party have a higher 
chance to win seats in local or federal institutions of the former maintains high levels of public support.  
192 See Weeks (2008).  
193 Ibid  
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willingness to approve or disapprove of how the national leader has handled the security crisis. By 
taking the potential effects from the party endorsements into account, the study can better 
approximate the informational environment 194  respondents might face before making their 
decision to approve or disapprove of the leader’s actions. Thus, I contend that all else equal, elite 
cues in the form of single-party endorsements or bipartisan consensus can have an effect on the 
public’s willingness to impose audience costs upon the leader’s actions against rebel groups in the 
escalation phrases during domestic security crises.195 
To empirically test the claim that elite and social group cues in the form of endorsements affect 
the public’s willingness to punish their national leader196, the study utilizes the political influence 
of the two major political parties in India, the BJP and INC.197 Thus, the paper explores the effect 
of the BJP and INC individual endorsements198 and bipartisan consensus on voters’ willingness to 
punish the Indian prime minister for being inconsistent or backing down against rebel groups in 
domestic security crises.199  
 
194Approximately half of the Indian public has access to the internet. 
https://main.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/PIR_04042019_0.pdf. Furthermore, studies have shown that people prefer 
to inform their political views from groups that conform to their initial political preferences (Munson & Resnick 
2010; Park et al. 2009) (Kaplan & Haelein, 2010).  
195 And by extension to that of the international Security Crises.  
196 Accounting for social and elite cues, this study will present more evidence for the renewed debate around the 
question whether public opinion is influenced primarily by elites or it can also be shaped by cues from politically 
likeminded social groups (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page 
& Shapiro, 2010;  Bullock, 2011; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017).  
197This study used messages from the country’s major political parties as the elite cues; see Gilens and Murakawa 
(2002) and Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017).  
198 As in Tomz’s (2007) study the level of political engagement has been shown to affect respondents’ willingness to 
punish their leaders.  
199 To the best of the author knowledge these questions have remained unexplored. Expectedly the majority of 
evidence in support of the existence of audience cost originate from major western democracies such as the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Canada (see Ganguly & Hellwig & Thompson, 2016) with one exception – Costa Rica see 
(Hurwitz, Peffley & Seligson 1993).  
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The public’s level of susceptibility to elite and social group cues varies across issues (Gilens & 
Murakawa, 2002; Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009). The lack of clear incentives for the public to stay 
informed200 about the best approach to tackle a security threat from non-state actors might make 
its attitude more susceptible to cues from the country’s political parties.201 Importantly, the issue 
of counter-insurgency operations and anti-terrorism may not always have clear solutions that202 
might increase the uncertainty under which the public needs to decide whether to support or oppose 
a policy. For example, Goswami (2009) and Agarwal (2013) review the Indian government 
counter-insurgency program and find that often, it has been ineffective which could further support 
the claim that there might not be a consensus on what specific counterinsurgency approach should 
be pursued by the government. One might assume that it is needless to argue against the notion 
that asking Indian citizens whether they need to engage the rebels with force is an “easy” question 
that could rarely be affected by contradicting cues.203 Nonetheless, due to the protracted nature of 
India’s insurgencies, especially the two left-wing rebel groups, the Naxalite-Maoists204 and the 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland rebels, sections of the public might hold different views 
on what is the right approach to deal with the long-standing rebel groups.205 For instance, a policy 
of overwhelming retaliation206 by the army and security forces after attacks by the Naxalite-Maoist 
 
200 Perhaps importantly because the country insurgent groups affect particular regions of India and not the country’s 
entirety.  
201 Referring to situation in which respondents are presented with information about the positions of others “like you” 
on the given policy issue. See Mann and Sinclair (2013).   
202 For more details on the distinction of hard and easy issues and how they affect voter behavior see Carmines and 
Stimson (1980).  
203 Both review the Indian government counter-insurgency program and it has been changing and often ineffective 
which could be take as a further point in support of the claim that there might not be a consensus on what specific 
approach must be taken to tackle the threat.  
204 https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/half-a-century-of-indias-maoist-insurgency/  
205 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/government-signs-landmark-nagaland-peace-
treaty-with-nscni-m-in-presence-of-pm-narendra-modi/articleshow/48332059.cms  
206 Which is one of the strategies pointed out by Staniland’s (2018) work.  
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rebels is often said to decrease the Indian government’s ability to stimulate defections or decrease 
public support for the militants. However, we do not have empirical evidence to determine whether 
such an approach will decrease the possibility that the country’s leader will suffer from audience 
costs in the Indian context.  
Due to this dynamic, the public is being polarized on the issue of approving or opposing their 
leader’s decision to back down or engage the rebels. I contend207 that because of the uncertain 
results of each of the possible responses by the government, respondents’ position will be 
susceptible to single-party, bipartisan, and social group endorsements with shared political views 
that can give some further backing to one position or the other. In such circumstances, subjects 
will tend to rely on the available cues from politically relevant groups to decide whether they 
should sanction their leader’s actions or support them.208 In addition, it can be expected that 
subjects’ will also seek “second opinion” by public figures in the given context (Page & Shapiro, 
1992; Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013; Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017). Respondents’ 
psychological affinity towards ideologically similar groups could be even stronger in complex 
issues such as domestic security (Lazarsfeld & Gaudet & Berelson, 1968; Campbell & Converse 
& Miller & Stokes, 1960; Gilens & Murakawa, 2002; Mann & Sinclair, 2013). For instance, the 
perceived similarity of interests might lead to conformity with the elite’s position on the issue 
despite the clear indication that the Indian national government’s portrayal of the counter-
insurgency policy to be in the national interest. Taking this into account, it is reasonable to argue 
 
207 It is important to note that due to the lack of studies on the issue, the claims are inherently explorative and 
speculative.  
208 It is not uncommon that some domestic pollical issues, especially those pertaining to security, could have received 
more attention by the Indian media and, as a result, affect the sample’s respondents by creating “pretreatment effects”, 
as Druckman and Leeper (2012) point.  
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that in the Indian political context, the average respondent’s level of approval or disapproval will 
be affected by the endorsement messages from the two major political parties in India, regardless 
of how the leader has decided to respond to the rebel group’s provocation. Therefore, to test the 
effect of party endorsements upon the public’s willingness to punish their leader, hypothesis two 
postulates:  
Hypothesis 2: Respondents are more likely to shift their choice to approve or disapprove of their 
leader handling of the crisis to match that of the party or social group endorsement they have been 
exposed to, regardless of the type of action against the rebel group.209 
 
Research Design and Sample 
 
 
The study relies on three survey experiments to test the hypotheses. The first study consists of 
1600 Indian respondents follows a 2x3 design to test the effect of the individual party 
endorsements that the two major political parties have on Indians’ willingness to approve or 
disapprove of their leader’s handling of the crises with the rebel group. The second study has a 
4x2 design and samples an additional 1800 respondents from India, while study three uses 400 
Nigerian participants with 2x3 design.  
 
209 It is important to note that there is evidence that Indian voters do not necessary vote for their caste (Mihay, 2016)  
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The three survey experiments proceeded as follows. First, respondents were presented with a 
battery of demographic questions, interest in politics, and support for a given party, adapted for 
India and Nigeria’s socio-political context. Second, respondents are asked about their political 
dispositions – military assertiveness, political engagement, and party affiliation. Every participant 
in the three survey experiments was asked to read a situation that their country has faced and will 
likely face in the future and that they will have to indicate their approval or disapproval of the 
leader’s handling of the crisis. Then, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the treatment 
scenarios describing how the Indian and Nigerian leaders 210  have decided to respond to a 
hypothetical and belligerent rebel group, which members have taken control of several villages, 
thus raising tensions.  
In experiment one , I presented subjects with two decision scenarios describing how the Indian 
prime minister has decided to respond to an armed group in central India, which has taken control 
of several villages. The treatments shown on Table 1 are built upon two types of responses: 1) – 
Engage condition in which the national leader threatens and subsequently uses force against the 
rebels controlling the city, and 2) No engagement condition – in this situation the country’s leader 
threatens the rebels with the use of force, but the rebels do not comply and the country’s leader, 
decides to back down, and not use force while attempting negotiations.  
To capture the elite cues’ effect, the study randomly manipulated whether respondents received 
the treatment revealing the position taken by Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian National Congress 
Party, or the scenario in which they are not informed about any of the parties’ positions. For 
 
210 The prime minister is not named, but with the recent anti-terrorism actions, it can be strongly expected that most 
respondents will infer that the scenarios are referring to actions taken or being taken by the acting Indian prime minister 




example, “The Bharatiya Janata party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime 
minister’s handling of the situation;// The Indian National Congress party have urged Indians to 
unite and support the prime minister’s handling of the situation”  which can be either backing 
down or following through by engaging the threat. Hence, participants were presented with a short 
paragraph, and a summary describing the belligerent actions of the rebels, the leader’s threat, and 
follow-up move.  
 
 
Table 8: Experiment 1 India Treatment Groups 
Introductory Text The following questions concern the decision of India’s leaders 
when faced with domestic security challengers. You will read 
about a situation that India has faced in the past and will likely 
face again in the future. Indian leaders have managed the 
situation in different ways. In the following 
 




In central India, rebels have pushed back local security forces 
and taken control of several villages. Reports indicate that there 
are casualties among the police, civilians, and local government 
personal. The prime minister has stated that the Indian 
government will respond by sending the army. However, the 
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prime minister backed down and did not send the army to retake 
the villages from the rebels. The prime minister announced that 
the government would start peace negotiations. The rebels 
continued to operate in the region, remained in control of 
several villages. 
 
Engage and Win Treatment 2  
 
In central India, rebels have pushed back local security forces 
and taken control of several villages. Reports indicate that there 
are casualties among the police, civilians, and local government 
personal. The prime minister has stated that the Indian 
government will respond by sending the army. The army 
started operations against the rebels. The army successfully 
pushed back the rebels and took control of the villages. 
 
Backing Down - Attempt 
Negotiations – Elite Cue BJP 
Support 
Treatment 3  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
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respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister 
backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but 
instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and 
continued to operate in the region and remained in control of 
several villages. The Bharatiya Janata Party has urged Indians 
to unite and support the prime minister’s handling of the 
situation. 
 
Backing Down - Attempt 
Negotiations – Elite Cue INC 
Support   
Treatment 4  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister 
backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but 
instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and 
continued to operate in the region and remained in control of 
several villages. The Indian National Congress party has urged 
Indians to unite and support the prime minister’s handling of 




Engage and Win – Elite Cue 
BJP Support 
Treatment 5  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
of several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate 
that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The 
prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army started operations 
against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the 
rebels and took control of the villages. The Bharatiya Janata 
Party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime 
minister’s handling of the situation. 
 
Engage and Win – Elite Cue 
INC Support 
Treatment 6  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
of several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports indicate 
that there are casualties among the police and civilians. The 
prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army started operations 
against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the 
rebels and took control of the villages. The Indian National 
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Congress party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime 
minister’s handling of the situation.  
 
 
In experiment two, participants were presented with four scenarios describing how the Indian 
prime minister has decided to respond to an armed group in north India that has taken control of 
several villages. The treatments shown in Table 8  are built upon four types of responses: 1) Engage 
and Win is the condition in which the national leader threatens and subsequently uses force against 
the rebels controlling the village in a successful military operation, and 2) Backing down – in this 
situation the country’s leader threatens the rebels with the use of force, but the rebels do not comply, 
and the Indian prime minister decided to back down, and not use force; 3) Stay out  - in this 
scenario the national leader has decided not to issue a threat or engage the rebels and instead 
attempt to negotiate; 4) Engage and Lose - in the fourth scenario the leader engages the threat but 
the military operation proves to be largely unsuccessful.  
To capture the elite cues’ effect, this study randomly manipulated whether respondents received 
the treatment revealing a bipartisan endorsement by both the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian 
National Congress Party, or the scenarios in which they are not informed about any of the parties’ 
positions. The elite cue informs respondents that both parties support the leader’s actions, 
indicating a bipartisan consensus.211 Similarly, the study uses a classic social group cues message 
to capture its effects by incorporating the statement: “For reference in a recent poll and in this 
survey, about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the 
 
211 See  Appendix C.4 for the list of the full text.  
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prime minister’s actions in this situation.”, which signals opposition or support from the 
respondents’ referenced social and co-partisan groups. The overall framing of the vignettes is 
practically following the same format as in experiment one. 
 
Table 9: Experiment 2: India Treatment Groups 
Introductory Text The following questions concern the decision of India’s leaders 
when faced with domestic security challengers. You will read 
about a situation that India has faced in the past and will likely 
face again in the future. Indian leaders have managed the 
situation in different ways.  
 
Backing Down - Attempt 
Negotiations 
Treatment 1 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister 
backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but 
instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and 
continued to operate in the region and remained in control of 




Engage and Win Treatment 2  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started 
operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed 
back the rebels and took control of the villages. 
 
Engage and Lose Treatment 3 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started 
operations against the rebels, but they ended largely ineffective. 
The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the 
region and remained in control of the villages.   
 
Stay Out and Attempt 
Negotiations 




Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
not respond to provocations, stay out, and start negotiations. 
The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the 
region and remained in control of the villages. 
 
Backing Down - Attempt 
Negotiations – Social Group 
Cue Opposes the Decision of 
the Leader 
Treatment 5  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister 
backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but 
instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and 
continued to operate in the region and remained in control of 
the villages. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, 
about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated 





Backing Down - Attempt 
Negotiations – Social Group 
Cue Supports the Decision of 
the Leader  
Treatment 6  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister 
backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but 
instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and 
continued to operate in the region and remained in control of 
the villages. For reference, in a recent poll and in this survey, 
about 75% of Indians with your political views have indicated 
that they approve of the prime minister’s actions in this 
situation.    
 
Backing Down - Attempt 
Negotiations  - Elite Cue – 
Bipartisan Support for the 
Leader 
Treatment 7  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
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respond by sending the army. However, the prime minister 
backed down and did not sent the army against the rebels but 
instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and 
continued to operate in the region and remained in control of 
the villages. Leaders of the Indian National Congress party and 
the Bharatiya Janata Party together with their coalition partners 
expressed support for the prime minister’ actions in this 
difficult situation.   
 
Engage and Win – Social 
Group Cue Opposes the 
Decision of the Leader 
Treatment 8  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started 
operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed 
back the rebels and took control of the villages. For reference, 
in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with 
your political views have indicated that they disapprove of the 




Engage and Win – Social 
Group Cue Supports the 
Decision of the Leader 
Treatment 9  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started 
operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed 
back the rebels and took control of the villages. For reference, 
in a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with 
your political views have indicated that they approve of the 
prime minister’s actions in this situation.  
 
Engage and Win – Elite Cue 
– Bipartisan Support for the 
Leader 
Treatment 10  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started 
operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed 
back the rebels and took control of the villages. Leaders of the 
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Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, 
together with their coalition partners, expressed support for the 
prime minister’s actions in this difficult situation. 
 
Engage and Lose – Social 
Group Cue Opposes the 
Decision of the Leader 
Treatment 11  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started 
operations against the rebels, but they ended largely ineffective. 
The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the 
region and remained in control of the villages. For reference, in 
a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your 
political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime 
minister’s actions in this situation. 
 
Engage and Lose – Social 
Group Cue Supports the 
Decision of the Leader  
Treatment 12  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
127 
 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started 
operations against the rebels, but they ended largely ineffective. 
The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the 
region and remained in control of the villages. For reference, in 
a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your 
political views have indicated that they approve of the prime 
minister’s actions in this situation. 
 
Engage and Lose – Elite Cue 
– Bipartisan Support for the 
Decision of the Leader 
Treatment 13  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
respond by sending the army. The army was sent and started 
operations against the rebels, but they ended largely ineffective. 
The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the 
region and remained in control of the villages. Leaders of the 
Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, 
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together with their coalition partners, expressed support for the 
prime minister’s actions in this difficult situation.  
 
Stay Out and Attempt 
Negotiations – Social Group 
Cue Opposes the Decision of 
the Leader 
Treatment 14  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
not respond to provocations, stay out, and start negotiations. 
The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the 
region and remained in control of the villages. For reference, in 
a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your 
political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime 
minister’s actions in this situation.  
 
Stay Out and Attempt 
Negotiations – Social Group 
Cue Support the Decision of 
the Leader 
Treatment 15  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
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not respond to provocations, stay out, and start negotiations. 
The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the 
region and remained in control of the villages. For reference, in 
a recent poll and in this survey, about 75% of Indians with your 
political views have indicated that they approve of the prime 
minister’s actions in this situation. 
   
Stay Out and Attempt 
Negotiations – Elite Cue – 
Bipartisan Support for the 
Decision of the Leader 
Treatment 16  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in the state of Chhattisgarh. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will 
not respond to provocations, stay out, and start negotiations. 
The rebels did not back down and continued to operate in the 
region and remained in control of the villages. Leaders of the 
Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party, 
together with their coalition partners, expressed support for the 





The third experiment used Nigerian students who were randomly assigned to one of three scenarios 
describing how the Nigerian president has decided to respond to an armed group in of the country’s 
border regions that has taken control of several villages. The treatments are built upon three types 
of responses: 1) Engage and Win is the condition in which the Nigerian leader threatens and 
subsequently uses force against the rebels controlling the village in a successful military operation, 
and 2) Backing down – is the situation in which the Nigerian president has threatened the rebels 
with the use of force, but the rebels do not comply, and the president eventually decides to back 
down, and not use force; 3) Engage and Lose - in the third treatment group in which the leader 
engages the threat, but the military operation proves to be largely unsuccessful.  
 
Table 10: Experiment 3 Nigeria Treatment Groups 
Introductory Text The following questions concern the decision of Nigeria’s 
leaders when faced with security challenges. You will read 
about a situation that Nigeria has faced in the past and will 
likely face again in the future. Nigerian leaders have managed 
the situation in different ways. In the following lines you will 
read about one approach Nigerian leaders have chosen to take 
and asked whether you approve or disapprove of it.   




Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in one of Nigeria’s border regions. 
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Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and 
civilians. The Nigerian president has stated that the government 
will respond by sending in the army. However, the president 
backed down and did not send the army against the rebels but 
instead started negotiations. The rebels did not back down and 
continued to operate in the region and remained in control of 
several villages.     
  
Engage and Win Treatment 2  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
of several villages in one of Nigeria’s border regions. Reports 
indicate that there are casualties among the police and civilians. 
The Nigerian president has stated that the government will 
respond by sending the army. The army started operations 
against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the 
rebels and took control of the villages. 
 
Engage and Lose Treatment 3  
 
Rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control 
over several villages in one of Nigeria’s border regions. 
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Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police and 
civilians. The Nigerian president has stated that the government 
will respond by sending in  the army. The army was sent and 
started operations against the rebels, but they ended largely 
unsuccessful. The rebels did not back down and continued to 
operate in the region and remained in control of the villages.    
 
 
Following the treatments, the respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or 
disagreement, on a five-point Likert scale212, with their leader’s handling of the crisis. Respondents 
were also asked whether the actions of their leader have improved or damage the country’s 
reputation and their willingness to vote213 for him or her. None of the vignettes indicated the 
ideology of the rebel group or the number of casualties resulting from the initial attack and the 
ensuing operation by the Indian or Nigerian security and armed forces. I use the term “rebels” 
instead of insurgents because the former could be more well known among the English-speaking 
Indian and Nigerian respondents. The Nigerian respondents were not presented with the cue 
treatments. 
The Indian respondents were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.214 The study sampled 
respondents from all of India’s regions. To be included in the study, individuals must 1) be at least 
18 years of age, 2) be able to read and comprehend English, 3) have Indian citizenship, and reside 
 
212 The Nigerian respondents were asked to indicate their level of disagreement on an 11 point scale.  
213 Results from the dependent variable on voting are presented in the Appendix.  
214 Furthermore, Berinsky et al. (2012) finds that on average Mechanical Turk Samples are more, or at least, equally 
representative with student samples.  
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in the country, as indicated in their official profile. 215216  The Nigerian sample consists of 
approximately 400 university students sampled from several universities across the country. 217 
The Nigerian students were sampled with cooperation from local academics. Each of the students 
was invited to participate in the study through their online course groups on WhatsApp218 is 
frequently used by scholars in Africa to collect samples for both academic and non-academic 
research.    
It can be argued that the study use of convenience and student samples does not pose significant 
external validity problems that are normally assumed because of three reasons. First, the study 
follows the logic of Drunckman and Kam (2011), Berinsky, Gregory, Huber, and Gabriel (2012), 
who successfully demonstrate that using convenience and student samples allows scholars to 
successfully study the causal mechanisms of theories while maintaining a sufficient amount of 
generalizability among the general population. Together with other studies such as that by Mintz 
and Geva (1993), they have convincingly demonstrated that when theory-guided experiments 
examining specific cause and effects relationships are replicated, the results are similar and 
sometimes identical. Second, drawing from Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz’s (2006) work, this study’s 
inference do not depend on capturing the attitudes of any specialized decision making groups such 
as military officers, local or national political representatives, because the latter often have been 
shown to make a substantially different decision than the normal student population. Third, as 
 
215 This is controlled by applying the recently developed Qualtrics/Mechanical Turk Protocol (Burleigh, Kennedy, and 
Clifford’s (2018). Respondents will also have to indicate their state of residence.  
216 These measures will substantially decrease the possibility that the respondents in India are providing fraudulent 
answers by using software for automatic responses.  
217 List of the Universities: University of Nigeria Southwest;  University of Abuja; North-Central University of 
Agriculture Abeokuta; Lagos State University; Niger Delta University; Delta State University Abraka;  
218 The sampling was originally planned to be in person. However, due to the Pandemic, the students were contacted 
via their official university WhatsApp group profiles. The collection of the responses was conducted with guidance 
and collaboration from local academics.  
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Tomz (2007) and Bakker (2017) point out, convenience and student samples on average tend to 
consist of more motivated, politically active, and educated respondents than the particular 
country’s general population do offer benefits. Most notably, the easily comparable results to other 
studies and the mapping of the views of countries’ active civilians, which are more likely to 
influence the government due to their higher education and their better socio-economic status. As 
an illustration, the vignettes were presented to the study’s Indian and Nigerian respondents were 
all in English, as the small pilot studies demonstrated well-developed skills in the language across 
both sample populations. Furthermore, the majority of the Indian and Nigerian respondents 






If the article’s theoretical expectations are correct, the results from experiment one on domestic 
security crises should present evidence in support of two patterns of behavior. First, the majority 
of the respondents should be more likely to support219 their national leader for the policy of 
engaging the rebel group while imposing audience costs among those treatment groups in which 
the leader has decided to back down after issuing a threat. Second, the cues treatments would 
moderate the size of the audience costs relative to the baseline condition in which the leader is 
 
219 Reward their leader.  
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inconsistent by backing down while initiating negotiations with the rebel group. To test the 
hypotheses, the study relies on logistic regression220 using a binary variable to capture the level of 
approval coded as one and disapproval coded as zero of the leader’s handling of the security crisis. 
The results are further tested across several subsets of the samples to evaluate the robustness of 
the findings. All models control for respondents’ age, gender, education, income, party affiliation, 
leader approval, militarism, and political engagement. The findings are discussed below. 
 
 
Table 11: Leader Approval Base Treatment Effects by Experimental Condition in Percentages 
Scenario India Experiment 1 India Experiment 2 Nigeria Experiment 3 



































Note: The Table reports the base treatment effects in percentage across each of the scenarios. The percentages in each 
column may not sum to 100 because they are rounded. The ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown in the 
parentheses. The perception indicates the proportion of respondents who have chosen to support their leader’s handling 
of the domestic security crisis.  
  
 
220 The results also generally remain the same if OLS regression models are used for the analysis.  
221 This vignette was not presented to the respondent of Experiment 1 India. 
222 This vignette was not presented to the respondent of Experiment 1 India. 
223 This vignette was not presented to the respondent of Experiment 3 Nigeria. 
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Findings: Backing Down and Attempting Negotiations (H1) 
The findings present robust support for hypothesis (H1), stating that leaders who back down during 
the escalation phases of domestic security crises dealing with non-state armed actors such as rebels 
are more likely to suffer public disapproval and reputational costs. Table 11 outlines the base 
treatment effects presented in percentages across the experimental conditions of the three survey 
experiments. I find that in experiment one and experiment two, on average, Indians are about 10% 
and 16% more supportive of leaders who have engaged the rebel group as a result of their 
escalation compared to backing down and attempting negotiations with the armed non-state actor. 
The baseline treatment effect among Nigerians also supports hypothesis one (H1) as they are on 
average 18.5% more likely to approve of their leaders who decide to engage the rebel group 
compared to backing down and attempting negotiations. On the other hand, and as expected, the 
treatment effect is smaller, amounting to approximately 7% among those Indian respondents in 
experiment 2 who were informed that their leader had used the security forces and army units, but 
the operation was largely unsuccessful. In contrast, Nigerians’ level of support remains practically 
the same despite that they were informed of the unsuccessful security operation initiated by their 
leader. Turning to the last substantial treatment effect, it can be observed that the Indian respondent 
in experiment two demonstrates the same amount of support for a leader who have decided to deal 
with the escalation by staying out, while attempting negotiations with the rebel group. Before we 
turn to the regression model, it is important to observe that the Indian respondent consistently 
indicate higher levels of baseline support for their leaders across the scenarios ranging from 79 to 
95% approval of their leader’s handling of the crises. Compared to Indians’ high levels of support 
for their leaders in the context of domestic security crises, Nigerians’ support for their leader, even 
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in the context of crises, is substantially lower, ranging from 16 to 35%. Such discrepancies are 




Figure 12: Main Effects – Public Support for the Leader in Domestic Security Crises. Dependent 
variables: Leader Approval and Vote 
Note: Figure 12 presents the logistic regression result with binary dependent variables of approval and vote. The 
baseline is the treatment scenario in which the leader has backed down while attempting to initiate negotiations. The 
results are presented in odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals, while controlling for respondents’ level of 
militarism, political interest, age, education, income, and their approval ratings of the leader. The regression result 
from the Stay Out treatment group are presented in  Appendix C.3.  
 
Turning to Figure 12, I formally test whether the treatment effects are statistically significant using 
logistic regression models which control for respondents’ demographic and political covariates. 
The baseline group for all presented Modules in Figure 12 is the scenario in which the country’s 
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leader has decided to back down while attempting to initiate negotiations with the rebels after the 
latter has not complied with the former’s public threats. The results from experiment one in India 
(India 1) provide evidence in support of hypothesis one (H1), stating that the Indian public will 
impose audience costs upon their leaders if they back down against proactive rebel groups in 
domestic security crises during escalation phrases of the confrontation, compared to those that 
engage in a successful military operation. 
The results from experiment two in India (India 2) and experiment three in Nigeria (Nigeria 3) 
provide robust evidence in support of hypothesis one (H1). There are no consistently significant 
treatment effects among the sections of respondents presented with the scenario in which their 
leader has conducted an unsuccessful military operation against the rebels. The only exception is 
the result from the Nigerian experiment three, as its respondents are significantly more likely to 
approve of leaders who have conducted an unsuccessful military operation compared to the 
baseline. Even after controlling for respondents who have passed the post-treatment manipulation 
check and repeating the results on a subset of Non-Tamils224, the results still provide robust support 
for hypothesis one (H1).  
 
 
Findings: The Effects of Elite and Social Group Endorsement Cues225 
 
To start with, Figure 13 presents the main effects from experiment one with baseline treatment in 
which the Indian prime minister backs down while initiating negotiations, thus not sending the 
 
224 See Appendix C.3.  
225 The cue treatments were included only in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 among the study’s Indian participants.  
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army to engage the rebel group. Overall, the results from the one-sided party endorsement do not 
present robust evidence in support of hypothesis two (H2)’s claim as the party endorsements by 
the INC, or the BJP fails to significantly moderate respondents to approval rates, willingness to 
vote, and be more likely to say that the country or the prime minister’s reputation has improved 
because of the latter’s handling of the crisis. Despite the cues, the regression results demonstrate 
robust support for hypothesis one (H1) by indicating that leaders are significantly more likely to 
suffer from audience costs when they decide to back down while initiating negotiations compared 
to engaging the rebel group by starting a security operation. In contrast, Figure 13 show that 
endorsement message in the form of social group cues, part of experiment two, can significantly 
moderate respondents’ willingness to penalize or reward their leader based on his handling of the 
security crisis. For instance, respondents are more likely to approve of their leader’s decision to 
stay out and initiate negotiations as a result of being informed that their politically likeminded 
fellow citizens support the Indian prime minister’s decision. On the other hand, the bipartisan 
endorsement cues fail to induce consistent preference shifts and negate the core audience costs 
effects across the three treatment groups. Thus, on average, across the cue treatments, the results 
from experiments one and two suggest that social group cues are better able to moderate 






Figure 13: Main Effects – Cue Effects on the Public Support for their Leader in Domestic 
Security Crises. Dependent variables: Leader Approval 
Note: Figure 13 presents the logistic regression result from experiments one and two with binary dependent variables 
measuring respondents’ willingness to approve of their leader’s handling of the crisis. The baseline is the treatment 
scenario in which the leader has backed down while attempting to initiate negotiations. The results are presented in 
odd ratios with 90 percent confidence intervals while controlling for respondents’ level of militarism, political interest, 
age, education, income, and their approval ratings of the leader.   
 
 
Next, in Tables 113 and 114226, the results are shown as a subset of the treatment effect among 
BJP and INC supporters. Table 113 records that BJP supporters are significantly more likely to 
approve of a prime minister who engages and uses force against the rebels, thus capturing the 
theoretically expected result. However, despite the BJP endorsement of the leader’s handling of 
the crises, the results do not show that the party’s supporters are more likely to support their leader 
 
226 See Appendix C.3. 
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across the two scenarios – backing down while initiating negotiations and engage. The results 
provide additional evidence in support of hypothesis one (H1), as INC supporters are more likely 
to approve and indicate that the leader’s decision to engage the rebels has improved his and the 
country’s reputation. Surprisingly, INC supporters’ level of approval, willingness to vote and 
perception of the country’s reputation do not seem to be significantly affected by the INC’s 
endorsement of the leader’s actions. On the contrary, Tables 123 and 124227 provide more support 
for hypothesis one’s (H1) claim of the non-partisan logic of audience costs. Two exceptions are 
worth noting. In particular, the BJP party endorsement of the leader seems to have significantly 
affected INC supporters’ willingness to vote for leaders who have decided to engage the rebels. 
Nonetheless, at the same time, the INC supporters are adamant that their leaders who have decided 
to engage the rebels have damaged their reputation. Overall, the results from experiment one 
suggests that single-party cues/endorsements could, in some cases, moderate the opinion of India’s 
partisan supporters. In short, the single party endorsement cue treatments fail to consistently affect 
the public’s level of approval, intent to vote, and reputational costs for the country and the prime 
minister during the escalation phases of domestic security crises. Hence, it can be argued that 
leaders not acting decisively with force against armed non-state actors during the escalation phases 
of domestic security crises are likely to suffer from lower approval ratings and a lower voting base, 
and a damaged reputation across the partisan divide despite the pro-government messages of 
endorsement.  
When testing the results on the subset of respondents who support either the BJP or the INC the 
initial patterns remain robust and thus support hypothesis one (H1), as they are more likely to 
 
227 See Appendix C.3 
142 
 
approve of the prime minister’s decision to engage, resulting in a successful military operation 
against the rebels.228 Alternatively, in the scenario in which the prime minister has decided to stay 
out, BJP supporters have indicated that such a strategy will damage the prime minister’s reputation, 
perhaps due to damaging his image of a resolute leader. In contrast, in the same scenario in which 
the prime minister decides to stay out and try a diplomatic approach towards the rebels, INC 
supporters do seem to be reacting differently as they are more likely to vote for such a leader. 
Nonetheless, despite the two results, both BJP and INC supporters are adamant in their support for 
leaders who engaged the rebels, despite that the military operation ends unsuccessfully for the 
Indian army. Hence, the underlying importance of leaders to act aggressively during the escalation 
phase to consolidate the feeling of resolve while acting to punish the rebel group, despite the 
potential to increase the support for the rebel group further.   
To further evaluate the robustness of audience costs’ main effects and the cue’s moderating effect, 
I test whether the main findings retain their direction and significance among respondents self-
identifying as Hindus or those who have passed the post-treatment manipulation check.229 The 
results reconfirm the main effects, strongly suggesting that there are no heterogeneous treatment 
effects based on religion or those participants who have successfully passed the manipulation 
check. Lastly, I conducted additional analyses in the Appendix exploring the possibility that the 
effects are driven by those respondents that have not passed the manipulation check. After 
excluding all participants who have failed the post-treatment manipulation check I find that the 
 
228 See Appendix C.3. 
229 See Appendix C.3. 
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results are identical and present no evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects based on religion 
or those participants who have successfully passed the post-treatment manipulation check. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study’s results have several implications for audience cost and the public opinion literature. 
First, following on the rich set of experimental studies on audience costs,230 the study, tested for 
the first time and found support for the theory’s main claim that leaders who back down while 
initiating negotiations are likely to experience decreased approval ratings and incur reputational 
and electoral costs in the context of domestic security crises. The results from this exploratory 
study demonstrated that in the context of domestic security crises,231 Indians and Nigerians tend 
to be more willing to support leaders who have engaged the rebels regardless of whether the 
operation has been unsuccessful or successful compared to backing down or choosing a more 
diplomatic approach by staying out. The results also highlighted that the dynamic, magnitude and 
direction of the audience costs incurred by leaders who engage the aggressor country in 
international crises in either a successful or not engagements are largely identical to that of the 
domestic crises. In short, the findings reconfirm previous studies by Levendusky and Horwitz 
(2012), Lupton (2018), and Evers, Fisher, and Schaff (2019) that voters tend to impose audience 
costs predominantly in a non-partisan manner in situations of national importance.  
 
230 (Tomz, 2007; Quek, 2017; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Davies and Johns, 2013; Kertzer & Brutger, 2017; 
Evers & Fisher & Schaff, 2019).  
231 As in International Security Crises.  
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The study’s result adds to the literature by suggesting that leaders perhaps need to be equally 
careful with the swings in public approval and have incentives to avoid making false threats, as 
they could be caught bluffing and thus suffer from domestic repercussions (Tomz, 2009; Weeks, 
2008; Weiss, 2013; Quek, 2017). Specifically, during escalation phases of domestic security crises, 
the public’s opinion might affect leaders’ behavior to a significant level because the opposing non-
state armed actor’s attempts to improve their bargaining position by signaling determination. Such 
escalation phases initiated by the armed group often possibly trigger rally-behind the flag 
phenomena, which makes any concession to the rebels in the form of negotiations unlikely to be 
approved by the angry public eager for retaliation and punishment.232 For instance, the dynamics 
of public approval in domestic security crises demonstrate that it might be safer for national leaders 
to act aggressively regardless of the results because they will incur audience costs for inconsistency 
such as backing down while initiating negotiations when facing an attack by a rebel group. Then 
the expected response by the leader cannot be mired by inconsistency and attempts at 
negotiations,233 because, as the results suggest, the public will be experiencing rally around the 
flag and strongly disapproving of failures to engage the rebels as the latter is seen to be damaging 
the country’s reputation and willingness to act.234 Hence, this exploratory study offers, for the first 
time, 235  evidence that akin to international crises, national leaders are subject to the same 
incentives to avoid false threats while attempting negotiations due to the possibility of audience 
costs when dealing with rebel groups during the escalation phases of domestic security crises.236 
 
232 See Wayne (2019) 
233 Bluffing. See Fearon (1994). 
234 See Groeling and Baum (2008).  
235 To the best of the author’s knowledge, other studies have not tested the directional effect of peoples view on 
military assertiveness and domestic security issues such as rebel groups through the lenses of audience cost theory.  
236 As already mentioned, loss of seats in the national assembly, loss of popularity, loss of power, or regime change.  
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Second, the study examined the moderating effects of social group cues and the effects of elite 
cues in the form of one-party endorsements and bipartisan endorsements on Indian voters’ 
willingness to impose audience costs on national leaders based on their handling of the domestic 
security crisis. The results extend previous findings by suggesting that Indian respondents’ 
attitudes are moderated by party endorsements and social group cues sharing their political 
views 237  similar to American and European constituencies (Dempsey, 1987; Zaller, 1992; 
Berinsky, 2009; Entman, 2004; Jordan & Page, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Bullock, 2011; 
Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017; Dunckan, 2001; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; 
Petty & Wegener, 1998). For instance, regardless of their partisanship, the study found that Indian 
voters tend to disapprove of leaders who have decided to back down and being inconsistent, thus 
further corroborating the cross-country validity of audience costs theory (Jentleson, 1992; 
Jentleson & Britton, 1998; Tomz, 2007; Levendusky & Horowitz, 2012; Evers & Fisher & Schaff, 
2019). The absence of consistent effect from the one-sided party endorsement on respondents’ 
willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader presents additional evidence of the importance 
of reputation, credibility, and resolve as already identified by scholars such as Dafoe, Renshon, 
and Huth (2014), Kagan (1995), Tang (2005), Tingley and Walter (2011). On the other hand, 
bipartisan party endorsements 238  seem to have consistent on participants notion of national 
interests resulting in the reduction of the expected partisan effects as the respondents support the 
leader’s actions regardless of the scenario.239 Also, and even to a large extent, the study’s results 
 
237 See (see Dunckan, 2001; Kuklinski & Hurley, 1994; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Petty & Wegener, 1998; Kertzer 
& Zeitzoff, 2017).  
238 Defined as party cues (see Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2009).  
239 See (Bartels, 2002; Baum, & Groeling, 2009; Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Gaines et al., 2007; 
Taber & Lodge, 2006; Zaller, 1992; Gerber & Green, 1999). 
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clearly indicate the potential of social group cues to affect the public’s willingness to impose 
audience costs upon their leaders or approve of their actions.  
Comparing the effects of the one-party endorsements with the bipartisan party endorsements, it is 
apparent that the former has a significantly weaker effect on respondents’ choices in the context 
of audience costs scenarios240 thus, replicating some of the results by Levendusky and Horowitz 
(2012) and Evers, Fisher, and Schaaf (2019). Building upon the work by Dempsey (1987), Zaller 
(1992), Berinsky (2009), Entman (2004), Jordan and Page (1992), Page and Shapiro (2010), 
Bullock (2011), Kertzer and Zeitzoff (2017) by accounting for the effect of one party, bipartisan, 
and social group endorsement cues, this study adds more empirical evidence on the interaction of 
audience costs and elite cues’ transformative influence upon the public’s attitudes in the context 
of security issues.  
Consequently, the study offers additional insights into when leaders might have incentives to use 
force and whether they can afford to escalate or not, as they will be aware of the electoral costs of 
inconsistency. Backing down and attempting negotiations with the rebel group/s perceived as the 
weaker side can be particularly detrimental for the leader's approval rating as in such crises, the 
public is likely to experience "rally-behind the flag phenomena," making any concessions to the 
rebels hardly acceptable. The study provides further insights on the conditions under which the 
public's position can shift and when such efforts will fail to sway the support of the masses in the 
intended direction by comparing the effects of party and bipartisan cues. Lastly, the results provide 
a fresh look upon governments' decision to use force during the escalation phases in domestic 
security crises such as the protest movement in Hong Kong, the separatist groups in Catalonia and 
 
240 See Gerber and Rogers (2009) and Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Panagopoulos (2013).  
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Cameroon, the Philippines' military operations against the Islamic militants, or the Indonesian 
state's crackdown of the renewed secessionist movements in West Papua.   
The study has several limitations, which I acknowledge could pose questions about the validity of 
the results. Notably, the convenience samples, the oversampling of the Tamil minority, the more 
educated and politically engaged. The severity of the problem is diminished because the principal 
results remain robust when performing all the analyses on a subset of the samples accounting only 
for the non-Tamils, despite the reduced number of participants. In addition, closely following  
Tomz’s (2007; 2009) argument, taking into account respondents demonstrating high levels of 
political awareness, the result remains robust. The rationale is that citizens with higher levels of 
political awareness and education tend to be the politically active citizens and are more 
consequential to the probability that the leader will suffer audience costs and likely better represent 
what would be the public’s reaction. The second issue of concern is that the study does not capture 
the effect of single or bipartisan party endorsements opposing the actions of the leader during the 
security crisis. Third, it is not clear whether the Indian respondents’ will associate the hypothetical 
rebel group in central India with the Maoist rebels and how this could affect their responses241. 
Also, due to the increased levels of national fever, partisanship, and the country’s recent military 
interstate disputes with Pakistan242 and China,243 the support for hawkish policies might increase, 
and subjects should be more willing to punish their leader for backing down, while the latter, might 
increase the Indians susceptibility to elite cues from groups which share their political ideology. 
 
241 The former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh has repeatedly urged for national unity to tackle the Maoists 
threat for domestic security; see https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Naxalism-biggest-threat-to-internal-
security-Manmohan/article16302952.ece  
242 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-idUSKCN1QG0IR  




Forth, it is unclear how India and Nigeria’s active rebel groups might affect the responses attitudes 
of the participants due to the lack of public opinion studies on the issue. In particular pertaining to 
the scenarios depicting a domestic security crisis, this study does not claim that it strictly satisfies 
all the formal conditions of audience costs theory nor that it tests the classic type of the theory 
traditionally applied to model international military crises.244  I fully acknowledge that transferring 
the theoretical postulates and assumptions of audience cost theory to domestic security crises faces 
the limitation that non-state actors such as rebel groups might not be subject to the same amount 
of audience cost as the country’s leader, if at all. Regardless, there is clear evidence that rebel 
groups also have to manage their public image and reputation for resolve in order to keep their 
mobilization efforts productive and improve their bargaining position. Therefore, the results from 
the study are to be interpreted cautiously and viewed primarily as exploratory, attempting to 
evaluate the workings and microfoundations of audience costs theory during the escalation phases 
of domestic security crises compared to international ones.  
Future work on the relationship between audience cost and domestic security threats such as rebel 
groups could proceed in several different directions. First, audience cost theory’s applicability to 
domestic security crises can be tested in additional democratic states, which can further speak to 
the external and internal validity of the microfoundations of theory and that they are not country 
specific. The reason is that the attribution of audience costs could vary based on the non-state 
armed groups’ characteristics and whether their actions are perceived to be a serious threat by the 
public. Second, as Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) and Evers, Fisher, and Schaaf (2019) point, 
 
244 As originally designed by Fearon (1994) 
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scholars can test whether leaders could avoid audience cost by justifying their decision on new 
information to the public in non-western democracies.245 Countries of especial interest are Russia, 
Columbia, Turkey, Algeria, Mexico, Kenia, Brazil, and Indonesia due to their history of fighting 
non-state armed groups with periods of escalation of violence and signaling by the latter. Third, 
studies can disentangle the empirical claim that citizens have pre-determined policy preferences 
and whether they are willing to impose audience costs on their leader due to belligerency or 
inconsistency concerns during the crisis is inconsequential to their level of approval or disproval 
(Snyder & Borghard, 2011; Downes & Sechser, 2012; Chaudoin, 2014; Kertzer & Brutger, 2016). 
Fourth, more work is needed to test the effects on respondents’ willingness to impose audience 
costs after being informed about the position of international institutions,246 which have been 
shown to affect domestic political attitudes247. Lastly, future work should comparatively explore 
the effect of contradicting party cues, making the leader’s party affiliation explicit to participants, 
vary the strength of the non-state actor248, and its political objectives on the public’s willingness 




245 For research exploring how leaders’ justification influences the public see (Gowa, 1999; Levendusky & Horowitz, 
2012; Saunders, 2015). For instance, the leader could argue that the government-backed down because that was the 
right strategic decision to make.  
246 Such as the United Nations or a regional security organization.  
247 (Dragojlovic, 2013, 2015; Hayes & Guardino, 2013; Linos, 2011; Murray, 2014; Chapman, 2011; Chapman & 
Reiter, 2004). 
248 As the evidence demonstrates that armed groups perceived as weak lead to less fear, anxiety, and the resulting 
demand by the public for a more authoritarian hardline response (see Wayne, 2018). 







Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. International Security, 31(2), 42-78. 
Agarwal, A. K. (2013). The Third Dimension: Air Power in Combating the Maoist Insurgency. 
Vij Books India Pvt Ltd. 
Allison, R. (2013). Russia, the West, and military intervention. OUP Oxford. 
Arnesen, S., Johannesson, M. P., Linde, J., & Dahlberg, S. (2018). Do Polls Influence Opinions? 
Investigating Poll Feedback Loops Using the Novel Dynamic Response Feedback 
Experimental Procedure. Social Science Computer Review, 36(6), 735-743. 
Bali, Valentina A. 2007. \Terror and elections: Lessons from Spain." Electoral Studies 
26(3):669{ 
Baum, M. A. (2004). Going private: Public opinion, presidential rhetoric, and the domestic 
politics of audience costs in US foreign policy crises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
48(5), 603-631. 
Baum, M. A., & Groeling, T. (2009). Shot by the messenger: Partisan cues and public opinion 
regarding national security and war. Political Behavior, 31(2), 157-186. 
Baum, M. A., & Groeling, T. (2010). Reality asserts itself: Public opinion on Iraq and the 
elasticity of reality. International Organization, 64(3), 443-479. 
Baum, M. A., & Groeling, T. J. (2009). War stories: The causes and consequences of public 
views of war. Princeton University Press. 
Bausch, A. W., Faria, J. R., & Zeitzoff, T. (2013). Warnings, terrorist threats and resilience: A 
laboratory experiment. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30(5), 433-451.  
151 
 
Beinart, P. (2008). When politics no longer stops at the water’s edge: Partisan polarization and 
foreign policy. Red and blue nation, 2, 151-67. 
Bell, M. S., & Quek, K. (2018). Authoritarian Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace. 
International Organization, 72(1), 227-242. 
Berelson, B., Gaudet, H., & Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1968). The people's choice: How the voter makes 
up his mind in a presidential campaign. Columbia University Press. 
Berinsky, A. J. (2009). In time of war: Understanding American public opinion from World War 
II to Iraq. University of Chicago Press. 
Bishop, G. F., Tuchfarber, A. J., & Oldendick, R. W. (1986). Opinions on fictitious issues: The 
pressure to answer survey questions. Public Opinion Quarterly, 50(2), 240-250. 
Blair, G., Christine Fair, C., Malhotra, N., & Shapiro, J. N. (2013). Poverty and support for 
militant politics: Evidence from Pakistan. American Journal of Political Science, 57(1), 
30-48.Author(s): Graeme Blair, C.  
Blair, G., Imai, K., & Lyall, J. (2014). Comparing and combining list and endorsement 
experiments: Evidence from Afghanistan. American Journal of Political Science, 58(4), 
1043-1063. 
Broz, J. L. (2002). Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes. 
International Organization, 56(4), 861-887.  
Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Dickson, E. S. (2007). The propaganda of the deed: Terrorism, 
counterterrorism, and mobilization. American Journal of Political Science, 51(2), 364-
381. 
Bullock, J. G. (2011). Elite influence on public opinion in an informed electorate. American 
Political Science Review, 105(3), 496-515. 
152 
 
Cannon, B., & Iyekekpolo, W. (2018). Explaining Transborder Terrorist Attacks: The Cases of 
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. African Security, 11(4), 370-396. 
Carmines, E. G., & Stimson, J. A. (1980). The two faces of issue voting. American Political 
Science Review, 74(1), 78-91. 
Carpini, M. X. D., & Keeter, S. (1996). What Americans know about politics and why it matters. 
Yale University Press. 
Chapman, T. L. (2012). Securing approval: Domestic politics and multilateral authorization for 
war. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Chatterjee, A. (2015). Russia, the West, and Military Intervention. 
Chaudoin, S. (2014). Promises or policies? An experimental analysis of international agreements 
and audience reactions. International Organization, 68(1), 235-256. 
Chinwe Chikwem, F., & Chikwendu Duru, J. (2018). The resurgence of the Niger Delta militants 
and the survival of the Nigerian state. The Round Table, 107(1), 45-55. 
Chollet, D., & Goldgeier, J. (2008). McCain's Choice. The National Interest, (96), 68-72. 
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). A theory of framing and opinion formation in competitive 
elite environments. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 99-118. 
Cobb, M. D., & Kuklinski, J. H. (1997). Changing minds: Political arguments and political 
persuasion. American Journal of Political Science, 88-121. 
Colaresi, Michael. 2007. “The Benefit of the Doubt: Testing an Informational Theory of the 
Rally Effect.” International Organization 61(1): 99–143. 
Converse, P. E., Campbell, A., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1961). Stability and change in 
1960: a reinstating election. American Political Science Review, 55(2), 269-280. 
153 
 
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50, 
1431–1451. 
Davies, G. A., & Johns, R. (2013). Audience costs among the British public: the impact of 
escalation, crisis type, and prime ministerial rhetoric. International Studies Quarterly, 
57(4), 725-737. 
Difallah, D., Filatova, E., & Ipeirotis, P. (2018, February). Demographics and dynamics of 
mechanical turk workers. In Proceedings of the eleventh acm international conference on 
web search and data mining (pp. 135-143). ACM. 
Dorussen, H., & Mo, J. (2001). Ending economic sanctions: Audience costs and rent-seeking as 
commitment strategies. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(4), 395-426. 
Downes, A. B., & Sechser, T. S. (2012). The illusion of democratic credibility. International 
Organization, 66(3), 457-489. 
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins. 
Druckman, J. N., & Leeper, T. J. (2012). Learning more from political communication 
experiments: Pretreatment and its effects. American Journal of Political Science, 56(4), 
875-896. 
Eyerman, J., & Hart Jr, R. A. (1996). An empirical test of the audience cost proposition: 
Democracy speaks louder than words. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(4), 597-616. 
Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. 
American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577-592. 
Forthcoming Wayne, C. (2018) Risk or Retribution: How Citizens Respond to Terrorism  
Fortna, V. P. (2015). Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes. 
International Organization, 69(3), 519-556. 
154 
 
Gadarian, S. K. (2010). The politics of threat: How terrorism news shapes foreign policy 
attitudes. The Journal of Politics, 72(2), 469-483. 
Galesic, M., & Bosnjak, M. (2009). Effects of questionnaire length on participation and 
indicators of response quality in a web survey. Public opinion quarterly, 73(2), 349-
360.Survey race  
Ganguly, S., Hellwig, T., & Thompson, W. R. (2016). The foreign policy attitudes of Indian 
elites: Variance, structure, and common denominators. Foreign Policy Analysis, 13(2), 
416-438. 
Ganguly, S., Hellwig, T., & Thompson, W. R. (2016). The foreign policy attitudes of Indian 
elites: Variance, structure, and common denominators. Foreign Policy Analysis, 13(2), 
416-438. 
Gelpi, C. F., & Griesdorf, M. (2001). Winners or losers? Democracies in international crisis, 
1918–94. American Political Science Review, 95(3), 633-647. 
Gerber, A. S., & Green, D. P. (2012). Field experiments: Design, analysis, and interpretation. 
WW Norton.  
Getmansky, Anna and Thomas Zeitzo_. 2014. \Terrorism and Voting: The Effect of Rocket 
Goswami, N. (2009). India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’strategy. 
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 20(1), 66-86. 
Grynaviski, E. (2014). Constructive Illusions: Misperceiving the Origins of International 
Cooperation. Cornell University Press. 
Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., & Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Why does ethnic 




Herrmann, R. K., Tetlock, P. E., & Visser, P. S. (1999). Mass public decisions on go to war: A 
cognitive-interactionist framework. American Political Science Review, 93(3), 553-573. 
Hetherington, Marc and Elizabeth Suhay. 2011. \Authoritarianism, threat, and Americans' 
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber and Gallya Lahav. 2005. \Threat, anxiety, and 
Hurwitz, J., Peffley, M., & Seligson, M. A. (1993). Foreign policy belief systems in comparative 
perspective: The United States and Costa Rica. International Studies Quarterly, 37(3), 
245-270. 
Jensen, N. M. (2003). Democratic governance and multinational corporations: Political regimes 
and inflows of foreign direct investment. International organization, 57(3), 587-616. 
Jentleson, B. W., & Britton, R. L. (1998). Still pretty prudent: Post-Cold War American public 
opinion on the use of military force. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(4), 395-417. 
Jerit, J. (2009). How predictive appeals affect policy opinions. American Journal of Political 
Science, 53(2), 411-426. 
Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics (Vol. 49). Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Kertzer, J. D., & Brutger, R. (2016). Decomposing audience costs: Bringing the audience back 
into audience cost theory. American Journal of Political Science, 60(1), 234-249.  
Kreuter, F., Presser, S., & Tourangeau, R. (2008). Social Desirability Bias in CATI, IVR, and 
Web SurveysThe Effects of Mode and Question Sensitivity. Public opinion quarterly, 
72(5), 847-865. 
Krosnick, J. A., & Kinder, D. R. (1990). Altering the foundations of support for the president 
through priming. American Political Science Review, 84(2), 497-512. 
156 
 
Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. International security, 31(1), 
49-80. Sanger, D., Vlasic, B., & Maynard, M. (2008). ‘Car Bankruptcy Cited as Option 
by White House. New York Times, 19.  
Levendusky, M. S., & Horowitz, M. C. (2012). When backing down is the right decision: 
Partisanship, new information, and audience costs. The Journal of Politics, 74(2), 323-
338. 
Levy, J. S. (2012). Coercive threats, audience costs, and case studies. Security Studies, 21(3), 
383-390. 
Lindsay, J. M. (2000). The new apathy: How an uninterested public is reshaping foreign policy. 
Foreign Affairs, 2-8. 
Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. D. (2000). The institutional foundations of political competence: 
How citizens learn what they need to know. Elements of reason: Cognition, choice, and 
the bounds of rationality, 47-66. 
Lyall, J., Blair, G., & Imai, K. (2013). Explaining support for combatants during wartime: A 
survey experiment in Afghanistan. American Political Science Review, 107(4), 679-705.  
Mann, C. B., & Sinclair, B. (2013). Voters Like You: 5 Social Group Cues in Behavior and 
Opinion 6. Work, 15, 16.  
Mann, C. B., & Sinclair, B. (2013). Voters Like You: 5 Social Group Cues in Behavior and 
Opinion 6. Work, 15, 16. 
Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2002). Why democracies cooperate more: 




Martin, L. L. (1993). Credibility, costs, and institutions: Cooperation on economic sanctions. 
World Politics, 45(3), 406-432.  
Merolla, Jennifer L and Elizabeth J Zechmeister. 2009. Democracy at risk: How terrorist threats 
Mintz, A., Redd, S. B., & Vedlitz, A. (2006). Can we generalize from student experiments to the 
real world in political science, military affairs, and international relations?. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 50(5), 757-776.  
Mitra, D. M. (2005). Understanding Indian Insurgencies: Implications for Counterinsurgency 
Operations in the Third World. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY 
CA.  
Mueller, John and Mark G Stewart. 2012. \The terrorism delusion: America's overwrought 
Niedermaier, A. K. (Ed.). (2008). Countdown to war in Georgia: Russia's foreign policy and 
media coverage of the conflict in south Ossetia and Abkhazia. East View. 
Page Benjamin, I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1992). The rational public: Fifty years of trends in 
Americans' policy preferences. 
Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (2010). The rational public: Fifty years of trends in Americans' 
policy preferences. University of Chicago Press. 
Partell, P. J., & Palmer, G. (1999). Audience costs and interstate crises: An empirical assessment 
of Fearon's model of dispute outcomes. International Studies Quarterly, 43(2), 389-405. 
policy attitudes." The Journal of Politics 72(2):469{483. 
Posner, D. N. (2004). The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas 




Prins, B. C. (2003). Institutional instability and the credibility of audience costs: Political 
participation and interstate crisis bargaining, 1816-1992. Journal of Peace Research, 
40(1), 67-84. 
Quek, K. (2017). Type II Audience Costs. The Journal of Politics, 79(4), 1438-1443.Kai Quek, 
University of Hong Kong  
Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: A 
meta-analytic review. Personality and social psychology review, 10(4), 336-353.  
Rosenau, J. N. (1961). Public opinion and foreign policy: An operational formulation (Vol. 35). 
Random House. 
Sagramoso, D. (2007). Violence and conflict in the Russian North Caucasus. International 
Affairs, 83(4), 681-705. 
Schultz, K. A. (1998). Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. American 
Political Science Review, 92(4), 829-844. 
Schultz, K. A. (2001). Looking for audience costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(1), 32-60.  
Sides, J., & Gross, K. (2013). Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror. The 
Journal of Politics, 75(3), 583-598. 
Sinha, S. (2018). Fragile Hegemony: Modi, Social Media and Competitive Electoral Populism in 
India. International Journal of Communication, 11(2017), 4158-4180.  
Slantchev, B. L. (2006). Politicians, the media, and domestic audience costs. International 
Studies Quarterly, 50(2), 445-477. 
Slantchev, B. L. (2010). Feigning weakness. International Organization, 64(3), 357-388. 
Smith, Alastair. 1998. “International Crises and Domestic Politics.” American Political Science 
Review 92(3): 623–38.  
159 
 
Snyder, J., & Borghard, E. D. (2011). The cost of empty threats: A penny, not a pound. 
American Political Science Review, 105(3), 437-456. 
Staniland, P. (2018). Internal security strategy in India. India Review, 17(1), 142-158. 
Tarar, A., & Leventoğlu, B. (2009). Public commitment in crisis bargaining. International 
Studies Quarterly, 53(3), 817-839. 
Threat on Voting in Israeli Elections." American Political Science Review 108(03):588{604.  
Tingley, D. H., & Walter, B. F. (2011). Can cheap talk deter? An experimental analysis. Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, 55(6), 996-1020. 
Tomz, M. (2007). Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. 
International Organization, 61(4), 821-840.  
Tomz, M. (2009). The Foundations of Domestic Audience Costs: Attitudes, Expectations, and 
Institutions. Kitai, Seido, Gurobaru-Shakai, 85-97. 
Tomz, M. R., & Weeks, J. L. (2013). Public opinion and the democratic peace. American 
political science review, 107(4), 849-865 
Trager, R. F., & Vavreck, L. (2011). The political costs of crisis bargaining: Presidential rhetoric 
and the role of party. American Journal of Political Science, 55(3), 526-545. 
Ukiwo, U., Ahonsi, B., Ako, R., Emeseh, E., Samual, I., Ukeje, D. C., ... & Idemudia, U. 
(2011). Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: managing the complex politics of petro-
violence. Bloomsbury Publishing. 




Vasilopoulos, P., Marcus, G. E., & Foucault, M. (2018). Emotional responses to the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks: Addressing the authoritarianism puzzle. Political psychology, 39(3), 557-
575. 
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H., & Nie, N. H. (1993). Citizen activity: Who participates? 
What do they say?. American Political Science Review, 87(2), 303-318. 
Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. International 
Organization, 62(1), 35-64. 
Weiss, J. C. (2013). Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest in China. 
International Organization, 67(1), 1-35.  
Wittkopf, E. R. (1990). Faces of internationalism: Public opinion and American foreign policy. 
Duke University Press. 
Xie, T., & Page, B. I. (2010). Americans and the rise of China as a world power. Journal of 
Contemporary China, 19(65), 479-501.  














Using the theoretical frameworks of audience cost and the prospect theory, this dissertation project 
aimed to shed light on the extent to which elite and social group cues affect the public's willingness 
to embrace their leader's actions during domestic and international security crises. Through the 
work to answer this often central question in the international relations and public opinion 
literatures, several cautious conclusions and suggestions for future work can be made.  
First, the results from paper one demonstrated that when interacting prospect theory's framing 
effects outperform those of the elite and social group cues and consistently shapes the American 
public's willingness to support the risk-averse or risk-acceptant plans of humanitarian interventions. 
Also, in paper one, the study found that the expected effects of partisanship on respondents' 
susceptibility to party and social peer group endorsements compared to the frames of gains or 
losses. In short, the results do not provide evidence in support of the expected heterogeneous 
treatment effects based on respondents' party affiliation or political ideology.  
Second, in paper two, using the framework of audience costs theory, the study examined the extent 
to which elite and social group cues moderate public approval of their leaders' actions during 
security crises among Indians. Similar to the American participants, the results from paper two 
indicated that cues from elites or social groups do not consistently induce preference shifts in 
Indians' willingness to punish their leader for backing down or engaging in an unsuccessful 
military interstate dispute against another country. Consequently, casting further doubt about these 
162 
 
endorsement messages' potential to induce consistent preference shifts among the public during 
international security crises as political elites and social peer groups often use them. On the other 
hand, the findings of paper two suggest that the attitudes of the Indian participants are sometimes 
moderated by the elite and social group endorsement cues in a similar fashion to their American 
and European counterparts. In particular, the elite cue presented as bipartisan endorsements were 
able to induce strong notions of national interest among the public and, as expected, reduced the 
core effects of audience costs by moderating participants' choices toward the position held by their 
party regardless of the actions of the given Indian leader. Conversely, in a similar manner, the 
social group cue effects demonstrated that respondents do look for information from groups that 
share their political preferences, and they are likely to somewhat moderate their attitudes based on 
their peer group. Therefore, despite their underperformance than theoretically expected, the results 
do suggest that bipartisan and social group cues moderate respondents' approval levels, willingness 
to vote, and perception of an improved reputation of the country and that of their prime minister 
across a number of scenarios depicting international security crises.  
In paper three, this dissertation project provided further novel empirical evidence on the 
comparative effects and ability of elite and social group cues to moderate and induce preference 
shifts among the public's willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader's handling of 
domestic security crises. Again, drawing on survey experiments in India, the results cautiously 
suggest that despite the tactical use of positive elite and social group endorsement cues aimed at 
convincing the public approve of their leader's actions during the domestic security crisis, the latter 
are still highly susceptible to reputational costs if they back down to attempt negotiations. The 
absence of consistent effect from the one-sided party endorsement on respondents' willingness to 
approve or disapprove of their leaders presents additional evidence of the importance of reputation, 
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credibility, and resolve during domestic security crises. On the other hand, bipartisan party 
endorsements seem to more consistently moderate participants' notion of national interests 
resulting in the reduction of the expected partisan effects as the respondents support the leader's 
actions across the different scenarios. Also, to a large extent, the study's results indicate the 
potential of the often underappreciated bottom-up dynamics of social group cues to affect the 
public's willingness to approve or disapprove of their leader's actions. Therefore, the findings 
reconfirm previous studies demonstrating that, even in domestic security crises, regardless of 
whether they have been presented with a contradictory single party, bipartisan, or social group cue, 
the public most often tend to impose audience costs predominantly in a non-partisan manner in 
situations involving national security and their country's reputation for resolve. 
Overall, this dissertation project improves our understanding of the microfoundations and 
mesofoundations, determining the public's willingness to support the use of force in the broader 
context of prospect theory and audience costs. Moreover, the dissertation presents evidence that 
the tactical use of elite and social group cues might not be particularly effective in situations 
involving national security interests as these information signals might moderate but seem to be 
unable to consistently induce preference shifts in the public's attitudes during domestic and 
international security crises. My claim is not that single party, bipartisan, or social group 
endorsement cues do are unable to induce consistent preference shifts among the public. On the 
contrary, the experimental results primarily suggest the need for more work to establish the 
domain-specific effect of these endorsement messages as there are only partially explaining the 
public's tendency to support or oppose actions of their leader during international and domestic 
security crises.  
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Furthermore, the three papers demonstrate the utility of null results, which can stimulate the 
additional refinement of theoretical frameworks while presenting substantive empirical findings. 
Specifically, the study's results indicate the need for careful mapping of the specific issues and 
domains among which elite and social group cues tend to manifest stronger effects able to induce 
preference shifts or more consistent moderation of the American and Indian public's attitudes. 
Likewise, the inability of partisan affiliation to consistently moderate or produce preferences shift 
among the study's American and Indian respondents in the context of humanitarian interventions, 
trade disputes, international and domestic security crises does suggest that when country's security 
and its reputation for resolve are at stake endorsement messages in the form of cues are mostly 
ineffective. Also, the comparative effects of elite and social group cues and their ability to 
moderate the public attitudes across countries, situations, and policy issues clearly illustrated that 
scholars should include the latter more systematically in their work. Hence, scholars need to 
regularly incorporate the bottom-up dynamics of social group cues as they can no longer primarily 
focus on the top-down elite cue-driven models when examining these messages' effects on the 
















A.1 Sample Characteristics 
 
 
Experiments on Mturk have not been without their critics. Nonetheless, there are several positives 
and negatives in using the online tool survey of Mechanical Turk. The first being that researchers 
can gather survey data from thousands of online respondents at lower costs and for a shorter period 
than any other tool currently (Berinsky & Huber & Lenz, 2011). Positive number two is that in 
studies using Mechanical Turk, the unrepresentativeness of the drawn samples can be decreased 
to a minimum by increasing the quota of respondents from specific categories the researcher has 
detected to be underrepresented. This possibility makes generalizable inferences more valid, 
reliable, subject to replication, and a valuable addition to student samples (Berinsky et al., 2012; 
Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Mullinix et al., 2015).250 For instance, Levay, Freese, and Druckman 
(2016) compare population-based samples and those drawn from the Mechanical Turk and find 
that by increasing the number of participants from the relevant and unrepresented religious, 
political, or ethno/religious group can significantly improve the level of representativeness of the 
sample and increase the validity of experimental scholars’ inferences.  
Meanwhile, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk has also received a large amount of criticism from the 
literature (Levay & Freese & Druckman, 2016). The fundamental drawbacks are that studies using 
it tend on average to collect samples that often can be slightly unrepresentative of countries 
population in terms of demographic (younger), political ideology of respondents (more liberal), 
and the possibility of fraudulent use by some workers (Gerber & Huber & Doherty, & Dowling, 
2011; Huber & Hill & Lenz, 2012; Huber & Paris, 2013; Leeper & Freese, & Druckman, 2015). 
This study reduces the problems of oversampling more liberal leaning workers on Mechanical 
Turk by deliberate sampling a practically identical number of self-identifying democrats (40.63%) 
and republicans (38.66%).    
Scholars have also pointed at the possibility that Mechanical Turk’s pay rates affect its workers’ 
work quality. However, a study by Andersen and Lau (2018) addresses this criticism by present 
evidence from two different social science studies. Their results demonstrate that pay rates used in 
 
250 Combining student samples with mechanical Turk samples can provide benefits as similar results from both 
populations could provide valuable insights and increase the validity of the experimental findings.  
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Mechanical Turk do not systematically affect the quality of respondents’ work. This study 
compensated the workers with $0.70 dollar cents for their participation lasting on average 12-13 
minutes. Another source of concerns is the practice of individuals permanently living outside of 
the US to use Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to participate in studies limited only to US residents. 
To avoid the dangers of such fraudulent participants, this study applied Burleigh, Kennedy, and 
Clifford’s (2018) recently developed Qualtrics/Mechanical Turk Protocol for screening out 
international respondents using VPS.  
Turning to the sample characteristics, the paper operates with one student sample (referred to as 
experiment 1) consisting of 387 respondents from a large public university in the United States 
and one nation national sample (referred to as experiment 2) of American adults amounting to 
1622 respondents. In experiment one, males account for 39.53 percent of the sample, while in 
experiment two, males account for 53.88 percent of the respondent pool. Experiment 1 
demographic structure consists of 10.59% white respondents, 25.06% African American, 11.37% 
Asian, 14.73% Native American, Biracial 16.28%, and 25.96% have chosen not to indicate their 
race/ethnicity or to select other. While overall in experiment one 108 respondents or 27.91% 
identify as Latino/Hispanic.  
 
 
Table 12: Experiment 1 Student Sample 

































Income  Less than $25,000 88.89 
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 $25,000 to $35,000 
$35,000 to $50,000 
$50,000 to $75,000 
































The Mechanical Turk Sample (Experiment 2) closely follows the national demographic structure 
consists of 72.75% White, 13.75% as African-American, 6.78% Asian, less than one percent 
Native American, 4.01% Biracial, and 2.34% have not identified their ethnicity or race. In contrast 
to Experiment 2, approximately 14% (228) of the respondent identify as Latino/Hispanic. Both 
experiments 1 and 2 include more liberals 42.15% and 41.47%, moderates 32.56% and 23.30%, 
while conservatives’ amount to 24.29% and 35.33, respectively. Respondents’ partisanship 
affiliation in experiments 1 and 2 consists of 53.75% and 40.63% identifying as democrats, 18.09% 
and 20.72% independents, and 28.17 and 38.66% republicans.  
 
 
Table 13: Experiment 2 Mechanical Turk Sample 


























Less than 3 
 










Less than $25,000 
$25,000 to $35,000 
$35,000 to $50,000 
$50,000 to $75,000 




































A.2 List of the Treatments 
 























5 Gains  
Elite Cue 




Democrat B  
27 116 
7 Gains  
Elite Cue 




Republican B  
28 116 
9 Gains Social Cue A  29 116 
10 Losses Social Cue A  28 115 
11 Gains  Social Cue B  26 116 
12 Losses Social Cue B  28 116 
13 Gains  
No Social or 
Elite Cue  
27 116 
14 Losses 
No Social or 















Q How old are you? 
➢ 18-29   
➢ 30-39    
➢ 40-49   
➢ 50-59   
➢ 60+   
 
Q What is your biological (genetic) sex 
➢ Male   
➢ Female   
➢ Other    
 
Q What gender do you currently identify with 
➢ Male    
➢ Female   
➢ Other    




Q Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what?  
➢ Strong Democrat     
➢ Weak Democrat    
➢ Independent Democrat    
➢ Independent   
➢ Independent Republican    
➢ Weak Republican    
➢ Strong Republican   
➢ Very strong Republican   
 
Q Do you agree or disagree with the US president’s decision to impose sanctions on Russia? This 
question is designed to ensure you are reading carefully. Please choose "Prefer not to say" below 
as a sign that you are paying attention. 
➢ Strongly Agree   
➢ Somewhat Agree   
➢ Slightly Agree    
➢ Prefer not to say     
➢ Slightly Disagree    
➢ Somewhat Disagree    




Q What is the highest level of education you have completed?   
➢ Less than High School Diploma   
➢ High school Diploma   
➢ Some College or Associate’s Degree    
➢ College/University Bachelor’s Degree   




Q What is your race/ethnicity?     
➢ African American/Black    
➢ Asian    
➢ Caucasian/White    
➢ American Indian or Alaskan Native    
➢ Biracial   
➢ Other   
➢ Prefer not to say   
 
Q Do you consider your ethnicity to be Hispanic/Latino(a)?  
➢ Yes   
➢ No   
 
Q What is your annual income?  
➢ Less than $25,000    
➢ $25,000 to 35,000     
➢ $35,000 to 50,000    
➢ $50,001 to 75,000   
➢ $75,001 to 100,000   
➢ Over $100,000   
 
Q Have you migrated to the United States or you were born here252 
➢ I migrated   
➢ I was born in the United States   
➢ Prefer not to answer   
 
Q How would you describe yourself politically?  
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➢ Very liberal  
➢ Liberal/Progressive   
➢ Slightly liberal   
➢ Moderate   
➢ Slightly conservative   
➢ Conservative   
➢ Very Conservative   
 
Q Did you vote in the 2016 presidential elections?   
➢ Yes   
➢ No   
 
Q For which candidate did you vote in the 2016 Presidential Elections  
➢ Donald Trump    
➢ Hilary Clinton    
➢ Other    
➢ I did not vote    




Q Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.  
 Never  One Time  Sometimes  
Several 
Times  
On a Regular 
Basis  
Worked for a 
political 
campaign   
o  o  o  o  o  
Donate 
money to a 
political 
campaign  
o  o  o  o  o  
Served in a 
community 
board  




problem   
o  o  o  o  o  
Contacted a 
government 
official   
o  o  o  o  o  
Participated 
in a political 
gathering or 
rally.  





Q How closely do you follow national politics 
➢ Very Closely    
➢ Closely  
➢ Somewhat Closely  
➢ Not too Closely  
➢ Not at all   
 
Q How closely do you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world? 
➢ Very Closely   
➢ Closely   
➢ Somewhat Closely  
➢ Not too Closely  
➢ Not at all   
 
Next, you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, 
national identity, and the US's role in the international political system. You can indicate only one 
answer per question which range from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each 




Q The best way a country can ensure its security is with the use of its military and security forces 
to discourage current and potential international challengers.       
➢ Strongly disagree    
➢ Disagree  
➢ Neither agree nor disagree   
➢ Agree    
➢ Strongly agree   
 
Q The use of military force only makes problems worse.                          
➢ Strongly agree    
➢ Agree   
➢ Neither agree nor disagree   
➢ Disagree   
➢ Strongly disagree   
 
Q Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an 
international crisis that is threatening vital national interests of your country.                            
➢ Strongly agree   
➢ Agree   
➢ Neither agree nor disagree   
➢ Disagree   
➢ Strongly disagree 
   
Q To what extent do you agree that the United States is superior compared to other nations?      
➢ Strongly agree   
➢ Agree   
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➢ Neither agree nor disagree  
➢ Disagree  
➢ Strongly disagree   
 
Q To what extent do you agree that some things the United States has done in the recent past made 
you feel ashamed.   
➢ Strongly agree   
➢ Agree   
➢ Neither agree nor disagree  
➢ Disagree  
➢ Strongly disagree  
 
Q Which of the following are most important for your national identity. Five (5) indicates very 
important, and zero (0) indicates not important at all to your national identity.   
 0  1  2 3  4  5  
American 
culture  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Race/Ethnicity  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Religion  o  o  o  o  o  o  




Q The United States needs to cooperate more with the United Nations in settling international 
disputes. 
➢ Strongly agree   
➢ Agree   
➢ Neither agree nor disagree   
➢ Disagree   
➢ Strongly disagree   
 
Q The United States needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.  
➢ Strongly agree   
➢ Agree   
➢ Neither agree nor disagree  
➢ Disagree   
➢ Strongly disagree   
 
Q The United States should primarily focus its efforts to take care of the well-being of Americans 
and not get involved in other nations’ conflicts    
➢ Strongly agree    
➢ Agree    
➢ Neither agree nor disagree   
➢ Disagree    
➢ Strongly disagree   
 
In the next lines, you will read about five political situations that the US government currently 
faces or might face in the future and asked to choose a plan of action for each of them. Please read 
them carefully.         
 
      [Subjects are presented with the five scenarios in a randomized order.] 
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[Decision problem 1 Fictional Scenario in the country of Aboria of East-Africa]  
 
A congressional committee is discussing the situation in the country of Aboria. Currently, the 
country’s rural areas are plagued by warring ethnic groups fighting for control of resources, and 
the authoritarian leader of Aboria has been unwilling to control them. The country’s is also 
experiencing food shortages further aggravated by the political instability and intergroup violence 
that prevents aid agencies from reaching civilians, placing about 50,000 lives at risk. Two plans 
of intervention are considered, each involving 1500 U.S troops. [Social Cue] In addition a recent 
public opinion poll the majority of people with your political views have strongly 
[supported/opposed] $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] For reference, the [Republican/Democratic party 
has endorsed $PLAN A/B 
 
[Domain of Gains] 
 
If plan A is selected,    
About 1300 U.S. troops return home safely from the intervention, and their presence may save 
about 30,000 civilian lives in Aboria. 
        
If plan B is selected,    
There is an 80% chance that about 1400 U.S. troops will return home safely from the intervention 
and their presence may save around 50,000 civilians lives in Aboria, but a 20% chance that about 
1200 U.S. troops will return home safely, and around 10,000 civilian lives in Aboria will be lost.        
    




If plan A is selected,    
About 100 U.S. troops may die, be wounded, or be captured in the operation, and about 5000 
civilians’ lives in Aboria will be lost.             
 
If plan B is selected,   
There is an 80% chance that U.S. troops will sustain no casualties, and no civilians lives in Aboria 
will be lost, but a 20% chance that about 300 U.S. troops will not return home safely, and instead 
will die in combat, be wounded, or be captured, and around 10,000 civilian lives in Aboria will be 




Q Please indicate which plan of action you choose  
➢ Strongly support plan A    
➢ Mostly Support Plan A   
➢ Somewhat support plan A  
➢ Neither Plan   
➢ Somewhat support plan B    
➢ Mostly Support Plan B   
➢ Strongly support plan B   
 
Q To what extent do you agree or disagree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?  
➢ Strongly agree   
➢ Mostly Agree    
➢ Somewhat agree  
➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree    
➢ Somewhat disagree   
➢ Mostly Disagree   
➢ Strongly disagree   
 
Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT intervene its national security interests 
will suffer because instability will create a breeding ground for terrorists.     
➢ Strongly agree    
➢ Mostly Agree     
➢ Somewhat agree   
➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree   
➢ Somewhat disagree   
➢ Mostly Disagree  




[Decision problem 2 Venezuela] 
A congressional committee is discussing the situation in Venezuela. The South American country 
is experiencing a severe economic and political crisis. For the past several years, the opposition 
party in Venezuela has been pushing for reforms in the economy to stop the food crisis in the 
country. So far, the pro-government paramilitary units have killed approximately 56 protesters 
trying to open the border crossing for humanitarian aid. The leader of Venezuela has proposed 
policies, including arrests, to limit the influence of the opposition movement which endangers the 
lives of about 5000 civilians. Two plans of intervention are considered, each involving 2500 U.S 
troops. [Social Cue] Interestingly in a recent public opinion poll the majority of people with your 
political views have strongly [supported/opposed] $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] For reference, the 
[Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B 
 
[Domain of Gains] 
 
If plan A is selected,    
About 2400 U.S. troops will return home safely from the intervention and their presence may save 
around 3000 Venezuelan civilian lives.          
If plan B is selected,    
There is a 95% chance that all U.S. troops will return home safely from the intervention and their 
presence may save around 5000 Venezuelan civilian lives, and a 5% chance that about 2300 U.S. 
troops will return home safely, and about 3000 Venezuelan civilian lives will be lost.        
 




If plan A is selected,    
About 150 U.S. troops may die, be wounded or be captured during the operation, and about 500 
Venezuelan civilian lives will be lost.  
           
If plan B is selected,    
There is a 95% chance that the U.S. troops will sustain no casualties, and no Venezuelan civilians’ 
lives will be lost, and a 5% chance that about 200 U.S. troops will die in combat, be wounded, or 
be captured, and around 2000 Venezuelan civilian lives will be lost.     
 
Q Please indicate which plan of action you choose  
➢ Strongly support plan A    
➢ Mostly support plan A   
➢ Somewhat support plan A   
➢ Neither plan   
➢ Somewhat support plan B   
➢ Mostly support plan B   




Q To what extent do you agree or disagree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?  
 
➢ Strongly agree    
➢ Mostly Agree    
➢ Somewhat agree   
➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree   
➢ Somewhat disagree   
➢ Mostly Disagree   
➢ Strongly disagree   
 
Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT intervene its national security interests 
will suffer because of a spillover of violence into neighboring countries.  
➢ Strongly agree    
➢ Mostly Agree    
➢ Somewhat agree   
➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree    
➢ Somewhat disagree    
➢ Mostly Disagree   
➢ Strongly disagree  
 
 
[Decision problem 3 Cameroon]  
A congressional committee is discussing the situation in Cameroon (a country in Central Africa). 
The Cameroonian population is divided between two groups: the English-speaking minority and 
the French-speaking majority. Recently the majority has taken control of most of the positions of 
power in the country, resulting in rising tensions to which the military has responded with reprisals 
against villages part of the English-speaking minority. Due to the anarchic situation and an 
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estimated 20,000 lives are at risk. Two plans of intervention are considered, each involving the 
deployment of 1000 U.S. troops. [Social Cue] Similarly, in the latest public opinion poll the 
majority of people with your political views have strongly [supported/opposed] $PLAN A/B // 
[Elite Cue] For reference, the [Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B 
 
[Domain of Gains] 
If plan A is selected,   
About 900 U.S. troops will return home safely, and many as 15,000 Cameroonian civilian lives 
will be saved.             
 
If plan B is selected,    
There is a 67% chance that all U.S. troops will return home safely, and 20,000 Cameroonian 
civilians’ lives will be saved.  But also, there is a 33% chance that about 850 U.S. troops will return 
home safely, and about 10,000 Cameroonian civilian lives will be lost.      
 
[Domain of Losses]  
If plan A is selected,    
About 100 U.S. troops will not return home safely and as many as 8,000 Cameroonian civilian 
lives will be lost.          
 
If plan B is selected,    
There is a 67% chance that all US troops will return home safely, and no Cameroonian civilians 
will be lost.  But also, there is a 33% chance that about 150 U.S. troops will not return home safely 




Q Please indicate which plan of action you choose  
➢ Strongly support plan A   
➢ Mostly support plan A   
Somewhat support plan A   
➢ Neither plan    
➢ Somewhat support plan B   
➢ Mostly support plan B    
➢ Strongly support plan B   
 
Q To what extent do you agree or disagree that the United States has a moral obligation to intervene?  
➢ Strongly agree   
➢ Mostly Agree    
➢ Somewhat agree  
➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree   
➢ Somewhat disagree    
➢ Mostly Disagree  




Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT intervene its reputation for resolve 
will suffer, making it more difficult to achieve future foreign policy goals.  
 
➢ Strongly agree    
➢ Mostly Agree    
➢ Somewhat agree   
➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree    
➢ Somewhat disagree    
➢ Mostly Disagree   
➢ Strongly disagree   
 
[Decision Problem 4 US-China Trade War] 
US China G Social B The US president needs to choose and implement the type of tariffs to be 
imposed on China. In five days, the president must specify the type of tariff plan to be implemented 
as about 200,000-250,000 US jobs are at stake. The president’s research team has come up with 
four tariff plans. [Social Cue] In the latest official opinion poll, people with your political views 
[support/oppose] $PLAN A/B // [Elite Cue] Most of the [Republican/Democratic party has 
endorsed $PLAN A/B 
 




If tariff plan A is selected the US economy will create approximately 80,000 to 110, 000 jobs.           
If tariff plan B is selected then there is a 90% chance that the US economy will create 
approximately 120,000 to 150,000 jobs, and a 10% chance that it will lose 200,000 to 220,000 
jobs.          
If tariff plan C is selected there is a 60% chance that the US economy will create approximately 
160,000 to 190,000 jobs, and a 40% chance that no jobs are created.           
If tariff plan D is selected there is a 50% chance that the US economy will create approximately 
220,000 to 250,000 jobs, and a 50% chance that it will lose between 220,000 to 250,000 jobs.      
 
[Domain of Losses]  
 
If tariff plan A is selected the US economy will lose 80,000 to 110,000 jobs.          
If tariff plan B is selected there is a 90% chance that the US economy will lose 110,000 to 150,000 
to jobs, and a 10% chance that approximately 200,000 to 220,000 jobs are created.           
If tariff plan C is selected there is a 60% that the US economy will lose 30,000 to 50,000 jobs, and 
a 40% chance that it will lose 200,000 to 220,000 jobs.           
If tariff plan D is selected there is a 50% chance that the US economy will lose between 220,000 




Q Please indicate which Tariff Plan you choose? 
➢ Tariff Plan A   
➢ Tariff Plan B   
➢ Tariff Plan C  
➢ Tariff Plan D  
➢ Neither Plan   
 
Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT use an increase in tariffs to stop 
Chinese unfair trading practices its economic interests will suffer 
➢ Strongly agree    
➢ Mostly Agree    
➢ Somewhat agree   
➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree    
➢ Somewhat disagree    
➢ Mostly Disagree   
➢ Strongly disagree   
 
Q Do you agree/disagree that if the United States does NOT use an increase in tariffs to stop 
Chinese unfair trading practices its security interests will suffer  
➢ Strongly agree    
➢ Mostly Agree    
➢ Somewhat agree   
➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree   
➢ Somewhat disagree    
➢ Mostly Disagree  
➢ Strongly disagree  
 
[Decision problem 5 The Asian Disease Design] 
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The U.S. is making preparations for the outbreak of a rare Tropical disease, which is expected to 
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs/plans to combat the disease have been proposed. After 
repeated tests of the medications, the consequences of each of the programs will be as follows. 
[Social Cue] In the same opinion pool, people with your political views [support/oppose] $PLAN 
A/B // [Elite Cue] Officially, the [Republican/Democratic party has endorsed $PLAN A/B 
 
[Domain of Gains] 
If Plan A is selected: "200 people will be saved"         
If Plan B is selected: "there is a 1/3 (33%) probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 
(67%) probability that no people will be saved"    
 
[Domain of Losses]  
If Program A is selected: "400 people will die.      
If Program B is selected: "there is a 1/3 (33%) probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 (67%) 
probability that 600 people will die.     
 
Q Please indicate which plan of action you choose? 
➢ Strongly support plan A   
➢ Mostly support plan A   
➢ Somewhat support plan A   
➢ Neither plan   
➢ Somewhat support plan B   
➢ Mostly support plan B   
➢ Strongly support plan B   
 




Q What was the difference between the two plans across the decision problems?  
➢ Number of casualties and relative risk    
➢ Government debt   




A.4 Regression Models and Robustness Checks 
 
 
The Tables in Appendix IV show the results from the large Mechanical Turk sample (Experiment 





Table 14: Results for Aboria Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A253 Dem B254 Rep A255 Rep B256 Group A257 Group B258 
        
Domain of Losses 5.810*** 3.696*** 7.698*** 7.668*** 4.549*** 2.755*** 2.727*** 
 (2.199) (1.234) (3.132) (2.827) (1.638) (0.944) (0.895) 
Males 1.195 0.908 1.749 1.491 0.715 2.505*** 0.966 
 (0.424) (0.293) (0.665) (0.552) (0.260) (0.893) (0.315) 
Education  1.139 1.038 0.831 1.187 0.920 1.020 0.856 
 (0.126) (0.098) (0.096) (0.132) (0.107) (0.109) (0.084) 
Age 1.022 1.107 1.184 1.060 0.941 1.020 1.132 
 (0.171) (0.151) (0.203) (0.177) (0.142) (0.158) (0.171) 
Militarism  0.880 0.780 0.827 0.830 1.404 0.603 0.718 
 (0.314) (0.238) (0.275) (0.250) (0.435) (0.186) (0.220) 
Internationalism  0.967 0.907 1.303 0.972 1.329 1.210 0.899 
 (0.262) (0.251) (0.336) (0.287) (0.370) (0.309) (0.244) 
Political Awareness 0.639** 0.655** 0.395*** 0.642** 0.486*** 0.745 0.517*** 
 (0.145) (0.119) (0.090) (0.134) (0.104) (0.151) (0.095) 
Constant 0.607 0.731 0.233 0.528 0.358 0.053*** 0.472 
 (0.685) (0.652) (0.274) (0.634) (0.358) (0.053) (0.510) 
        
Observations 159 182 165 169 169 173 184 
Pseudo R-squared 0.154 0.113 0.220 0.211 0.162 0.112 0.113 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
253 The democratic party has endorsed the risk-averse plan of action.  
254 The democratic party has endorsed the risk-acceptant plan of action.  
255 The republican party has endorsed the risk-averse plan of action.  
256 The republican party has endorsed the risk-acceptant plan of action.  
257 The group has endorsed the risk-averse plan of action.  






Table 15: Results for Venezuela Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 7.200*** 3.310*** 5.589*** 3.522*** 6.315*** 4.980*** 4.436*** 
 (3.019) (1.145) (2.157) (1.232) (2.464) (1.843) (1.685) 
Males 1.775 1.150 1.351 1.632 1.109 1.403 1.491 
 (0.670) (0.376) (0.506) (0.579) (0.422) (0.509) (0.550) 
Education  1.044 0.934 0.745** 0.969 0.970 0.959 0.825* 
 (0.122) (0.088) (0.087) (0.102) (0.113) (0.106) (0.090) 
Age 0.776 1.055 0.959 1.272 1.509** 1.145 1.027 
 (0.133) (0.139) (0.157) (0.208) (0.260) (0.181) (0.171) 
Militarism  1.094 1.736* 0.864 0.888 1.694 0.814 0.410** 
 (0.415) (0.520) (0.292) (0.252) (0.574) (0.267) (0.143) 
Internationalism  0.863 1.170 0.745 1.023 0.756 1.119 1.238 
 (0.251) (0.316) (0.191) (0.286) (0.221) (0.292) (0.370) 
Political Awareness 0.613** 0.485*** 0.467*** 0.517*** 0.499*** 0.533*** 0.368*** 
 (0.132) (0.090) (0.102) (0.108) (0.107) (0.112) (0.078) 
Constant 0.266 1.152 3.535 0.335 0.854 1.043 0.170 
 (0.302) (1.089) (4.035) (0.377) (0.920) (1.032) (0.203) 
        
Observations 179 188 167 170 171 179 186 
Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.126 0.190 0.144 0.227 0.162 0.231 
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 16: Results for Cameroon Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 26.195*** 7.823*** 9.653*** 7.527*** 6.502*** 13.538*** 10.192*** 
 (10.992) (2.900) (3.863) (2.799) (2.388) (5.728) (4.184) 
Males 2.217** 0.750 3.245*** 1.073 0.954 2.003* 2.968*** 
 (0.861) (0.261) (1.340) (0.393) (0.350) (0.832) (1.207) 
Education  0.862 1.127 0.990 1.206* 0.926 1.083 1.061 
 (0.100) (0.116) (0.120) (0.132) (0.109) (0.137) (0.125) 
Age 1.163 1.075 1.094 1.039 0.887 0.971 1.173 
 (0.203) (0.156) (0.186) (0.178) (0.139) (0.192) (0.208) 
Militarism  0.959 0.936 1.030 0.720 1.168 0.585 0.846 
 (0.362) (0.303) (0.357) (0.212) (0.373) (0.210) (0.310) 
Internationalism  0.755 1.275 0.795 0.792 1.208 0.933 1.061 
 (0.220) (0.374) (0.207) (0.235) (0.347) (0.281) (0.342) 
Political Awareness 0.994 0.648** 0.800 0.928 0.597** 1.110 0.423*** 
 (0.218) (0.127) (0.169) (0.190) (0.128) (0.246) (0.098) 
Constant 0.400 0.190* 0.125* 0.081** 0.493 0.128* 0.018*** 
 (0.469) (0.188) (0.152) (0.096) (0.503) (0.151) (0.024) 
        
Observations 194 176 161 172 163 172 174 
Pseudo R-squared 0.346 0.188 0.226 0.177 0.162 0.257 0.259 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 17: Results for Trade War Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
198 
 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 11.995*** 3.627*** 7.344*** 6.639*** 8.354*** 5.070*** 4.124*** 
 (4.680) (1.196) (2.741) (2.384) (2.984) (1.695) (1.399) 
Males 1.228 1.270 1.903* 1.340 0.551* 1.160 0.974 
 (0.456) (0.405) (0.700) (0.475) (0.198) (0.393) (0.322) 
Education  0.990 0.906 1.004 1.152 0.991 0.932 0.849 
 (0.108) (0.086) (0.105) (0.126) (0.107) (0.098) (0.086) 
Age 0.846 0.880 0.942 0.981 0.935 1.084 0.763 
 (0.143) (0.114) (0.154) (0.155) (0.144) (0.155) (0.128) 
Militarism  1.481 0.924 1.895* 0.629 1.098 1.160 0.703 
 (0.561) (0.270) (0.623) (0.194) (0.367) (0.365) (0.225) 
Internationalism  0.536** 1.215 1.157 0.768 1.026 0.880 0.794 
 (0.148) (0.324) (0.277) (0.229) (0.288) (0.220) (0.219) 
Political Awareness 1.212 0.696** 0.804 1.412* 0.946 0.811 1.007 
 (0.254) (0.126) (0.158) (0.261) (0.176) (0.159) (0.172) 
Constant 0.778 0.144** 0.040*** 0.074** 0.550 0.188* 0.560 
 (0.840) (0.134) (0.046) (0.085) (0.565) (0.188) (0.605) 
        
Observations 182 195 183 180 183 194 189 
Pseudo R-squared 0.240 0.0877 0.164 0.159 0.180 0.119 0.108 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 18: Results for Asian Disease Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 4.775*** 4.977*** 1.537 3.676*** 2.578*** 6.307*** 3.007*** 
 (1.673) (1.703) (0.511) (1.650) (0.860) (2.456) (0.950) 
Males 1.423 1.141 1.636 1.301 1.043 0.871 1.095 
 (0.489) (0.382) (0.554) (0.574) (0.350) (0.324) (0.350) 
Education  0.809** 0.913 0.856 0.971 1.027 1.066 0.877 
 (0.085) (0.090) (0.086) (0.130) (0.104) (0.120) (0.085) 
Age 0.819 1.049 0.873 0.681 1.046 1.016 0.998 
 (0.135) (0.138) (0.121) (0.166) (0.139) (0.164) (0.149) 
Militarism  1.057 0.832 1.292 0.561* 1.440 0.860 0.919 
 (0.357) (0.256) (0.392) (0.196) (0.436) (0.287) (0.278) 
Internationalism  0.968 1.027 1.175 0.904 0.971 0.931 0.805 
 (0.237) (0.280) (0.261) (0.324) (0.245) (0.253) (0.214) 
Political Awareness 0.711 0.703* 0.647** 0.651* 0.648** 0.849 0.664** 
 (0.148) (0.132) (0.128) (0.169) (0.129) (0.190) (0.118) 
Constant 1.389 0.051*** 2.244 0.378 0.363 0.111** 0.265 
 (1.484) (0.048) (2.292) (0.549) (0.350) (0.121) (0.282) 
        
Observations 173 191 165 148 177 178 192 
Pseudo R-squared 0.132 0.140 0.0546 0.131 0.0668 0.136 0.0813 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 19: Results for Aboria based on the subset of Democrats 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 5.565*** 2.978** 26.613*** 6.581*** 3.491** 3.673** 2.019 
 (3.217) (1.637) (23.919) (4.062) (1.966) (2.346) (1.188) 
Males 1.607 1.588 2.094 1.772 1.216 5.010*** 1.485 
 (0.821) (0.828) (1.327) (1.111) (0.669) (2.873) (0.907) 
Education  1.021 1.046 0.893 1.090 1.051 0.725* 0.713* 
 (0.163) (0.154) (0.193) (0.182) (0.179) (0.134) (0.134) 
Age 1.038 1.157 1.642* 0.881 0.977 1.157 0.725 
 (0.266) (0.266) (0.478) (0.216) (0.220) (0.328) (0.211) 
Militarism  1.598 0.760 1.176 1.033 1.737 0.324** 0.756 
 (1.023) (0.418) (0.659) (0.521) (0.885) (0.168) (0.399) 
Internationalism  0.945 0.820 1.204 0.882 1.252 1.556 1.288 
 (0.388) (0.357) (0.504) (0.401) (0.618) (0.720) (0.598) 
Political Awareness 0.793 0.457** 0.471* 0.791 0.752 0.699 0.195*** 
 (0.248) (0.159) (0.214) (0.227) (0.253) (0.288) (0.085) 
Constant 0.365 0.984 0.095 0.166 0.580 0.027** 0.385 
 (0.591) (1.387) (0.170) (0.320) (0.889) (0.041) (0.687) 
        
Observations 70 77 70 70 71 81 77 
Pseudo R-squared 0.156 0.168 0.304 0.193 0.108 0.246 0.259 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 20: Results for Venezuela based on the subset of Democrats 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 9.779*** 4.097** 8.963*** 7.912*** 6.662*** 8.076*** 2.513 
 (5.924) (2.596) (6.641) (4.964) (4.385) (5.472) (1.606) 
Males 1.343 1.340 1.051 1.741 1.092 1.145 3.683* 
 (0.724) (0.795) (0.614) (1.221) (0.666) (0.644) (2.602) 
Education  0.985 0.986 0.766 1.211 0.977 0.897 0.725 
 (0.161) (0.165) (0.153) (0.224) (0.176) (0.161) (0.147) 
Age 0.875 1.093 0.787 1.261 1.691* 1.657* 0.547** 
 (0.224) (0.275) (0.219) (0.369) (0.468) (0.507) (0.167) 
Militarism  1.839 4.280** 1.381 1.810 2.603 0.634 0.257** 
 (1.171) (3.011) (0.752) (1.032) (1.585) (0.335) (0.156) 
Internationalism  1.259 1.226 1.098 0.939 0.697 1.817 1.842 
 (0.569) (0.603) (0.439) (0.494) (0.397) (0.793) (0.985) 
Political Awareness 0.835 0.285*** 0.372** 0.705 0.329*** 0.587 0.178*** 
 (0.254) (0.115) (0.159) (0.232) (0.134) (0.215) (0.082) 
Constant 0.495 0.529 3.534 0.036 0.194 0.415 0.159 
 (0.818) (0.840) (5.907) (0.076) (0.356) (0.649) (0.314) 
        
Observations 80 70 70 70 76 83 81 
Pseudo R-squared 0.221 0.272 0.164 0.260 0.290 0.233 0.372 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 21: Results for Cameroon based on the subset of Democrats 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 168.692*** 9.260*** 106.542*** 19.302*** 4.437*** 62.677*** 13.080*** 
 (175.088) (5.969) (112.070) (13.897) (2.419) (63.260) (9.503) 
Males 3.134 1.228 2.829 1.108 1.208 2.430 1.996 
 (2.368) (0.710) (2.431) (0.790) (0.642) (1.778) (1.364) 
Education  0.552** 0.994 1.103 1.131 1.069 0.794 0.747 
 (0.144) (0.166) (0.290) (0.211) (0.180) (0.185) (0.166) 
Age 0.965 0.914 0.914 0.899 1.102 1.306 0.759 
 (0.335) (0.242) (0.346) (0.275) (0.256) (0.504) (0.247) 
Militarism  1.664 1.128 2.534 1.796 1.213 0.179** 0.271** 
 (1.326) (0.741) (2.169) (1.026) (0.618) (0.128) (0.180) 
Internationalism  1.345 1.715 1.419 1.099 0.919 0.642 1.688 
 (0.843) (0.840) (0.753) (0.579) (0.459) (0.377) (0.825) 
Political Awareness 0.783 0.356** 0.319** 0.849 0.780 0.615 0.354** 
 (0.346) (0.151) (0.183) (0.283) (0.260) (0.338) (0.146) 
Constant 1.661 0.652 0.165 0.017* 0.414 0.019* 0.024* 
 (3.931) (1.033) (0.361) (0.039) (0.645) (0.042) (0.049) 
        
Observations 86 73 69 67 74 82 74 
Pseudo R-squared 0.564 0.248 0.505 0.311 0.130 0.433 0.308 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 22: Results for the Trade War scenario based on the subset of Democrats 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 17.845*** 1.707 5.833*** 4.827*** 5.043*** 5.926*** 3.895** 
 (12.888) (0.930) (3.897) (2.773) (3.012) (3.057) (2.266) 
Males 1.115 2.421 1.522 0.544 0.276** 0.623 1.326 
 (0.706) (1.329) (0.929) (0.323) (0.173) (0.317) (0.753) 
Education  1.017 0.860 0.774 1.132 1.059 0.811 0.888 
 (0.186) (0.135) (0.165) (0.181) (0.176) (0.134) (0.151) 
Age 0.612 0.923 1.285 0.992 1.126 0.979 1.079 
 (0.200) (0.196) (0.368) (0.247) (0.302) (0.223) (0.302) 
Militarism  3.615* 0.546 1.634 0.765 1.940 2.258 0.314** 
 (2.806) (0.329) (0.952) (0.374) (1.190) (1.129) (0.172) 
Internationalism  0.490 0.703 0.733 0.891 0.784 1.002 0.931 
 (0.227) (0.312) (0.302) (0.407) (0.427) (0.440) (0.438) 
Political Awareness 1.801* 1.112 1.001 1.545 1.044 0.861 0.982 
 (0.593) (0.354) (0.388) (0.444) (0.352) (0.283) (0.303) 
Constant 1.844 0.054* 0.049 0.117 6.738 0.424 0.034* 
 (3.325) (0.086) (0.094) (0.217) (11.842) (0.649) (0.062) 
        
Observations 75 77 71 71 80 93 75 
Pseudo R-squared 0.319 0.0955 0.137 0.138 0.179 0.187 0.119 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 23: Results for the Asian Disease based on the subset of Democrats 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 1.850 2.983* 2.150 3.523* 1.565 14.926*** 2.823* 
 (0.956) (1.683) (1.203) (2.620) (0.848) (10.255) (1.507) 
Males 1.167 1.238 2.409 2.114 0.618 0.442 1.805 
 (0.578) (0.661) (1.331) (1.772) (0.335) (0.279) (0.967) 
Education  0.882 0.789 0.771 0.805 1.063 0.732 0.963 
 (0.137) (0.126) (0.126) (0.177) (0.173) (0.144) (0.162) 
Age 0.760 1.276 1.196 0.514* 0.914 1.221 0.927 
 (0.204) (0.288) (0.261) (0.197) (0.203) (0.335) (0.248) 
Militarism  0.443 1.343 1.189 0.806 1.593 1.848 1.238 
 (0.265) (0.799) (0.570) (0.536) (0.840) (1.108) (0.620) 
Internationalism  0.658 0.788 0.860 0.575 0.614 0.607 1.232 
 (0.250) (0.363) (0.319) (0.366) (0.309) (0.323) (0.533) 
Political Awareness 0.826 0.658 0.907 0.495* 0.742 0.450* 0.629 
 (0.250) (0.226) (0.308) (0.199) (0.232) (0.208) (0.185) 
Constant 0.366 0.079 2.557 1.009 0.669 0.038 0.127 
 (0.563) (0.122) (3.750) (2.548) (1.051) (0.087) (0.210) 
        
Observations 72 76 70 55 73 90 80 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0927 0.150 0.0904 0.251 0.0519 0.339 0.0872 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 24: Results for Aboria based on the subset of Republicans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 13.149*** 3.131** 3.195* 5.193** 13.882*** 4.265* 3.258** 
 (9.936) (1.579) (2.163) (3.564) (11.126) (3.368) (1.848) 
Males 1.069 0.640 3.413 1.609 0.995 3.116 0.741 
 (0.861) (0.354) (2.550) (1.051) (0.753) (2.435) (0.390) 
Education  0.970 1.158 0.543*** 1.564** 0.775 2.219** 0.875 
 (0.250) (0.178) (0.113) (0.349) (0.192) (0.695) (0.143) 
Age 0.799 1.070 1.456 1.306 1.246 0.623 1.462* 
 (0.272) (0.226) (0.461) (0.406) (0.431) (0.218) (0.334) 
Militarism  1.713 0.625 0.615 0.540 1.575 0.425 0.800 
 (1.353) (0.306) (0.401) (0.352) (0.984) (0.396) (0.477) 
Internationalism  1.287 0.917 0.776 0.949 1.025 1.397 0.728 
 (0.806) (0.435) (0.358) (0.570) (0.575) (0.774) (0.370) 
Political Awareness 0.246** 0.773 0.289*** 0.415* 0.209*** 0.608 0.540** 
 (0.135) (0.198) (0.113) (0.214) (0.101) (0.206) (0.163) 
Constant 0.593 1.255 0.003** 0.904 0.287 0.024 0.145 
 (2.049) (1.993) (0.009) (2.430) (0.714) (0.066) (0.318) 
        
Observations 56 79 70 58 63 55 77 
Pseudo R-squared 0.307 0.126 0.309 0.277 0.382 0.229 0.167 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 25: Results for Venezuela based on the subset of Republicans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 16.738*** 1.755 2.120 1.029 8.163*** 5.250** 7.604*** 
 (14.954) (0.856) (1.350) (0.645) (6.217) (4.397) (5.190) 
Males 2.153 0.587 1.428 1.720 1.972 2.323 1.286 
 (1.743) (0.307) (0.974) (1.075) (1.381) (1.870) (0.790) 
Education  0.671 1.020 0.639** 0.888 1.207 1.104 0.853 
 (0.188) (0.144) (0.129) (0.177) (0.248) (0.309) (0.159) 
Age 0.458** 1.015 1.538 0.972 1.694 1.132 1.416 
 (0.172) (0.198) (0.469) (0.280) (0.546) (0.381) (0.367) 
Militarism  3.393 0.929 0.600 1.725 1.974 0.958 0.657 
 (2.872) (0.433) (0.391) (1.027) (1.223) (1.079) (0.438) 
Internationalism  0.670 0.891 0.218*** 0.623 0.846 0.497 1.094 
 (0.478) (0.393) (0.113) (0.383) (0.417) (0.362) (0.578) 
Political Awareness 0.289** 0.610** 0.538* 0.254*** 0.381** 0.334*** 0.512* 
 (0.154) (0.149) (0.180) (0.121) (0.150) (0.137) (0.175) 
Constant 0.112 5.280 0.154 5.073 7.827 19.998 0.015* 
 (0.309) (8.620) (0.368) (11.734) (19.117) (65.823) (0.037) 
        
Observations 64 87 71 61 62 57 73 
Pseudo R-squared 0.388 0.0859 0.298 0.236 0.279 0.351 0.275 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 26: Results for Cameroon based on the subset of Republicans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 18.489*** 9.772*** 5.596** 2.988* 20.782*** 5.493** 15.474*** 
 (13.596) (5.921) (4.140) (1.980) (19.239) (4.157) (12.332) 
Males 4.257** 0.249** 9.570*** 1.355 0.959 2.257 4.272** 
 (3.006) (0.158) (8.030) (0.828) (0.712) (1.821) (2.969) 
Education  0.932 1.257 0.566** 1.609** 0.632* 1.656* 1.314 
 (0.175) (0.222) (0.136) (0.359) (0.161) (0.463) (0.271) 
Age 1.330 1.104 1.231 0.984 1.035 0.624 1.590 
 (0.365) (0.264) (0.409) (0.328) (0.317) (0.228) (0.451) 
Militarism  1.057 0.438 1.630 0.338* 2.340 0.746 1.370 
 (0.650) (0.257) (1.119) (0.201) (1.665) (0.671) (0.971) 
Internationalism  0.640 0.606 0.406* 0.550 1.265 1.080 1.695 
 (0.323) (0.320) (0.203) (0.337) (0.756) (0.667) (1.176) 
Political Awareness 0.768 0.936 0.634 1.041 0.201*** 1.199 0.402** 
 (0.327) (0.271) (0.205) (0.420) (0.111) (0.368) (0.150) 
Constant 3.208 0.156 0.059 0.024 4.217 0.043 0.001** 
 (8.818) (0.288) (0.159) (0.058) (10.026) (0.137) (0.002) 
        
Observations 70 77 67 62 58 53 71 
Pseudo R-squared 0.267 0.273 0.292 0.175 0.337 0.180 0.333 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 27: Results for the Trade War scenario based on the subset of Republicans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 13.217*** 5.353*** 13.230*** 11.530*** 35.402*** 6.356** 5.711*** 
 (8.611) (2.814) (8.798) (8.597) (30.210) (4.573) (3.337) 
Males 1.498 0.539 3.878** 5.102** 0.402 2.873 0.909 
 (0.939) (0.297) (2.611) (3.789) (0.318) (2.042) (0.496) 
Education  0.824 0.928 1.186 1.244 1.232 0.924 0.962 
 (0.161) (0.141) (0.213) (0.286) (0.297) (0.201) (0.162) 
Age 1.292 0.693* 0.902 0.711 1.041 1.569 0.626* 
 (0.335) (0.149) (0.252) (0.238) (0.321) (0.441) (0.167) 
Militarism  0.608 0.804 1.579 1.228 0.268* 0.579 1.271 
 (0.411) (0.381) (0.856) (0.839) (0.205) (0.462) (0.751) 
Internationalism  0.724 1.165 1.637 0.276* 2.061 0.528 0.693 
 (0.348) (0.544) (0.693) (0.193) (1.411) (0.295) (0.335) 
Political Awareness 0.790 0.574** 0.769 1.134 0.780 0.728 1.264 
 (0.305) (0.161) (0.220) (0.448) (0.294) (0.230) (0.382) 
Constant 0.111 0.702 0.029 0.033 0.041 0.045 5.033 
 (0.276) (1.146) (0.062) (0.089) (0.102) (0.115) (11.324) 
        
Observations 68 91 75 65 65 63 79 
Pseudo R-squared 0.227 0.184 0.228 0.337 0.410 0.196 0.176 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 28: Results for the Asian Disease based on the subset of Republicans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 8.121*** 10.639*** 1.118 5.091* 5.719*** 6.147** 3.890** 
 (5.302) (6.363) (0.724) (4.545) (3.730) (5.183) (2.160) 
Males 0.884 0.433 2.787 0.799 1.729 2.860 0.715 
 (0.577) (0.267) (1.843) (0.591) (1.035) (2.342) (0.381) 
Education  0.694* 1.037 0.879 0.922 1.210 1.364 0.824 
 (0.144) (0.168) (0.163) (0.228) (0.222) (0.326) (0.134) 
Age 0.969 0.762 0.688 0.982 1.403 0.960 0.991 
 (0.275) (0.170) (0.199) (0.511) (0.315) (0.336) (0.219) 
Militarism  0.587 0.455 2.645 0.471 2.070 1.489 0.715 
 (0.368) (0.253) (1.620) (0.277) (1.240) (1.415) (0.425) 
Internationalism  1.021 0.569 0.680 1.953 1.509 0.572 0.375** 
 (0.492) (0.273) (0.279) (1.460) (0.681) (0.368) (0.185) 
Political Awareness 0.675 0.803 0.368*** 0.449 0.430** 0.974 0.632 
 (0.263) (0.242) (0.131) (0.226) (0.169) (0.350) (0.200) 
Constant 1.738 0.020** 1.604 0.040 0.771 0.087 0.517 
 (4.780) (0.037) (3.342) (0.121) (1.531) (0.263) (1.120) 
        
Observations 64 88 65 60 68 55 78 
Pseudo R-squared 0.195 0.264 0.180 0.176 0.191 0.163 0.169 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 29: Results for Aboria Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 9.607*** 5.240*** 10.956*** 9.273*** 5.105*** 2.722*** 2.952*** 
 (4.103) (1.957) (5.206) (3.711) (1.972) (0.955) (1.031) 
Males 0.920 0.976 2.287* 1.800 0.769 2.403** 0.964 
 (0.362) (0.356) (0.975) (0.749) (0.298) (0.876) (0.337) 
Education  1.245* 0.988 0.785* 1.161 0.944 1.014 0.878 
 (0.155) (0.102) (0.100) (0.139) (0.115) (0.110) (0.092) 
Age 1.111 1.223 1.168 1.043 0.926 0.969 1.061 
 (0.197) (0.186) (0.220) (0.182) (0.149) (0.152) (0.174) 
Militarism  0.812 0.662 0.700 0.864 1.403 0.633 0.707 
 (0.321) (0.223) (0.256) (0.279) (0.453) (0.196) (0.233) 
Internationalism  0.976 0.815 1.382 0.780 1.345 1.180 0.855 
 (0.288) (0.244) (0.388) (0.244) (0.386) (0.303) (0.240) 
Political Awareness 0.726 0.606** 0.352*** 0.694 0.538** 0.884 0.606** 
 (0.199) (0.135) (0.095) (0.174) (0.138) (0.190) (0.125) 
Constant 0.566 0.475 0.070* 0.415 0.373 0.089** 0.504 
 (0.694) (0.475) (0.098) (0.523) (0.397) (0.092) (0.575) 
        
Observations 147 159 146 149 146 160 155 
Pseudo R-squared 0.208 0.159 0.255 0.229 0.150 0.0916 0.0922 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 30: Results for Venezuela Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 19.337*** 4.197*** 7.395*** 4.135*** 10.630*** 4.961*** 5.631*** 
 (11.155) (1.625) (3.238) (1.521) (4.993) (1.934) (2.418) 
Males 1.424 1.380 1.936 1.852 1.356 1.477 1.420 
 (0.627) (0.512) (0.800) (0.729) (0.587) (0.567) (0.576) 
Education  1.131 0.919 0.753** 0.912 1.004 0.896 0.859 
 (0.150) (0.093) (0.095) (0.102) (0.132) (0.104) (0.103) 
Age 0.776 1.075 0.951 1.247 1.527** 1.096 0.954 
 (0.150) (0.157) (0.169) (0.209) (0.304) (0.179) (0.170) 
Militarism  1.042 1.599 0.858 1.079 1.889* 0.968 0.304*** 
 (0.474) (0.510) (0.309) (0.321) (0.702) (0.328) (0.119) 
Internationalism  0.938 1.133 0.634* 0.954 0.718 1.079 1.143 
 (0.320) (0.326) (0.174) (0.280) (0.230) (0.289) (0.365) 
Political Awareness 1.022 0.495*** 0.490*** 0.653* 0.570** 0.575** 0.382*** 
 (0.304) (0.110) (0.121) (0.147) (0.156) (0.132) (0.097) 
Constant 0.169 0.764 1.974 0.550 1.734 1.723 0.126 
 (0.215) (0.811) (2.536) (0.640) (2.126) (1.820) (0.165) 
        
Observations 162 163 150 153 145 166 159 
Pseudo R-squared 0.283 0.136 0.213 0.126 0.261 0.152 0.229 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 31: Results for Cameroon Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 28.645*** 13.891*** 10.642*** 8.845*** 9.421*** 13.957*** 11.027*** 
 (12.663) (6.168) (4.767) (3.529) (3.915) (6.184) (4.795) 
Males 2.174* 0.804 4.028*** 1.336 0.853 1.704 2.620** 
 (0.912) (0.331) (1.824) (0.547) (0.343) (0.729) (1.123) 
Education  0.927 1.016 1.008 1.113 0.899 1.039 1.131 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.131) (0.131) (0.115) (0.135) (0.141) 
Age 1.122 1.067 1.095 1.042 0.874 0.972 1.070 
 (0.204) (0.183) (0.199) (0.186) (0.153) (0.196) (0.205) 
Militarism  0.875 1.186 1.268 0.748 1.223 0.517* 0.672 
 (0.359) (0.438) (0.469) (0.230) (0.419) (0.191) (0.264) 
Internationalism  0.774 1.501 0.655 0.739 1.362 0.854 1.013 
 (0.240) (0.491) (0.183) (0.230) (0.421) (0.261) (0.342) 
Political Awareness 1.212 0.560** 0.996 1.022 0.676 1.150 0.459*** 
 (0.352) (0.141) (0.235) (0.242) (0.176) (0.277) (0.119) 
Constant 0.320 0.201 0.148 0.095* 0.854 0.135 0.018*** 
 (0.393) (0.234) (0.200) (0.118) (0.946) (0.165) (0.025) 
        
Observations 178 150 142 149 141 159 149 
Pseudo R-squared 0.365 0.270 0.241 0.195 0.195 0.258 0.265 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 32: Results for the Trade War scenario Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 12.677*** 5.770*** 7.546*** 5.890*** 10.357*** 7.820*** 5.350*** 
 (5.196) (2.165) (3.063) (2.255) (4.180) (2.947) (2.039) 
Males 1.081 1.540 1.842 1.122 0.503* 1.128 0.968 
 (0.423) (0.562) (0.721) (0.431) (0.202) (0.425) (0.350) 
Education  0.964 0.867 0.971 1.129 1.060 0.946 0.892 
 (0.111) (0.091) (0.107) (0.130) (0.127) (0.109) (0.099) 
Age 0.895 0.843 0.997 1.012 0.946 1.121 0.722* 
 (0.158) (0.121) (0.171) (0.165) (0.162) (0.178) (0.131) 
Militarism  1.366 1.108 1.729 0.595 0.909 1.150 0.661 
 (0.554) (0.352) (0.583) (0.191) (0.331) (0.394) (0.230) 
Internationalism  0.547** 1.417 1.133 0.781 1.092 0.842 0.783 
 (0.156) (0.406) (0.284) (0.241) (0.326) (0.230) (0.226) 
Political Awareness 1.243 0.624** 0.736 1.348 0.949 0.829 1.088 
 (0.322) (0.140) (0.166) (0.291) (0.218) (0.192) (0.225) 
Constant 0.676 0.105** 0.022*** 0.081** 0.397 0.059** 0.283 
 (0.764) (0.111) (0.028) (0.097) (0.458) (0.071) (0.327) 
        
Observations 166 171 162 159 155 176 162 
Pseudo R-squared 0.241 0.144 0.169 0.139 0.213 0.181 0.136 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 33: Results for the Asian Disease Main Effects among respondents who have passed the Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 5.201*** 7.339*** 1.805* 4.216*** 2.911*** 5.929*** 3.632*** 
 (1.878) (2.845) (0.644) (2.106) (1.043) (2.326) (1.231) 
Males 1.139 1.302 1.757 1.826 1.318 0.886 1.370 
 (0.419) (0.489) (0.638) (0.924) (0.474) (0.338) (0.473) 
Education  0.830* 0.851 0.836* 0.876 1.062 1.062 0.897 
 (0.090) (0.092) (0.090) (0.130) (0.115) (0.120) (0.094) 
Age 0.815 1.003 0.888 0.618* 1.055 0.929 0.961 
 (0.140) (0.145) (0.132) (0.166) (0.149) (0.157) (0.153) 
Militarism  1.202 0.830 1.540 0.536* 1.533 0.885 1.003 
 (0.429) (0.281) (0.497) (0.200) (0.489) (0.297) (0.327) 
Internationalism  1.086 1.112 1.059 0.854 1.092 0.955 0.895 
 (0.277) (0.323) (0.247) (0.327) (0.283) (0.260) (0.245) 
Political Awareness 0.784 0.627** 0.676* 0.553* 0.693 0.960 0.748 
 (0.200) (0.149) (0.151) (0.183) (0.167) (0.228) (0.155) 
Constant 0.937 0.032*** 4.295 0.512 0.237 0.166 0.200 
 (1.042) (0.035) (4.884) (0.791) (0.249) (0.187) (0.225) 
        
Observations 159 168 149 127 154 165 164 
Pseudo R-squared 0.142 0.191 0.0705 0.187 0.0809 0.126 0.0899 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 34: Results for Aboria based on the subset of Liberals.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 3.879** 2.225 55.045*** 8.398*** 6.000*** 5.353*** 2.698* 
 (2.263) (1.216) (63.223) (5.179) (3.453) (2.910) (1.474) 
Males 1.764 0.718 1.109 1.839 1.176 4.998*** 1.858 
 (1.003) (0.357) (0.752) (1.184) (0.642) (2.710) (1.049) 
Education  1.193 1.051 0.963 1.047 1.171 0.877 0.849 
 (0.201) (0.153) (0.226) (0.168) (0.222) (0.147) (0.135) 
Age 1.100 0.784 1.281 0.984 0.798 1.186 0.774 
 (0.313) (0.167) (0.404) (0.232) (0.199) (0.296) (0.212) 
Militarism  1.153 0.714 1.013 1.713 1.258 0.471 0.965 
 (0.761) (0.341) (0.622) (0.904) (0.662) (0.217) (0.512) 
Internationalism  0.696 0.705 1.271 0.822 1.403 1.109 0.802 
 (0.299) (0.287) (0.599) (0.380) (0.723) (0.436) (0.351) 
Political Awareness 0.607 0.533** 0.156*** 0.857 0.797 0.830 0.311*** 
 (0.199) (0.154) (0.108) (0.238) (0.257) (0.275) (0.117) 
Constant 0.176 4.476 0.067 0.265 0.492 0.014*** 0.445 
 (0.310) (6.390) (0.133) (0.546) (0.808) (0.021) (0.761) 
        
Observations 64 80 65 71 73 90 78 
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.155 0.356 0.184 0.153 0.220 0.176 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 35: Results for Venezuela based on the subset of Liberals.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 9.063*** 5.021** 28.106*** 6.123*** 5.939*** 6.013*** 5.814** 
 (5.838) (3.168) (29.701) (3.888) (3.728) (3.281) (4.219) 
Males 1.028 0.649 1.170 2.663 1.876 1.060 9.010*** 
 (0.613) (0.361) (0.888) (1.884) (1.073) (0.535) (7.088) 
Education  1.124 1.017 0.911 1.201 0.955 0.941 1.046 
 (0.195) (0.161) (0.204) (0.213) (0.177) (0.148) (0.219) 
Age 0.814 1.000 0.515* 1.354 1.555 1.396 0.556* 
 (0.240) (0.229) (0.185) (0.379) (0.427) (0.347) (0.186) 
Militarism  1.274 2.188 1.695 1.640 1.295 0.910 0.245** 
 (0.812) (1.172) (1.126) (0.881) (0.750) (0.411) (0.165) 
Internationalism  0.966 1.247 0.662 1.286 0.601 1.341 1.825 
 (0.438) (0.548) (0.346) (0.638) (0.348) (0.495) (1.072) 
Political Awareness 0.746 0.337*** 0.253** 0.511** 0.596 0.565* 0.125*** 
 (0.224) (0.112) (0.154) (0.171) (0.220) (0.176) (0.071) 
Constant 1.121 4.275 5.717 0.015* 0.169 0.570 0.072 
 (2.095) (6.658) (11.783) (0.033) (0.298) (0.749) (0.154) 
        
Observations 78 76 66 71 71 93 83 
Pseudo R-squared 0.234 0.239 0.320 0.242 0.205 0.170 0.430 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 36: Results for Cameroon based on the subset of Liberals.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 177.558*** 5.244*** 81.752*** 15.223*** 4.444*** 30.592*** 12.550*** 
 (195.233) (3.094) (84.492) (10.972) (2.431) (20.825) (8.092) 
Males 4.950* 0.725 3.345 2.889 1.366 1.175 3.189* 
 (4.332) (0.378) (2.772) (2.044) (0.712) (0.718) (1.998) 
Education  0.576** 1.032 1.593 1.365 1.057 0.940 0.826 
 (0.146) (0.156) (0.458) (0.261) (0.186) (0.180) (0.150) 
Age 0.757 0.969 1.186 1.427 0.861 1.242 0.957 
 (0.299) (0.219) (0.449) (0.402) (0.212) (0.385) (0.287) 
Militarism  0.951 0.627 1.156 1.129 1.195 0.415* 0.458 
 (0.804) (0.314) (0.842) (0.613) (0.631) (0.216) (0.294) 
Internationalism  1.041 1.325 0.650 2.067 1.209 0.914 1.076 
 (0.651) (0.559) (0.378) (1.116) (0.628) (0.418) (0.490) 
Political Awareness 0.437* 0.641 0.647 0.717 0.871 1.316 0.537 
 (0.207) (0.196) (0.404) (0.238) (0.281) (0.483) (0.206) 
Constant 1.145 0.946 0.030 0.001*** 0.617 0.063 0.045 
 (2.953) (1.449) (0.071) (0.002) (0.988) (0.108) (0.087) 
        
Observations 85 76 67 70 73 91 76 
Pseudo R-squared 0.589 0.145 0.505 0.285 0.118 0.351 0.266 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 37: Results for the Trade War scenario based on the subset of Liberals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 15.414*** 2.473 31.516*** 4.783** 13.405*** 5.465*** 8.227*** 
 (11.394) (1.450) (30.425) (2.928) (8.824) (2.647) (5.335) 
Males 2.042 1.962 1.306 0.577 0.485 1.111 0.911 
 (1.310) (1.104) (0.897) (0.357) (0.304) (0.546) (0.528) 
Education  1.264 0.840 0.602** 1.069 1.132 0.820 0.723* 
 (0.239) (0.139) (0.150) (0.178) (0.225) (0.129) (0.123) 
Age 0.657 1.146 1.541 0.936 0.798 1.117 1.344 
 (0.216) (0.251) (0.490) (0.253) (0.235) (0.258) (0.391) 
Militarism  4.086* 0.512 2.187 0.336** 0.945 2.208* 0.317* 
 (3.080) (0.272) (1.370) (0.185) (0.572) (1.022) (0.192) 
Internationalism  0.344** 0.824 0.842 1.082 0.758 0.948 0.593 
 (0.174) (0.358) (0.413) (0.534) (0.421) (0.355) (0.298) 
Political Awareness 1.285 0.984 0.725 1.645* 1.029 0.887 1.083 
 (0.410) (0.316) (0.377) (0.469) (0.353) (0.267) (0.376) 
Constant 0.130 0.146 0.009** 0.087 0.217 0.159 0.109 
 (0.243) (0.220) (0.019) (0.182) (0.401) (0.222) (0.207) 
        
Observations 76 81 68 69 77 97 78 
Pseudo R-squared 0.311 0.106 0.299 0.187 0.229 0.169 0.201 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 38: Results for Asian Disease based on the subset of Liberals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 1.909 2.126 1.713 4.050* 3.797** 17.080*** 4.693*** 
 (1.010) (1.160) (0.984) (3.037) (2.192) (11.009) (2.511) 
Males 1.109 1.269 1.484 1.417 0.659 0.575 1.851 
 (0.604) (0.649) (0.822) (1.122) (0.377) (0.348) (0.982) 
Education  0.887 0.726** 0.854 0.728 0.983 0.964 1.018 
 (0.143) (0.114) (0.138) (0.165) (0.184) (0.166) (0.162) 
Age 0.726 1.379 1.108 0.431** 0.944 0.976 1.151 
 (0.215) (0.299) (0.235) (0.179) (0.212) (0.285) (0.310) 
Militarism  0.441 0.889 1.221 0.680 1.093 0.905 1.019 
 (0.273) (0.446) (0.574) (0.410) (0.598) (0.442) (0.566) 
Internationalism  0.784 0.690 0.729 0.544 0.637 0.863 0.865 
 (0.286) (0.297) (0.277) (0.358) (0.330) (0.377) (0.384) 
Political Awareness 0.758 0.697 0.556 0.468* 0.704 0.912 0.942 
 (0.225) (0.207) (0.255) (0.189) (0.229) (0.346) (0.288) 
Constant 0.380 0.187 1.047 4.502 0.461 0.006** 0.098 
 (0.614) (0.265) (1.534) (10.604) (0.749) (0.013) (0.172) 
        
Observations 69 82 64 58 72 94 82 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0909 0.135 0.0501 0.268 0.0868 0.311 0.142 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 39: Results for Aboria based on the subset of Conservatives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 13.904*** 2.917* 2.367 4.109** 20.728*** 6.033** 2.084 
 (10.761) (1.771) (1.409) (2.674) (21.460) (5.323) (1.192) 
Males 1.043 1.495 2.822* 1.647 0.837 15.985** 0.516 
 (0.898) (0.943) (1.730) (1.027) (0.760) (19.450) (0.297) 
Education  1.159 1.097 0.618** 1.416* 0.846 2.135* 0.906 
 (0.291) (0.199) (0.116) (0.291) (0.262) (0.846) (0.159) 
Age 0.888 1.181 1.381 1.028 1.995 0.497 1.269 
 (0.299) (0.283) (0.362) (0.350) (0.918) (0.270) (0.319) 
Militarism  1.302 0.897 0.515 0.819 0.767 5.288 0.647 
 (0.920) (0.520) (0.318) (0.466) (0.618) (6.159) (0.401) 
Internationalism  1.410 2.263 0.608 1.023 1.658 0.613 0.907 
 (0.925) (1.242) (0.259) (0.555) (1.051) (0.425) (0.505) 
Political Awareness 1.181 0.544* 0.481** 0.395* 0.103*** 0.494 0.541** 
 (0.612) (0.191) (0.142) (0.195) (0.072) (0.243) (0.159) 
Constant 0.011 0.310 0.246 0.461 0.031 0.034 0.940 
 (0.043) (0.586) (0.541) (1.014) (0.083) (0.100) (2.372) 
        
Observations 52 58 70 59 58 47 68 
Pseudo R-squared 0.259 0.122 0.208 0.195 0.497 0.359 0.141 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 40: Results for Venezuela based on the subset of Conservatives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 38.874*** 1.131 2.241 2.278 7.644** 20.729** 2.477 
 (48.305) (0.655) (1.449) (1.406) (6.106) (25.254) (1.564) 
Males 4.898 1.071 1.308 1.561 1.958 25.557** 1.277 
 (5.339) (0.637) (0.843) (0.876) (1.392) (34.605) (0.821) 
Education  0.674 0.909 0.532*** 0.941 1.222 1.139 0.821 
 (0.212) (0.155) (0.118) (0.182) (0.278) (0.384) (0.158) 
Age 0.672 0.913 1.811** 0.681 2.126** 1.324 1.099 
 (0.245) (0.198) (0.541) (0.202) (0.761) (0.541) (0.297) 
Militarism  1.062 1.571 0.450 1.219 1.813 0.775 0.953 
 (0.795) (0.823) (0.298) (0.637) (1.181) (0.964) (0.611) 
Internationalism  0.585 1.076 0.301** 0.839 1.337 0.195 1.403 
 (0.492) (0.484) (0.141) (0.440) (0.663) (0.196) (0.816) 
Political Awareness 0.824 0.520** 0.676 0.458* 0.347** 0.286** 0.448** 
 (0.411) (0.165) (0.215) (0.199) (0.151) (0.154) (0.141) 
Constant 0.000** 4.324 1.047 0.970 0.294 0.061 0.009* 
 (0.000) (8.070) (2.517) (1.937) (0.640) (0.190) (0.023) 
        
Observations 58 65 70 62 61 47 66 
Pseudo R-squared 0.449 0.0624 0.277 0.154 0.299 0.413 0.225 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 41: Results for Cameroon based on the subset of Conservatives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 16.258*** 8.180*** 4.872** 4.915** 14.370*** 83.859*** 8.555*** 
 (12.979) (5.643) (3.394) (3.783) (12.215) (128.674) (6.495) 
Males 2.547 0.452 5.056** 0.762 0.887 66.848** 2.146 
 (2.032) (0.321) (3.619) (0.551) (0.648) (119.633) (1.633) 
Education  0.911 1.300 0.614** 1.404 0.733 3.859** 1.209 
 (0.194) (0.274) (0.137) (0.318) (0.178) (2.524) (0.256) 
Age 1.375 1.149 1.060 0.647 1.351 0.492 1.372 
 (0.418) (0.301) (0.318) (0.247) (0.416) (0.370) (0.423) 
Militarism  1.776 0.537 1.074 0.425 1.604 0.300 1.135 
 (1.186) (0.355) (0.734) (0.258) (1.142) (0.479) (0.860) 
Internationalism  0.371* 0.755 0.500 0.278* 1.310 0.357 2.909 
 (0.217) (0.426) (0.229) (0.192) (0.727) (0.338) (2.087) 
Political Awareness 1.761 0.867 0.579* 0.654 0.264*** 1.451 0.291*** 
 (0.872) (0.319) (0.182) (0.321) (0.125) (0.817) (0.122) 
Constant 9.284 0.026* 0.948 0.022 0.936 0.000** 0.001** 
 (29.855) (0.053) (2.547) (0.058) (1.884) (0.000) (0.004) 
        
Observations 61 57 66 63 56 46 62 
Pseudo R-squared 0.273 0.229 0.259 0.296 0.310 0.530 0.343 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 42: Results for the Trade War scenarios based on the subset of Conservatives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of 
Gains 
No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 32.482*** 6.932*** 6.544*** 12.962*** 21.307*** 22.388*** 3.803** 
 (27.521) (4.713) (3.729) (10.345) (17.716) (22.498) (2.419) 
Males 1.517 0.794 1.802 5.674** 0.464 2.384 0.859 
 (1.275) (0.524) (1.014) (4.221) (0.338) (2.038) (0.527) 
Education  0.775 0.845 1.183 1.194 1.021 0.678 0.808 
 (0.195) (0.167) (0.190) (0.280) (0.241) (0.184) (0.146) 
Age 1.161 0.587** 0.814 1.052 1.260 1.829* 0.359*** 
 (0.362) (0.149) (0.204) (0.361) (0.368) (0.635) (0.128) 
Militarism  0.614 1.635 1.240 1.182 0.569 1.214 1.200 
 (0.465) (0.928) (0.622) (0.781) (0.440) (1.089) (0.707) 
Internationalism  1.301 2.439 1.239 0.479 0.825 0.200** 0.811 
 (0.783) (1.367) (0.447) (0.296) (0.501) (0.151) (0.444) 
Political Awareness 0.904 0.464** 0.810 1.098 1.170 0.649 0.994 
 (0.431) (0.170) (0.218) (0.467) (0.531) (0.286) (0.292) 
Constant 0.040 0.192 0.246 0.019 0.051 0.027 3.589 
 (0.135) (0.415) (0.465) (0.048) (0.107) (0.087) (9.153) 
        
Observations 61 66 78 66 63 55 70 
Pseudo R-squared 0.367 0.236 0.141 0.327 0.357 0.367 0.215 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 43: Results for the Asian Disease based on the subset of Conservatives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Baseline: Domain of Gains No Cues Dem A Dem B Rep A Rep B Group A Group B 
        
Domain of Losses 8.133*** 8.748*** 0.990 10.995** 7.153*** 8.046** 1.271 
 (5.866) (6.057) (0.576) (11.535) (5.015) (7.041) (0.690) 
Males 0.543 0.341 1.610 0.576 1.530 2.007 0.481 
 (0.411) (0.249) (0.918) (0.510) (0.936) (1.545) (0.271) 
Education  0.853 1.526** 0.800 0.974 0.804 0.845 1.104 
 (0.172) (0.316) (0.118) (0.416) (0.133) (0.264) (0.205) 
Age 1.040 0.875 0.739 0.976 1.429 0.943 0.888 
 (0.326) (0.215) (0.185) (0.546) (0.328) (0.326) (0.212) 
Militarism  0.666 0.286* 1.845 0.466 2.540 1.971 0.702 
 (0.461) (0.197) (0.997) (0.320) (1.723) (1.661) (0.408) 
Internationalism  0.970 0.648 0.872 1.657 1.428 0.676 0.662 
 (0.530) (0.347) (0.310) (1.351) (0.637) (0.423) (0.342) 
Political Awareness 0.797 0.822 0.555** 0.748 0.375** 0.895 0.562* 
 (0.376) (0.317) (0.162) (0.566) (0.148) (0.371) (0.169) 
Constant 6.259 0.005** 4.413 0.001 0.137 0.514 0.493 
 (20.619) (0.012) (8.487) (0.007) (0.236) (1.434) (1.142) 
        
Observations 58 66 68 59 66 51 71 
Pseudo R-squared 0.225 0.270 0.0942 0.265 0.184 0.198 0.136 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






To evaluate the robustness of the findings, two individual-level characteristics are worth exploring. 
First, to check the possible alternative explanation that respondents were not paying proper 
attention to the treatments, including the cues, the study performs a test of the main effect only 
with respondents who have successfully passed the manipulation check. Tables 21-25 demonstrate 
that the results only for the respondents that have correctly answered the manipulation check 
remain consistent for the main effects of the frames and the cues.  
Second, controlling for gender, there is evidence to suggest that males are, on average, more likely 
to support the risk-acceptant plan compared to females for two of the intervention scenarios: 
Venezuela and Cameroon (p<0.05). At the same time, similar to the Kemel and Paraschiv’s (2018)  
findings there is no substantial difference between the relative number of females and males 
choosing to support the intervention in general or acting in the trade dispute scenario. Interestingly, 
controlling for race and ethnicity, the study reconfirms the finding by Boettcher (2004) that African 
Americans are more risk-averse relative to whites across the three intervention scenarios. African 
Americans are more risk averse than white respondents across Aboria, Venezuela, the trade 
disputes, and interestingly the scenario for intervention in Cameroon. The overwhelming support 
for the risk averse plans for intervention by the African American seen as more dovish (Nincic & 
Nincic, 2002) respondents in the sample further strengthen an earlier finding by Boettcher (2004) 
that Caucasians demonstrate significantly higher willingness to support riskier intervention than 






Table 44: Experiment 1 Randomization Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Gains Dem-A Dem-B Rep-A Rep-B Rep-B Rep-B 
        
Gender  1.235 1.311 1.110 0.997 0.641 0.955 0.854 
 (0.279) (0.424) (0.367) (0.314) (0.216) (0.308) (0.279) 
Ethnicity  1.126 0.795* 1.074 0.956 1.090 1.114 0.985 
 (0.098) (0.107) (0.134) (0.116) (0.137) (0.139) (0.122) 
Education 1.136 0.860 1.359 0.820 0.768 1.103 1.310 
 (0.226) (0.238) (0.394) (0.229) (0.227) (0.316) (0.383) 
Age  1.013 1.289 0.948 1.173 1.390  0.843 
 (0.323) (0.519) (0.531) (0.523) (0.537)  (0.373) 
National Chauvinism 1.065 1.052 1.139 0.801 0.909 1.162 1.025 
 (0.132) (0.187) (0.206) (0.138) (0.165) (0.209) (0.186) 
Militarism 1.270 1.042 0.828 0.895 1.045 1.185 1.304 
 (0.268) (0.315) (0.253) (0.267) (0.315) (0.353) (0.395) 
Internationalism 1.115 0.939 1.274 0.785 1.165 1.464 0.767 
 (0.189) (0.225) (0.319) (0.185) (0.295) (0.364) (0.183) 
Political Engagement 1.112 0.835 0.763 0.777 1.289 1.210 1.355* 
 (0.141) (0.167) (0.161) (0.156) (0.258) (0.204) (0.218) 
Constant 0.280 0.213 0.031** 0.579 0.734 0.059** 0.112* 
 (0.252) (0.268) (0.042) (0.711) (0.935) (0.073) (0.147) 
        
Observations 367 367 367 367 264 356 367 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0123 0.0207 0.0158 0.0174 0.0238 0.0192 0.0264 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 45: Experiment 2 Randomization Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Gains Dem-A Dem-B Rep-A Rep-B Rep-B Rep-B 
        
Gender  1.041 0.982 0.918 0.804 0.948 1.139 0.974 
 (0.108) (0.143) (0.137) (0.120) (0.141) (0.170) (0.144) 
Ethnicity  1.021 0.920** 1.026 1.002 0.961 1.037 1.062 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.040) (0.037) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) 
Education 0.993 0.968 0.972 0.987 0.904** 0.932 1.093** 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041) (0.042) (0.048) 
Age  1.055 1.055 1.128* 0.893* 0.950 1.005 0.873** 
 (0.047) (0.066) (0.071) (0.059) (0.062) (0.065) (0.057) 
National Chauvinism 1.046 1.072 0.989 1.004 0.960 0.975 1.081 
 (0.055) (0.080) (0.075) (0.076) (0.073) (0.074) (0.082) 
Militarism 0.858 1.109 0.900 1.139 1.057 0.948 0.931 
 (0.081) (0.147) (0.122) (0.155) (0.144) (0.129) (0.125) 
Internationalism 1.020 0.925 0.907 0.902 0.990 1.205* 1.173 
 (0.080) (0.103) (0.101) (0.103) (0.112) (0.136) (0.132) 
Political Engagement 1.000 0.992 0.976 0.988 0.927 0.968 1.168** 
 (0.058) (0.079) (0.084) (0.082) (0.077) (0.081) (0.092) 
Constant 0.645 0.218*** 0.133*** 0.299*** 0.375** 0.138*** 0.103*** 
 (0.199) (0.093) (0.059) (0.131) (0.162) (0.062) (0.046) 
        
Observations 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00248 0.00829 0.00616 0.00543 0.00641 0.00644 0.0127 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




A.5 Analysis of the Open Answers 
 
 
As an additional robustness check for experiment one consisting of the student sample, all 
participants were asked to provide one written answer explaining why they have selected the given 
plan of actions. The student participants’ open answer was based on the last scenario they have 
randomly received. The participants provide only one written answer. Conducting a simple content 
analysis, I found that the overwhelmingly students indicated that they were aware that the different 
plants of actions contain diverging amounts of risks. In general, the written answers of the student 
participants were in line with the expectation of prospect theory. For instance, the following 
answer summarizes the reasoning of that portion of participant who have decided to select the risk-
averse plan of action “I believe it's best to go with the guaranteed option. Especially when dealing 
with lives of people, you can't put them up for gamble/risks.” A frequent alternative reason for 
select the risk-averse option for conducting the humanitarian intervention clearly refers to the need 
to minimize American casualties “Guaranteed US lives saved with a large number of the other 
lives saved. If we didn't even have to get involved in the first place, and we are and are saving 
30,000 lives and keeping as many troops alive as possible is a win win.” Others referred to the 
trade dispute scenario and justified their decision to select the risk-averse plan by explaining that 
“It offers a reasonable chance of creating more jobs than Plan A with little risk. Plan B and D are 
too risky.” And “I feel that it has the most room for success with as little room for failure as 
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possible. Some of the others had room for more success but could possibly have been detrimental 
to the economy so it’s better to play it safe with little risk.”  
Other the other hand, as expected those selecting the risk-acceptant plans of actions justified their 
choice by stating that “There is a high probability that the soldiers will return home safely, and I 
believe the 20% risk is worth the increased civilian lives that are saved.” An additional, frequently 
occurring reason for selecting the risk-acceptant plan of action is best represented by the following 
explanations provided by two participants “Because the risk for US soldiers in plan B was slightly 
higher than plan A, but the risk for others was lower in the risk section. There is still a higher 
chance everyone will benefit, which plan A does not give us. That is, to say, if we even have to 
intervene in the first place.” And “The possible benefit seems to outweigh the risk. 95% chance 
that all the troops are saved, and more citizens are saved is decent odds versus a 5% chance that 
both of those numbers end up lower.” Finally, turning to the classic Asian disease scenario using 
the traditional mathematically equivalent frames for the expected costs, the study again finds that 
respondents clearly understood the situation best demonstrated by the following written answers: 
“With a 1/3 chance that no one dies and a 2/3 chance that a similar casualty to Plan A, it's a risk 
that could possibly ensure that no one dies” And “If there is a chance, even if it is very small, that 
more people will be saved, then I'd rather take my chances with that plan rather than being 
guaranteed that a set amount of people will die/survive.”  
In conclusion, the participants’ written answers in experiment one consistently demonstrates that 
they understand that the different plans of action presented to them are about risk and the expected 
costs measured in civilian, military lives, or lost jobs. Taken together, the written answers by the 
387 student participants in experiment one and the post-treatment manipulation check for the large 
Mechanical Turk sample for experiment two strongly suggest that participants have understood 
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the treatments. Thus, confirming the validity of prospect theory’s framing effects even when the 
costs are non-mathematically equivalent to better approximate the real-world crisis descriptions 
the public is exposed to together with endorsement cues from political parties and political like-
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Table 46: India Sample 1 description 





















































Education High School or Below 7.0 
 Bachelor/Undergraduate Degree 40.0 







Bharatiya Janata Party 
Indian National Congress 
National Democratic Alliance led by 
BJP 
United Progressive Alliance led by 
INC 
All India Trinamool Congress 
Bahujan Samaj Party 
Communist Party of India 








































Table 47: India Sample 2 description 














































Education High School or Below 4.37 
 Bachelor/Undergraduate Degree 42.1 







Bharatiya Janata Party 
Indian National Congress 
National Democratic Alliance led by 
BJP 
United Progressive Alliance led by 
INC 
All India Trinamool Congress 
Bahujan Samaj Party 
Communist Party of India 













Religion  Hindu 
Muslim 
Christian 


















Table 48: Nigeria Sample description 


























 Efik 2.7 
 Ikwere 1.3 
 Ebira 0.4 
 Awori 0.8 
 Fulani 1.3 
 Tapa 0.25 
 Isoko 1.7 
 Kalabari  0.13 
 Ibibio 2.3 
 Birom 0 
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 Kanuri 0.4 
 Shuwa-Arab 0 
 Tiv 1.2 
 Jukun 0.4 
 Nupe 0.1 
 Gwari 1.0 
 Ljaw 1.8 
 Igala 1.2 
 Edo 4.4 
 Other 6.10 
   
Education No Formal Schooling 
Informal schooling only (including 
Koranic schooling) 





 Primary school completed   
Intermediate school or some 
secondary school / high school   
Secondary school / high school 
completed  
Post-secondary qualifications, other 
than university e.g. a diploma or 
degree from a polytechnic or college 
Some university  



















All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)   
All Progressives Grand Alliance 
(APGA)   
All People’s Party (APP)   
Conscience People’s Congress (CPC)   
Labour Party (LP) 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)   
Other 













          Note: number of respondents = 771 
 
 
Experiments on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk has not been without its critics. An important note is 
that there are several positives and negatives in using the online survey tool of Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. First, the positive is that researchers can gather survey data from hundreds and 
thousands of online respondents with lower costs and for a shorter period than any other tool 
currently (Couper, 2011). The second positive is that in studies using Mechanical Turk the 
unrepresentativeness of the drawn samples can be decreased to a minimum by increasing the 
number of respondents from specific categories the researcher has detected to be underrepresented 
in the already collected portion of the sample. This possibility makes generalizable inferences 
more valid and reliable in comparison to solely observational studies (Berinsky et al., 2012; 
Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Mullinix et al., 2015). For instance, Levay, Freese, and Druckman 
(2016) compare population-based samples and those drawn from the Mechanical Turk and find 
that by increasing the number of participants from the relevant and unrepresented religious, 
political, or ethno/religious group can significantly improve the level of representativeness of the 
sample and increase the validity of experimental scholars’ inferences. Similarly, Paolacci, 
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Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) find that Mechanical Turk samples are on often more representative 
to the general population than all volunteer or student samples.261 
Meanwhile, the Mechanical Turk has also received a large amount of criticism from the literature 
(Levay & Freese & Druckman, 2016). The fundamental drawbacks are those studies using it tend 
on average to gather samples that often can be slightly unrepresentative of countries population in 
terms of demographic and political variables and the possibility of fraudulent use by some workers 
(Gerber & Huber & Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; Huber & Hill & Lenz, 2012; Huber & Paris, 2013; 
Leeper & Freese, & Druckman, 2015). Furthermore, scholars have focused attention on the 
possibility that Mechanical Turk’s pay rates affect its workers (respondents) work quality. 
However, a study by Andersen and Lau (2018) addresses this criticism by present evidence from 
two different social science studies. Their results demonstrate that pay rates used in Mechanical 
Turk do not systematically affect the quality of respondents’ work.262  
 
 
Treatment Groups Experiment 1 India  
Treatment Group  Number of Respondents  
Backing Down  163 
Engage Win  164 
Engage Lose 163 
Engage Lose Less Casualties  164 
Engage Win More Casualties  166 
Backing Down Pakistan  163 
Engage Win Pakistan  164 
Engage Lose Pakistan  163 
Engage Lose Less Casualties 
Pakistan  
163 





Treatment Groups – Experiment 2 India  
Treatment Group  Number of Respondents  
Backing Down  85 
Engage Win  86 
Engage Lose 84 
 
261 Also see (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012) for further evidence in support the notion.  
262 https://www.behind-the-enemy-lines.com/2010/03/new-demographics-of-mechanical-turk.html For a more 
detailed investigation the global Mechanical Turk demographics see (Difallah & Filatova & Ipeirotis, 2018 
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Engage Lose Less Casualties  85 
Engage Win More Casualties  85 
 
Treatment groups – Experiment 3 Nigeria  
Treatment Group  Number of Respondents  
Backing Down  151 
Engage Win  155 
Engage Lose 152 
Engage Win More Casualties  87 
Engage Lose Less Casualties  87 
 
 
Treatment groups – Experiment 4 India  
Treatment Group  Number of Respondents  
Backing Down  134 
Backing Down – BJP supports 
the Leader’s decision  
140 
Backing Down – INC 
supports Leader’s decision 
136 
Engage and Win  139 
Engage and Win – BJP 
supports the Leader’s decision 
137 
Engage and Win – INC 




Treatment groups – Experiment 5 India  
Treatment Group  Number of Respondents  
Backing Down  134 
Backing Down - Social Group 
Opposes  
140 
Backing Down - Social Group 
Supports 
136 





Engage Win  137 
Engage Win – Social Group 
Opposes  
139 
Engage Win – Social Group 
Supports 
135  
Engage Win – Bipartisan 
Support 
137 
Engage Lose   141 
Engage Lose – Social Group 
Opposes  
136 
Engage Lose – Social Group 
Supports  
138 
Engage Lose – Bipartisan 
Support  
133 
Stay Out  135 
Stay Out – Social Group 
Opposes   
134 
Stay Out – Social Group 
Supports  
140 







B.2 Experiment 1 India 
 
















Baseline: Backing Down (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
      
Engage Win 3.620*** 1.794 4.970*** 5.686*** 3.215*** 
 (1.609) (0.761) (2.325) (2.541) (0.993) 
Engage Lose  0.925 1.007 1.257 1.338 1.497 
 (0.313) (0.381) (0.472) (0.486) (0.487) 
Engage Win More Casualties  1.156 0.947 2.267** 4.227*** 1.520 
 (0.414) (0.346) (0.907) (1.758) (0.542) 
Engage Lose Less Casualties 1.744 1.063 4.394*** 4.852*** 0.846 
 (0.675) (0.409) (1.955) (2.054) (0.354) 
Militarism  0.999 0.683 1.932*** 1.612** 1.706*** 
 (0.272) (0.181) (0.376) (0.301) (0.267) 
Internationalism  0.726* 0.688** 1.085 1.039 0.604*** 
 (0.127) (0.116) (0.252) (0.228) (0.101) 
Age 0.740** 0.783* 1.233 1.564*** 1.257* 
 (0.100) (0.108) (0.200) (0.262) (0.165) 
Gender  2.004*** 0.855 1.065 2.174** 1.272 
 (0.537) (0.208) (0.329) (0.706) (0.243) 
Education 0.862 0.953 1.221 1.163 0.939 
 (0.121) (0.131) (0.189) (0.176) (0.062) 
Income  0.628*** 0.817** 1.017 1.031 1.529*** 
 (0.065) (0.078) (0.028) (0.026) (0.188) 
Constant 52.564*** 41.357*** 0.158 0.034** 0.090*** 
 (56.382) (41.231) (0.222) (0.045) (0.055) 
      
Observations 847 867 412 426 624 
Pseudo R-squared 0.119 0.0545 0.109 0.120 0.0937 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




















Baseline: Backing Down (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
      
Engage Win 3.461*** 1.664 4.697*** 0.637 2.045*** 
 (1.601) (0.797) (2.039) (0.233) (0.552) 
Engage Lose  1.684 0.560 1.612 0.511* 1.182 
 (0.694) (0.216) (0.608) (0.189) (0.303) 
Engage Win More Casualties  2.110* 1.008 5.056*** 0.766 0.968 
 (0.940) (0.419) (2.150) (0.284) (0.301) 
Engage Lose Less Casualties 1.153 0.815 4.788*** 0.849 1.387 
 (0.434) (0.337) (2.050) (0.321) (0.441) 
Militarism  0.750 0.705 2.025*** 0.856 1.245 
 (0.223) (0.199) (0.383) (0.136) (0.177) 
Internationalism  0.502*** 0.477*** 1.647** 1.179 0.814 
 (0.097) (0.086) (0.382) (0.222) (0.127) 
Age 0.734** 0.689*** 1.326* 0.684*** 0.952 
 (0.108) (0.098) (0.212) (0.093) (0.120) 
Gender  1.093 0.877 1.203 1.510 1.032 
 (0.297) (0.231) (0.375) (0.390) (0.182) 
Education 1.202 1.062 0.975 0.875 0.914 
 (0.181) (0.148) (0.157) (0.117) (0.056) 
Income  0.667*** 0.888 1.041 1.003 1.073 
 (0.073) (0.085) (0.030) (0.024) (0.123) 
Constant 10.797** 23.569*** 0.179 4.692 1.926 
 (11.945) (24.229) (0.261) (5.686) (1.074) 
      
Observations 799 826 400 393 623 
Pseudo R-squared 0.123 0.0976 0.143 0.0331 0.0405 
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Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 51: Experiment 1 Main Effects Approval, Reputation, Vote (Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Reputation Vote 
    
Target Country Complies 1.873** 2.015** 1.879 
 (0.561) (0.685) (0.882) 
Engage Win the Engagement 2.434*** 2.671*** 2.000 
 (0.791) (0.990) (0.905) 
Engage Lose the Engagement 0.833 0.812 1.139 
 (0.228) (0.251) (0.487) 
Engage Win with more Casualties 0.918 1.341 1.085 
 (0.254) (0.440) (0.442) 
Engage Lose with less Casualties 1.480 0.925 1.093 
 (0.441) (0.288) (0.465) 
Militarism 1.752*** 2.455*** 2.322*** 
 (0.286) (0.439) (0.638) 
Nationalism 1.339*** 1.365*** 1.164 
 (0.148) (0.165) (0.188) 
Political Awareness 1.449*** 1.767*** 1.701*** 
 (0.168) (0.227) (0.295) 
Internationalism 0.910 1.105 1.166 
 (0.131) (0.172) (0.268) 
Party Affiliation 2.445*** 2.440*** 2.634*** 
 (0.255) (0.283) (0.371) 




Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1263 
 
Table 52: Experiment 1 Country A Main Effects (Logit) 
 
263 All the regression models for Experiment 1 control for: Income, Education, Gender and Age.  
 (0.046) (0.056) (0.086) 
Constant 9.910*** 2.285 3.294 
 (8.344) (1.982) (3.662) 
Observations 1,645 1,564 832 
Pseudo R-squared 0.202 0.261 0.317 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Reputation Vote 
    
Target Country Complies 2.667** 2.428** 2.531 
 (1.148) (1.083) (1.728) 
Engage Win the Engagement 3.964*** 3.494** 3.247* 
 (1.932) (1.785) (2.288) 
Engage Lose the Engagement 0.939 1.723 2.180 
 (0.346) (0.770) (1.435) 
Engage Win with more Casualties 1.075 2.007 0.855 
 (0.420) (0.968) (0.536) 
Engage Lose with less Casualties 1.842 1.071 0.764 
 (0.774) (0.446) (0.465) 
Income 0.645*** 0.693*** 0.690** 
 (0.073) (0.084) (0.106) 
Education 0.892 1.152 0.834 
 (0.133) (0.189) (0.209) 
Gender 2.172*** 0.963 0.934 
 (0.634) (0.062) (0.108) 
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Age 0.769* 0.739* 0.845 
 (0.120) (0.129) (0.224) 
Militarism 1.824*** 2.262*** 1.764 
 (0.421) (0.570) (0.670) 
Nationalism 1.322* 1.350* 1.104 
 (0.209) (0.233) (0.239) 
Political Engagement 1.403** 1.712*** 2.182*** 
 (0.234) (0.313) (0.548) 
Internationalism 0.865 1.169 1.210 
 (0.182) (0.261) (0.382) 
Party Affiliation 2.320*** 2.290*** 3.017*** 
 (0.333) (0.369) (0.705) 
Left-Right Political Views 0.955 0.978 1.100 
 (0.062) (0.071) (0.105) 
Constant 9.224* 4.062 7.068 
 (11.234) (5.218) (13.406) 
    
Observations 810 771 408 
Pseudo R-squared 0.224 0.250 0.355 
249 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 53: Experiment 1 Pakistan Main Effects (Logit) 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Reputation Vote 
    
Target Country Complies 1.466 1.798 1.509 
 (0.642) (0.989) (0.990) 
Engage Win the Engagement 1.595 2.138 1.443 
 (0.716) (1.218) (0.956) 
Engage Lose the Engagement 0.743 0.339** 0.556 
 (0.313) (0.159) (0.333) 
Engage Win with more Casualties 0.745 0.800 1.143 
 (0.300) (0.389) (0.691) 
Engage Lose with less Casualties 1.228 0.813 1.390 
 (0.535) (0.403) (0.875) 
Income 0.821* 0.971 1.045 
 (0.087) (0.107) (0.157) 
Education 0.810 0.945 0.715 
 (0.121) (0.151) (0.161) 
Gender 0.913 0.973 1.488 
 (0.249) (0.307) (0.648) 
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Age 0.869 0.755 0.885 
 (0.140) (0.132) (0.194) 
Militarism 1.786** 2.977*** 3.488*** 
 (0.422) (0.791) (1.292) 
Nationalism 1.317* 1.441** 1.188 
 (0.212) (0.255) (0.271) 
Political Engagement 1.493** 1.830*** 1.609** 
 (0.248) (0.351) (0.379) 
Internationalism 0.927 1.106 1.124 
 (0.189) (0.251) (0.327) 
Party Affiliation 2.645*** 2.724*** 2.740*** 
 (0.415) (0.480) (0.598) 
Left-Right Political Views 1.102 1.284*** 1.322*** 
 (0.073) (0.097) (0.127) 
Constant 9.256* 1.146 1.055 
 (11.012) (1.453) (1.749) 
    
Observations 835 793 424 
Pseudo R-squared 0.206 0.315 0.328 
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Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 54: Experiment 1 Subset Non-Tamils (Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Reputation Vote 
    
Target Country Complies 1.891 1.179 1.730 
 (0.764) (0.537) (0.961) 
Engage Win the Engagement 4.135*** 4.090*** 1.885 
 (1.930) (2.202) (1.019) 
Engage Lose the Engagement 1.165 1.301 0.806 
 (0.434) (0.606) (0.416) 
Engage Win with more Casualties 1.224 1.636 1.242 
 (0.459) (0.753) (0.654) 
Engage Lose with less Casualties 1.346 0.940 1.188 
 (0.548) (0.434) (0.667) 
Income 0.787** 0.904 0.875 
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 (0.084) (0.106) (0.113) 
Education 0.687*** 0.873 0.773 
 (0.098) (0.141) (0.147) 
Gender 1.749* 0.933 0.954 
 (0.516) (0.094) (0.040) 
Age 0.987 0.845 0.840 
 (0.146) (0.140) (0.160) 
Militarism 1.429 2.265*** 2.129** 
 (0.315) (0.571) (0.649) 
Nationalism 1.110 1.137 1.189 
 (0.161) (0.187) (0.214) 
Political Engagement 1.501*** 2.422*** 1.608** 
 (0.236) (0.470) (0.331) 
Internationalism 1.241 1.490* 1.348 
 (0.235) (0.319) (0.363) 
Party Affiliation 2.045*** 2.496*** 2.683*** 
 (0.287) (0.411) (0.502) 
Left-Right Political Views 1.143** 1.253*** 1.312*** 
 (0.066) (0.085) (0.101) 
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Constant 10.138** 2.345 2.253 
 (11.605) (2.951) (3.237) 
    
Observations 915 856 593 
Pseudo R-squared 0.197 0.332 0.343 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 55: Experiment 1 Subset Hindu (Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Reputation Vote 
    
Target Country Complies 1.983* 2.712* 1.709 
 (0.756) (1.493) (0.920) 
Engage Win the Engagement 3.024*** 1.869 2.540 
 (1.256) (0.882) (1.454) 
Engage Lose the Engagement 0.843 0.531 1.943 
 (0.276) (0.206) (1.012) 
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Engage Win with more Casualties 1.107 1.204 1.693 
 (0.389) (0.544) (0.909) 
Engage Lose with less Casualties 2.426** 0.994 1.835 
 (1.003) (0.429) (0.957) 
Income 0.717*** 0.896 0.776* 
 (0.073) (0.094) (0.107) 
Education 0.801 0.941 0.771 
 (0.108) (0.141) (0.158) 
Gender 1.718** 1.374 1.687 
 (0.453) (0.404) (0.683) 
Age 0.797 0.744* 0.854 
 (0.110) (0.117) (0.172) 
Militarism 1.740*** 2.503*** 1.731* 
 (0.359) (0.575) (0.537) 
Nationalism 1.465** 1.234 1.318 
 (0.217) (0.201) (0.257) 
Political Engagement 1.368** 1.810*** 1.473* 
 (0.207) (0.309) (0.315) 
Internationalism 1.028 1.313 1.260 
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 (0.194) (0.265) (0.333) 
Party Affiliation 2.314*** 2.063*** 2.703*** 
 (0.303) (0.307) (0.517) 
Left-Right Political Views 0.951 1.029 1.145 
 (0.061) (0.078) (0.099) 
Constant 24.619*** 7.780* 3.187 
 (26.619) (9.528) (5.055) 
    
Observations 1,281 1,234 646 
Pseudo R-squared 0.196 0.206 0.269 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 56: Experiment 1 Manipulation Check Pass (Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Reputation Vote 
    
Target Country Complies 1.980 2.934** 1.747 
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 (0.830) (1.423) (1.035) 
Engage Win the Engagement 1.717 2.425* 1.300 
 (0.710) (1.117) (0.721) 
Engage Lose the Engagement 0.701 0.946 1.330 
 (0.265) (0.407) (0.774) 
Engage Win with more Casualties 0.831 1.609 1.014 
 (0.310) (0.706) (0.541) 
Engage Lose with less Casualties 1.072 1.409 1.023 
 (0.422) (0.617) (0.560) 
Income 0.685*** 0.764** 0.800* 
 (0.070) (0.085) (0.100) 
Education 0.789* 0.936 0.652** 
 (0.105) (0.143) (0.135) 
Gender 1.098 0.911 2.032* 
 (0.283) (0.267) (0.795) 
Age 0.984 0.720** 0.985 
 (0.135) (0.108) (0.190) 
Militarism 2.037*** 2.385*** 2.651*** 
 (0.425) (0.562) (0.818) 
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Nationalism 1.257 1.680*** 1.067 
 (0.176) (0.278) (0.206) 
Political Engagement 1.712*** 1.635*** 2.105*** 
 (0.261) (0.300) (0.438) 
Internationalism 1.194 1.612** 1.232 
 (0.216) (0.331) (0.326) 
Party Affiliation 2.049*** 2.085*** 2.429*** 
 (0.279) (0.332) (0.466) 
Left-Right Political Views 1.145** 1.275*** 1.263*** 
 (0.066) (0.085) (0.098) 
Constant 21.079*** 4.700 5.013 
 (23.060) (5.735) (7.992) 
    
Observations 1,264 1,211 662 
Pseudo R-squared 0.246 0.330 0.359 
Standard errors in parentheses 






B.3 Experiment 2 India 
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B.4 Experiment 3 Nigeria 
 
Table 58: Experiment 3 Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline Backing Down  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Engage Win the Engagement 1.959*** -1.401** 1.214** 
 (0.548) (0.599) (0.534) 
Engage Lose the Engagement  0.594 -0.428 0.514 
 (0.537) (0.587) (0.523) 
Engage Win with More Casualties -0.399 0.377 -0.0664 
 (0.624) (0.682) (0.607) 
Engage Lose with Less Casualties -0.443 0.0980 -0.370 
 (0.634) (0.693) (0.616) 
Militarism  0.743*** 0.171 0.202 
 (0.275) (0.301) (0.268) 
Political Awareness  -0.204 -0.183 0.0560 
 (0.236) (0.258) (0.230) 
Hawkishness  0.165 0.289 -0.270 
 (0.290) (0.316) (0.282) 
Internationalism  -1.534*** 1.070*** -0.973*** 
 (0.354) (0.387) (0.344) 
Economics Approval 0.254 -0.211 0.603*** 
 (0.177) (0.193) (0.172) 
Religiosity  0.159** 0.0454 0.0377 
 (0.0737) (0.0805) (0.0717) 
Age 0.711** -0.292 0.850*** 
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 (0.295) (0.323) (0.287) 
Gender -0.521 0.430 -0.383 
 (0.400) (0.437) (0.389) 
Education -0.000557 0.160 0.0231 
 (0.132) (0.144) (0.129) 
Occupation 0.196 -0.462* 0.0354 
 (0.255) (0.279) (0.248) 
Constant 1.178 5.341*** 1.210 
 (1.516) (1.657) (1.475) 
    
Observations 269 269 269 
R-squared 0.177 0.105 0.137 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 59: Robustness Check Experiment 3 Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Militarism  -0.0271 -0.0276 0.117*** -0.0315 
 (0.0370) (0.0379) (0.0315) (0.0310) 
Political Awareness  0.00220 0.0407 -0.0217 -0.0226 
 (0.0324) (0.0332) (0.0276) (0.0271) 
Hawkishness  -0.0403 -0.0716* 0.0961*** -0.0209 
 (0.0391) (0.0401) (0.0332) (0.0327) 
Internationalism  0.0692 -0.0288 0.00979 -0.0158 
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 (0.0486) (0.0498) (0.0413) (0.0406) 
Economics Approval 0.00296 0.0159 -0.0402* 0.0221 
 (0.0242) (0.0248) (0.0206) (0.0202) 
Religiosity  0.00146 0.0123 0.00328 -0.00627 
 (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.00860) (0.00846) 
Age -0.0409 -0.0330 0.118*** 0.0692** 
 (0.0390) (0.0400) (0.0331) (0.0326) 
Gender -0.0527 -0.0258 0.0850* 0.0713 
 (0.0544) (0.0557) (0.0462) (0.0455) 
Education 0.0195 -0.0102 0.00267 0.000575 
 (0.0182) (0.0186) (0.0154) (0.0152) 
Occupation -0.0198 -0.0304 0.000228 0.0160 
 (0.0351) (0.0360) (0.0298) (0.0294) 
Constant 0.217 0.305 -0.124 -0.0728 
 (0.207) (0.212) (0.176) (0.173) 
     
Observations 269 269 269 269 
R-squared 0.029 0.038 0.148 0.053 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 60: Experimental Results in LOGIT for Experiments 1, 2, and 3. Dependent variable: Leader Approval - - Subset of 
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B.5 Experiment 4 India 
 
Table 61: Experiment 4 Main Effects 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Reputation of 
the 
Country264 
Reputation of the 
Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out 1.153 1.205 3.774 6.380 
 (0.216) (0.241) (3.868) (3.971) 
Engage and Lose 4.111*** 2.307*** 8.026** 7.402** 
 (0.929) (0.489) (3.400) (3.490) 
Engage and Win  10.737*** 4.918*** 16.162*** 14.452*** 
 (3.175) (1.229) (3.827) (3.929) 
Party Affiliation  1.151 1.256** 1.914 -0.039 
 (0.121) (0.127) (1.548) (1.589) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.112 1.282*** 3.320*** 3.320** 
 (0.095) (0.104) (1.258) (1.292) 
Militarism  1.352** 1.640*** 3.849* 6.718*** 
 (0.171) (0.211) (2.007) (2.061) 
 
264 The Coefficient Plots for the reputation of the country and the prime minister are attached to the appendix.   
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Political Awareness 2.108*** 2.195*** 2.621* 2.744* 
 (0.221) (0.225) (1.381) (1.418) 
Trust in the Government 1.359*** 1.485*** 5.689*** 7.682*** 
 (0.152) (0.164) (1.806) (1.854) 
Constant 2.715 0.883 41.731*** 50.921*** 
 (2.026) (0.632) (10.929) (11.220) 
     
Observations 1,745 1,685 441 441 
Pseudo R-squared 0.241 0.259   
R-squared   0.220 0.251 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1265 
 
 
Table 62: Experiment 4 Main Effects Subset Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister Protest 
      
Stay Out  1.151 1.668** 7.092* 9.058** 1.443 
 (0.267) (0.426) (4.140) (4.306) (0.367) 
Engage and Lose 6.446*** 3.425*** 8.338** 8.584** 1.356 
 (1.752) (0.864) (3.667) (3.814) (0.329) 
 
265 All the regression models for Experiment 2 control for: Income, Education, Gender and Age. 
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Engage and Win  25.549*** 14.176*** 16.994*** 14.940*** 1.235 
 (10.892) (5.128) (4.089) (4.253) (0.307) 
Group Oppose 1.528 1.093 4.773 3.811 0.594** 
 (0.397) (0.289) (3.774) (3.925) (0.139) 
Group Endorse 2.888*** 1.608* 5.345 0.588 0.884 
 (0.813) (0.454) (3.690) (3.838) (0.215) 
Elite Endorse 2.443*** 1.375 4.182 -0.084 0.896 
 (0.677) (0.376) (3.590) (3.734) (0.219) 
Party Affiliation  1.222 1.433*** 1.505 -0.889 0.935 
 (0.165) (0.187) (1.650) (1.716) (0.121) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.031 1.314*** 3.412** 3.439** 0.732*** 
 (0.108) (0.133) (1.323) (1.376) (0.071) 
Militarism  1.098 1.487** 3.692* 6.739*** 1.069 
 (0.166) (0.231) (2.148) (2.234) (0.153) 
Political Engagement 2.366*** 2.045*** 2.992** 2.789* 3.555*** 
 (0.313) (0.266) (1.493) (1.553) (0.404) 
Trust in the Government 1.506*** 1.375** 6.091*** 7.813*** 1.118 
 (0.217) (0.194) (1.977) (2.056) (0.152) 
Constant 0.553 0.147** 43.439*** 51.664*** 65.269*** 
 (0.523) (0.130) (11.749) (12.221) (55.329) 
      
Observations 990 928 381 381 944 
Pseudo R-squared 0.281 0.282   0.341 
R-squared   0.230 0.256  
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 63: Experiment 4 Main Effects Subset Hindu 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister Protest 
      
Stay Out  0.906 0.934 1.656 3.578 1.332 
 (0.202) (0.220) (4.517) (4.761) (0.311) 
Engage and Lose 6.022*** 2.313*** 5.047 3.306 1.137 
 (1.840) (0.602) (3.992) (4.208) (0.261) 
Engage and Win  14.933*** 4.369*** 16.492*** 13.948*** 0.892 
 (5.762) (1.283) (4.373) (4.609) (0.199) 
Group Oppose 1.762** 1.606* 4.271 0.394 0.877 
 (0.439) (0.392) (3.901) (4.112) (0.191) 
Group Endorse 3.307*** 2.383*** 3.435 1.586 0.939 
 (0.942) (0.629) (4.136) (4.360) (0.209) 
Elite Endorse 3.225*** 2.113*** 2.173 -2.850 1.382 
 (0.903) (0.544) (3.903) (4.114) (0.324) 
Party Affiliation  1.094 1.100 -0.345 -2.616 0.780** 
 (0.153) (0.140) (1.820) (1.919) (0.095) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.241** 1.196* 1.889 2.670* 0.829** 
 (0.131) (0.117) (1.367) (1.441) (0.075) 
Militarism  1.574*** 1.880*** 4.027* 6.245** 1.543*** 
 (0.259) (0.295) (2.364) (2.492) (0.221) 
Political Engagement 2.358*** 2.230*** 0.313 1.816 3.435*** 
 (0.307) (0.273) (1.609) (1.696) (0.356) 
Trust in the Government 1.042 1.271* 7.086*** 8.360*** 0.960 
 (0.151) (0.174) (2.109) (2.223) (0.126) 
Constant 4.651 3.008 52.058*** 58.725*** 103.499*** 
 (4.383) (2.702) (12.514) (13.190) (84.525) 
      
Observations 1,347 1,323 324 324 1,293 
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Pseudo R-squared 0.279 0.205   0.358 
R-squared   0.189 0.204  
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 64: Experiment 4 Main Effects Manipulation Check Pass 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister Protest 
      
Stay Out  1.240 1.216 1.640 2.416 1.091 
 (0.274) (0.291) (4.481) (4.613) (0.247) 
Engage and Lose 4.160*** 2.325*** 6.244 5.660 1.060 
 (1.093) (0.584) (3.982) (4.100) (0.237) 
Engage and Win  9.628*** 4.274*** 15.155*** 11.786** 0.886 
 (3.245) (1.243) (4.487) (4.620) (0.203) 
Group Oppose 1.432 1.373 5.355 2.478 0.989 
 (0.349) (0.330) (3.819) (3.932) (0.218) 
Group Endorse 2.235*** 2.404*** 4.534 1.263 1.027 
 (0.576) (0.629) (3.904) (4.019) (0.229) 
Elite Endorse 2.671*** 2.096*** 4.306 0.861 1.175 
 (0.710) (0.545) (3.735) (3.846) (0.266) 
Party Affiliation  1.259* 1.278** 1.171 -0.438 0.888 
 (0.153) (0.151) (1.740) (1.792) (0.096) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.063 1.221** 2.123 1.324 0.833** 
 (0.109) (0.120) (1.486) (1.530) (0.075) 
Militarism  1.465** 1.686*** 3.301 5.264** 1.402** 
 (0.221) (0.257) (2.435) (2.507) (0.192) 
Political Engagement 2.013*** 2.071*** 2.719* 2.566 3.783*** 
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 (0.248) (0.253) (1.572) (1.619) (0.399) 
Trust in the Government 1.336** 1.559*** 8.131*** 10.723*** 0.853 
 (0.180) (0.211) (2.192) (2.257) (0.106) 
Constant 2.116 1.091 45.362*** 58.992*** 51.882*** 
 (1.875) (0.929) (13.007) (13.392) (41.426) 
      
Observations 1,393 1,366 338 338 1,368 
Pseudo R-squared 0.247 0.281   0.354 
R-squared   0.239 0.259  
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 65: Experiment 4 Main Effects Manipulation Check Non-Tamils Pass 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister Protest 
      
Stay Out  1.221 1.535 5.903 6.386 1.375 
 (0.311) (0.429) (4.426) (4.611) (0.392) 
Engage and Lose 5.739*** 3.539*** 6.715* 7.134* 1.194 
 (1.679) (0.992) (3.986) (4.153) (0.322) 
Engage and Win  19.719*** 12.132*** 14.571*** 11.885** 1.227 
 (8.585) (4.567) (4.409) (4.594) (0.347) 
Group Oppose 1.500 0.986 5.781 5.691 0.578** 
 (0.423) (0.280) (3.933) (4.098) (0.152) 
Group Endorse 3.114*** 1.828* 4.966 1.764 0.896 
 (0.957) (0.565) (3.863) (4.025) (0.242) 
Elite Endorse 2.563*** 1.452 3.614 0.640 0.863 
 (0.765) (0.434) (3.751) (3.908) (0.233) 
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Party Affiliation  1.222 1.494*** 1.806 -0.640 1.079 
 (0.176) (0.212) (1.719) (1.792) (0.152) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.006 1.307** 3.456** 2.970** 0.730*** 
 (0.119) (0.149) (1.378) (1.436) (0.081) 
Militarism  1.157 1.417** 3.222 6.711*** 1.146 
 (0.189) (0.240) (2.229) (2.322) (0.183) 
Political Engagement 2.273*** 2.067*** 2.635* 2.060 4.127*** 
 (0.324) (0.295) (1.566) (1.632) (0.537) 
Trust in the Government 1.478** 1.394** 6.097*** 8.240*** 0.911 
 (0.239) (0.224) (2.115) (2.204) (0.141) 
Constant 0.663 0.200 42.848*** 55.064*** 51.175*** 
 (0.702) (0.198) (12.320) (12.838) (49.099) 
      
Observations 864 822 345 345 827 
Pseudo R-squared 0.271 0.302   0.372 
R-squared   0.225 0.251  
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 66: Experiment 4 Main Effects Manipulation Check Hindu Pass 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister Protest 
      
Stay Out  0.959 0.896 1.683 0.607 1.545 
 (0.256) (0.255) (5.149) (5.449) (0.427) 
Engage and Lose 6.397*** 2.600*** 4.599 3.008 1.258 
 (2.357) (0.824) (4.607) (4.876) (0.335) 
Engage and Win  16.583*** 4.497*** 18.451*** 13.034** 0.966 
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 (7.872) (1.592) (5.070) (5.366) (0.252) 
Group Oppose 1.600 1.628* 7.130* 2.615 1.019 
 (0.477) (0.472) (4.246) (4.494) (0.264) 
Group Endorse 3.054*** 2.555*** 5.504 5.047 0.969 
 (1.023) (0.804) (4.700) (4.975) (0.253) 
Elite Endorse 3.646*** 2.447*** 3.710 -0.427 1.365 
 (1.266) (0.777) (4.328) (4.581) (0.372) 
Party Affiliation  1.117 1.047 0.194 -2.318 0.834 
 (0.185) (0.160) (1.999) (2.115) (0.115) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.173 1.119 0.480 0.721 0.835* 
 (0.155) (0.137) (1.616) (1.710) (0.091) 
Militarism  1.783*** 2.291*** 6.855** 7.143** 1.638*** 
 (0.353) (0.431) (2.914) (3.084) (0.276) 
Political Engagement 2.302*** 2.149*** 0.365 1.648 3.781*** 
 (0.367) (0.323) (1.856) (1.965) (0.475) 
Trust in the Government 1.132 1.317 7.450*** 9.284*** 0.854 
 (0.203) (0.229) (2.525) (2.672) (0.135) 
Constant 3.783 2.890 49.210*** 62.620*** 56.963*** 
 (4.366) (3.132) (14.501) (15.348) (55.779) 
      
Observations 1,079 1,065 249 249 1,047 
Pseudo R-squared 0.293 0.235   0.383 
R-squared   0.211 0.197  
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 67: Experiment Main Effects 4 Subset No Cue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister Protest 
      
Stay Out  0.769 1.151 -6.226 -0.759 0.714 
 (0.266) (0.428) (7.262) (7.263) (0.255) 
Engage and Fail  3.786*** 4.805*** 4.626 7.821 1.011 
 (1.562) (2.059) (5.242) (5.242) (0.387) 
Engage and Win  19.724*** 4.695*** 22.898*** 20.514*** 0.786 
 (11.558) (1.998) (6.842) (6.843) (0.288) 
Party Affiliation  1.148 1.119 3.291 1.707 0.923 
 (0.238) (0.229) (2.133) (2.134) (0.173) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.115 1.473** 1.024 1.775 0.670*** 
 (0.183) (0.237) (1.681) (1.681) (0.102) 
Militarism  0.945 1.299 5.610** 7.989*** 1.385 
 (0.215) (0.306) (2.742) (2.743) (0.309) 
Political Engagement 2.267*** 2.367*** 3.712* 3.277* 2.527*** 
 (0.448) (0.472) (1.892) (1.892) (0.435) 
Trust in the Government 1.334 1.263 7.078*** 8.421*** 0.937 
 (0.306) (0.277) (2.621) (2.621) (0.195) 
Constant 11.513* 1.293 30.338** 33.756** 364.098*** 
 (15.201) (1.727) (14.818) (14.819) (462.054) 
      
Observations 449 425 206 206 435 
Pseudo R-squared 0.292 0.299   0.266 
R-squared   0.306 0.335  
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 68: Experiment 4 Subset Cue Social Group Oppose 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister Protest 
      
Stay Out  1.014 1.008 -2.926 -4.778 1.162 
 (0.465) (0.479) (8.531) (8.506) (0.461) 
Engage and Fail  3.088** 1.297 1.364 -5.348 1.052 
 (1.586) (0.619) (8.017) (7.993) (0.420) 
Engage and Win  10.987*** 4.534** -1.806 -1.404 0.800 
 (8.966) (2.846) (8.557) (8.532) (0.311) 
Party Affiliation  0.990 1.266 8.164* 7.759* 0.688* 
 (0.257) (0.299) (4.093) (4.080) (0.137) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.038 1.307 2.945 0.173 0.833 
 (0.231) (0.265) (3.300) (3.290) (0.132) 
Militarism  1.866** 1.597 -2.382 4.539 1.216 
 (0.581) (0.496) (5.334) (5.318) (0.287) 
Political Engagement 2.331*** 2.643*** -6.028 -6.988* 3.721*** 
 (0.685) (0.691) (3.720) (3.709) (0.714) 
Trust in the Government 1.575 1.595* 10.482** 14.086*** 0.867 
 (0.441) (0.418) (4.553) (4.539) (0.189) 
Constant 60.802** 4.819 81.428*** 102.737*** 88.830*** 
 (110.456) (8.519) (26.845) (26.765) (127.199) 
      
Observations 428 421 76 76 422 
Pseudo R-squared 0.295 0.281   0.338 
R-squared   0.363 0.457  
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 69: Experiment 4 Subset Cue Social Group Endorse 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister Protest 
      
Stay Out  2.045* 1.950* 10.212 22.572** 1.434 
 (0.806) (0.785) (8.736) (8.550) (0.540) 
Engage and Fail  3.612*** 1.794 3.418 14.542 1.279 
 (1.582) (0.726) (9.415) (9.215) (0.485) 
Engage and Win  4.765*** 7.340*** 12.796 16.673* 0.919 
 (2.238) (4.101) (8.582) (8.399) (0.351) 
Party Affiliation  1.622** 1.277 -3.879 -10.727** 0.897 
 (0.306) (0.250) (4.293) (4.201) (0.158) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.261 1.304* 1.799 2.125 0.883 
 (0.194) (0.201) (3.926) (3.842) (0.129) 
Militarism  1.604** 1.753** 7.528 14.241** 1.726** 
 (0.374) (0.434) (5.780) (5.658) (0.391) 
Political Engagement 2.269*** 2.141*** -1.179 0.909 3.417*** 
 (0.441) (0.408) (3.662) (3.584) (0.564) 
Trust in the Government 1.014 1.616** 9.832* 12.310** 0.957 
 (0.202) (0.332) (5.194) (5.084) (0.188) 
Constant 1.184 0.913 90.644** 97.417*** 62.172*** 
 (1.753) (1.228) (36.429) (35.655) (84.971) 
      
Observations 435 430 76 76 438 
Pseudo R-squared 0.192 0.250   0.355 
R-squared   0.359 0.444  
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 70: Experiment 4 Subset Cue Elite Endorse 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.634 0.935 5.899 5.191 
 (0.664) (0.399) (8.464) (9.470) 
Engage and Fail  13.586*** 2.539* 16.931* 7.648 
 (8.697) (1.218) (8.513) (9.525) 
Engage and Win  27.104*** 3.748*** 13.730 6.332 
 (21.483) (1.886) (8.572) (9.591) 
Party Affiliation  0.847 1.366 -2.182 -2.527 
 (0.207) (0.288) (4.145) (4.638) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.207 1.172 7.408* 7.046 
 (0.230) (0.203) (3.833) (4.289) 
Militarism  1.337 2.278*** 4.190 1.290 
 (0.417) (0.687) (4.935) (5.521) 
Political Engagement 1.952*** 1.754*** 9.095** 7.263* 
 (0.447) (0.378) (3.814) (4.268) 
Trust in the Government 1.822** 1.497* -5.706 -2.137 
 (0.459) (0.349) (4.917) (5.502) 
Constant 0.610 0.812 16.543 40.962 
 (0.950) (1.110) (23.988) (26.840) 
     
Observations 433 409 83 83 
Pseudo R-squared 0.279 0.228   
R-squared   0.261 0.211 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 71: Experiment 4 Subset BJP Party Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.003 0.891 6.594 9.330* 
 (0.268) (0.244) (4.970) (5.076) 
Engage and Fail  8.991*** 3.330*** 8.221* 11.402** 
 (3.586) (1.088) (4.360) (4.453) 
Engage and Win  12.524*** 4.462*** 15.283*** 14.072*** 
 (5.437) (1.577) (4.846) (4.949) 
Party Affiliation  2.104** 1.585 3.620 -1.035 
 (0.658) (0.462) (4.461) (4.556) 
Prime Minister Approval 2.697*** 2.172** 6.987 5.677 
 (0.883) (0.674) (4.241) (4.331) 
Militarism  2.782*** 2.736*** 0.398 -3.975 
 (0.940) (0.903) (4.385) (4.478) 
Political Engagement 1.116 1.117 2.518* 2.949* 
 (0.148) (0.138) (1.514) (1.546) 
Trust in the Government 1.141 2.033*** 2.129 4.016 
Baseline: Back Down (0.223) (0.385) (2.538) (2.592) 
 2.762*** 2.383*** 2.002 3.039 
Stay Out  (0.456) (0.359) (1.818) (1.856) 
 0.968 0.952 7.583*** 8.740*** 
 (0.187) (0.177) (2.601) (2.657) 
Constant 5.184 4.667 57.010*** 51.382*** 
 (5.670) (4.961) (14.821) (15.136) 
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Observations 1,035 1,020 251 251 
Pseudo R-squared 0.286 0.197   
R-squared   0.218 0.255 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 72: Experiment 4 Subset INC Party Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.615 1.769 8.924 12.515 
 (0.637) (0.788) (8.782) (9.037) 
Engage and Lose 3.829*** 1.942 6.735 5.360 
 (1.768) (0.893) (7.555) (7.774) 
Engage and Win  4.496*** 4.952*** 13.537 10.758 
 (2.219) (2.605) (9.186) (9.453) 
Group Oppose 0.884 1.009 17.629** 21.979** 
 (0.369) (0.472) (8.410) (8.654) 
Group Endorse 2.067 1.449 0.579 -8.015 
 (0.938) (0.673) (8.253) (8.492) 
Elite Endorse 3.377*** 2.187 14.499* 5.706 
 (1.577) (1.056) (7.782) (8.008) 
Party Affiliation  1.168 1.499** 0.170 2.162 
 (0.204) (0.272) (3.397) (3.496) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.524* 1.211 -2.262 0.819 
 (0.359) (0.317) (4.252) (4.376) 
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Militarism  2.030*** 2.419*** 3.999 6.345* 
 (0.419) (0.516) (3.488) (3.589) 
Political Engagement 2.176*** 2.202*** 2.936 3.556 
 (0.468) (0.473) (3.950) (4.065) 
Constant 1.153 1.677 49.863** 49.135** 
 (1.662) (2.469) (21.695) (22.325) 
     
Observations 409 394 97 97 
Pseudo R-squared 0.260 0.371   
R-squared   0.195 0.254 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







B.6 Experiment 5 India 
 
Table 73: Experiment 5 Main Effects 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Reputation 
of the 
Country266 
Reputation of the 
Prime Minister 
     
Engage 14.150*** 4.382*** 15.279*** 12.815*** 
 (5.433) (1.242) (4.216) (4.487) 
Party Affiliation 0.969 1.066 2.145 -1.311 
 (0.141) (0.148) (2.806) (2.987) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.032 1.309** 2.644 2.217 
 (0.120) (0.147) (2.021) (2.152) 
Militarism 1.265 1.386* 1.364 4.570 
 (0.213) (0.243) (3.400) (3.619) 
Nationalism 0.855 0.620*** 3.409 3.503 
 (0.107) (0.084) (2.450) (2.608) 
 
266 The Coefficient Plots for the reputation of the country and the prime minister are attached to the appendix.   
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Political Awareness 2.179*** 2.108*** -5.884** -4.311 
 (0.301) (0.285) (2.539) (2.703) 
Trust in the Government 1.619*** 2.018*** 8.967*** 10.929*** 
 (0.251) (0.308) (2.850) (3.034) 
Constant 15.459*** 6.059* 76.454*** 83.680*** 
 (15.006) (5.789) (17.329) (18.447) 
     
Observations 1,117 1,081 195 195 
Pseudo R-squared 0.243 0.256   
R-squared   0.306 0.288 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 74: Experiment 5 Subset Cue BJP Endorse 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage 38.381*** 9.844*** 23.143* 17.711 
 (29.550) (5.911) (12.021) (13.605) 
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Age 0.449** 0.514** -1.608 0.257 
 (0.157) (0.174) (10.632) (12.032) 
Gender 1.727 1.234 -13.818 -4.385 
 (1.003) (0.696) (15.490) (17.531) 
Education 1.270 0.843 -0.800 0.283 
 (0.367) (0.259) (6.673) (7.552) 
Income 0.703*** 0.903 -0.262 -1.599 
 (0.089) (0.113) (2.905) (3.288) 
Party Affiliation 0.861 1.311 3.571 7.978 
 (0.312) (0.446) (12.871) (14.567) 
Prime Minister Approval 0.661 0.878 5.895 7.122 
 (0.193) (0.250) (6.931) (7.844) 
Militarism 1.835 2.417** 5.006 -2.314 
 (0.750) (1.049) (11.529) (13.047) 
Nationalism 0.616* 0.536* 7.060 1.752 
 (0.170) (0.172) (6.994) (7.916) 
Political Awareness 1.914** 2.113** -5.090 0.802 
 (0.628) (0.671) (8.428) (9.538) 
Trust in the Government 3.525*** 2.529*** 3.884 4.914 
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 (1.445) (0.906) (9.240) (10.457) 
Constant 45.634* 48.054* 43.052 19.960 
 (103.552) (112.002) (69.459) (78.608) 
     
Observations 232 213 36 36 
Pseudo R-squared 0.401 0.336   
R-squared   0.453 0.371 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 75: Experiment 5 Subset Cue INC Endorse 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage 10.311*** 3.488*** 12.175*** 11.016** 
 (4.611) (1.097) (4.543) (4.765) 
Age  0.933 0.889 -5.051** -5.156* 
 (0.139) (0.135) (2.499) (2.621) 
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Gender 1.599 1.281 -1.110 -3.120 
 (0.472) (0.356) (4.688) (4.916) 
Education 0.901 0.986 -4.157* -3.497 
 (0.124) (0.132) (2.205) (2.312) 
Income  0.838*** 0.805*** 1.710* 1.986* 
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.991) (1.039) 
Party Affiliation 1.017 1.064 2.245 -2.676 
 (0.163) (0.165) (2.939) (3.082) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.103 1.406*** 1.332 1.220 
 (0.142) (0.176) (2.221) (2.329) 
Militarism 1.144 1.227 0.788 5.803 
 (0.216) (0.241) (3.731) (3.913) 
Nationalism 0.895 0.633*** 2.724 4.130 
 (0.129) (0.095) (2.691) (2.821) 
Political Awareness 2.262*** 2.158*** -5.912** -5.198* 
 (0.351) (0.324) (2.710) (2.842) 
Trust in the Government 1.472** 1.958*** 10.703*** 11.784*** 
 (0.255) (0.337) (3.177) (3.332) 
Constant 11.683** 4.000 80.872*** 92.212*** 
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 (12.854) (4.235) (18.039) (18.917) 
     
Observations 885 868 159 159 
Pseudo R-squared 0.213 0.249   
R-squared   0.290 0.291 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 76: Experiment 5 Subset Cue BJP Endorse Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage 1,505.164*** 293.542*** 15.488 12.076 
 (2,749.238) (458.220) (17.552) (19.123) 
Age  0.185** 0.258** -8.524 -2.453 
 (0.126) (0.154) (16.980) (18.500) 
Gender 2.547 1.949 -12.584 -5.577 
 (2.416) (1.987) (19.952) (21.737) 
Education 1.637 1.079 0.132 0.233 
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 (0.769) (0.564) (8.833) (9.623) 
Income  0.498*** 0.734 -1.405 -2.306 
 (0.120) (0.157) (4.355) (4.745) 
Party Affiliation 0.334 0.862 0.265 -6.656 
 (0.245) (0.532) (18.312) (19.951) 
Prime Minister Approval 0.555 0.738 10.477 12.899 
 (0.285) (0.364) (10.922) (11.900) 
Militarism 1.725 1.560 -2.491 -13.291 
 (1.075) (1.095) (17.956) (19.563) 
Nationalism 0.332** 0.524 7.086 3.258 
 (0.159) (0.266) (8.654) (9.428) 
Political Awareness 7.708*** 16.905*** -3.415 2.350 
 (5.824) (14.205) (10.437) (11.372) 
Trust in the Government 15.783*** 10.181*** 5.115 10.612 
 (14.028) (8.170) (12.289) (13.389) 
Constant 6,622.835* 1,024.931 49.289 48.878 
 (30,266.420) (5,035.159) (96.043) (104.640) 
     
Observations 134 119 29 29 
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Pseudo R-squared 0.639 0.601   
R-squared   0.404 0.356 
Standard Error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 77: Experiment 5 Subset Cue BJP Endorse Hindu 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage 74.160*** 38.380*** 39.265*** 33.192** 
 (85.635) (41.050) (11.182) (13.277) 
Age  0.376** 0.298** 7.036 9.119 
 (0.166) (0.152) (9.662) (11.472) 
Gender 1.438 0.989 7.883 15.274 
 (1.075) (0.863) (16.870) (20.031) 
Education 1.065 0.876 -3.723 -0.510 
 (0.386) (0.362) (5.779) (6.861) 
Income  0.751* 0.744 -2.059 -4.207 
 (0.128) (0.154) (2.980) (3.538) 
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Party Affiliation 0.673 0.820 25.796 28.239 
 (0.386) (0.497) (14.868) (17.654) 
Prime Minister Approval 0.564 0.508 6.607 6.741 
 (0.227) (0.243) (6.861) (8.146) 
Militarism 2.329 5.461*** 3.823 -2.845 
 (1.234) (3.526) (10.345) (12.284) 
Nationalism 0.817 1.003 5.978 3.217 
 (0.322) (0.485) (6.900) (8.193) 
Political Awareness 2.290* 2.168 -5.797 0.223 
 (1.002) (1.046) (7.868) (9.342) 
Trust in the Government 2.166 2.753 -5.077 -3.599 
 (1.231) (1.723) (9.107) (10.813) 
Constant 803.572** 9,663.915** -42.661 -64.186 
 (2,686.301) (38,712.506) (68.489) (81.323) 
     
Observations 170 155 26 26 
Pseudo R-squared 0.472 0.482   
R-squared   0.755 0.660 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 78: Experiment 5 Subset Cue BJP Endorse Manipulation Check Pass 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage 30.090*** 9.787*** 16.326 0.135 
 (25.703) (7.448) (16.226) (16.747) 
Age  0.400** 0.354** -10.636 -5.699 
 (0.160) (0.154) (12.768) (13.178) 
Gender 1.478 1.095 2.228 5.850 
 (0.987) (0.736) (17.400) (17.958) 
Education 1.266 0.840 3.760 6.599 
 (0.429) (0.322) (6.495) (6.703) 
Income  0.725** 0.898 2.598 2.024 
 (0.111) (0.147) (3.131) (3.231) 
Party Affiliation 0.929 1.091 18.433 19.716 
 (0.367) (0.436) (15.802) (16.309) 
Prime Minister Approval 0.705 0.919 16.437* 23.650** 
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 (0.231) (0.304) (8.761) (9.042) 
Militarism 2.021 4.441*** 14.380 11.524 
 (0.912) (2.402) (13.065) (13.485) 
Nationalism 0.556* 0.512 18.234* 20.282** 
 (0.184) (0.210) (8.854) (9.138) 
Political Awareness 1.948* 1.646 4.468 16.394* 
 (0.727) (0.617) (8.791) (9.073) 
Trust in the Government 2.959** 2.807** -15.136 -23.062* 
 (1.437) (1.348) (11.736) (12.112) 
Constant 39.581 158.335* -73.016 -114.919 
 (103.854) (460.002) (74.711) (77.108) 
     
Observations 190 176 27 27 
Pseudo R-squared 0.395 0.378   
R-squared   0.666 0.661 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 79: Experiment 5 Subset Cue INC Endorse Non-Tamils 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage 11.370*** 6.587*** 12.895*** 12.779** 
 (6.180) (2.991) (4.723) (4.935) 
Age  0.986 1.028 -4.395* -5.022* 
 (0.173) (0.200) (2.622) (2.739) 
Gender 1.756 1.644 -0.282 -4.565 
 (0.668) (0.673) (5.005) (5.229) 
Education 0.975 0.899 -4.761* -4.166 
 (0.159) (0.160) (2.427) (2.536) 
Income  0.860** 0.820*** 1.073 1.699 
 (0.059) (0.059) (1.067) (1.114) 
Party Affiliation 1.091 1.118 3.196 -2.007 
 (0.222) (0.238) (3.116) (3.256) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.063 1.353* 1.249 0.767 
 (0.163) (0.216) (2.395) (2.502) 
Militarism 0.795 1.109 0.699 6.464 
 (0.177) (0.268) (3.920) (4.096) 
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Nationalism 0.940 0.709* 3.096 4.751 
 (0.156) (0.135) (2.775) (2.900) 
Political Awareness 2.364*** 2.021*** -6.432** -5.600* 
 (0.473) (0.413) (2.898) (3.028) 
Trust in the Government 1.477* 2.094*** 10.510*** 11.369*** 
 (0.312) (0.478) (3.441) (3.595) 
Constant 4.153 3.176 82.219*** 97.857*** 
 (5.269) (4.409) (19.678) (20.560) 
     
Observations 485 451 138 138 
Pseudo R-squared 0.199 0.256   
R-squared   0.304 0.309 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 80: Experiment 5 Subset Cue INC Endorse Hindu 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
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Engage 10.326*** 4.150*** 10.729** 9.434* 
 (5.588) (1.599) (5.049) (5.215) 
Age  1.025 1.046 -3.671 -3.935 
 (0.180) (0.187) (2.954) (3.051) 
Gender 1.243 1.168 -0.958 -1.979 
 (0.420) (0.370) (5.160) (5.330) 
Education 0.900 0.845 -2.893 -2.521 
 (0.150) (0.139) (2.437) (2.517) 
Income  0.847** 0.838*** 1.212 1.584 
 (0.057) (0.055) (1.069) (1.104) 
Party Affiliation 0.962 0.886 -0.442 -4.418 
 (0.206) (0.176) (3.346) (3.456) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.207 1.528*** 0.593 0.248 
 (0.186) (0.230) (2.446) (2.526) 
Militarism 1.073 1.273 -0.918 5.425 
 (0.249) (0.297) (4.439) (4.585) 
Nationalism 0.912 0.554*** 4.230 5.823* 
 (0.165) (0.104) (3.121) (3.223) 
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Political Awareness 2.858*** 2.491*** -7.118** -6.437** 
 (0.539) (0.453) (3.010) (3.108) 
Trust in the Government 1.061 1.587** 7.226* 7.558* 
 (0.230) (0.338) (3.787) (3.911) 
Constant 12.790** 10.761* 83.237*** 94.068*** 
 (16.580) (13.596) (19.442) (20.081) 
     
Observations 683 690 122 122 
Pseudo R-squared 0.200 0.217   
R-squared   0.164 0.180 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 81: Experiment 5 Subset Cue INC Endorse Manipulation Check Pass 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage 14.970*** 3.822*** 12.961*** 13.898*** 
 (8.176) (1.422) (4.888) (5.065) 
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Age  0.889 0.849 -5.187* -7.460** 
 (0.147) (0.144) (2.885) (2.990) 
Gender 1.401 1.188 -1.628 -4.412 
 (0.493) (0.393) (4.947) (5.125) 
Education 0.872 1.058 -2.040 -2.482 
 (0.135) (0.153) (2.274) (2.356) 
Income  0.799*** 0.772*** 1.912* 2.482** 
 (0.054) (0.052) (1.112) (1.152) 
Party Affiliation 0.969 1.018 2.492 -3.309 
 (0.179) (0.182) (3.096) (3.208) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.029 1.196 1.054 0.910 
 (0.152) (0.174) (2.383) (2.469) 
Militarism 1.165 1.372 -0.183 6.771 
 (0.252) (0.314) (4.437) (4.597) 
Nationalism 0.916 0.606*** 4.918* 5.682* 
 (0.147) (0.103) (2.877) (2.981) 
Political Awareness 2.314*** 2.123*** -6.692** -6.400** 
 (0.416) (0.368) (2.870) (2.974) 
Trust in the Government 1.563** 2.168*** 10.779*** 10.591*** 
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 (0.311) (0.434) (3.347) (3.468) 
Constant 29.702*** 7.153 69.428*** 91.910*** 
 (37.525) (8.705) (18.586) (19.259) 
     
Observations 702 697 125 125 
Pseudo R-squared 0.255 0.269   
R-squared   0.313 0.339 
Standard Errors in parentheses 








B.7 Questionaire and Vignettes 
 
 
Experiment 1 India  
 
Pre-treatment questions  
 
Q How old are you? 
o 18-29   
o 30-39   
o 40-49   
o 50-59   
o 60+  
 
Q What is your gender? 
o Male   
o Female   





Q What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
o No formal school education      
o Primary      
o Lower secondary     
o Secondary     
o High School Degree    
o University Degree (Bachelor’s Degree)    
o Graduate Degree    




Q Do you agree or disagree with how the Indian government is managing the country’s economy? 
This question is designed to ensure you are reading carefully. Please choose "Prefer not to say," 
below as a sign that you are paying attention". 
o Strongly Disagree     
o Somewhat Disagree     
o Slightly Disagree     
o Prefer Not To Say     
o Slightly Agree    
o Somewhat Agree    




Q On what language do you communicate at home? 
o Hindi   
o Bengali   
o Telugu   
o Marathi  
o Tamil    
o English   
o Gujarati   
o Urdu   
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o Kannada   
o Odia   
o Malayalam   
o Punjabi   






Q Do you approve or disapprove of the way Narendra Modi is handling his job as prime 
minister?  1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly.  
o Not at all     
o Somewhat     
o Moderately     
o Very Much      
o Very Strongly     
 
 
Q Could you indicate your annual income 
o Up to 50,000 Rupees     
o 50,001 to 100,000 Rupees   
o 100,001 to 150,000 Rupees     
o 150,001 to 200,000 Rupees    
o 200,001 to 250,000 Rupees    
o 250,001 to 300,000 Rupees     
o Over 300,000 Rupees    
 
 
Q With which organized religion do you most identity with?   
o Hindu     
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o Muslim    
o Christian   
o Sikhism  
o Buddhism     
o Jainism  
o Zoroastrianism   
o Not Religious   
o Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion   
o Other    
o Hard to answer/refused     
 
 
Q Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?  
o Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)    
o Indian National Congress (INC)   
o National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)   
o United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)   
o All India Trinamool Congress    
o Bahujan Samaj Party   
o Communist Party of India   
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o Communist Party of India (Marxist)    
o Other   
 
 
Q For which party did you vote in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections?  
o Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)    
o Indian National Congress (INC)    
o National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)   
o United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)   
o All India Trinamool Congress     
o Bahujan Samaj Party   
o Communist Party of India   
o Communist Party of India (Marxist)     
o Other    
o I did not vote   
o Prefer not to answer   
 
 
Q How would you describe your political views? In a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 indicates the left, 
and 10 indicates the right.  
o 1   
o 2   
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o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6   
o 7   
o 8   
o 9   
o 10   
 
 








On a Regular 
Basis (5) 
Voting   




problem   
o  o  o  o  o  
Contacted a 
government 
official    
o  o  o  o  o  
Participated 
in a political 
protest   
o  o  o  o  o  
Participated 
in a political 
gathering or 
rally.    
o  o  o  o  o  
Worked for a 
political 
campaign  
o  o  o  o  o  
Donate 
money to a 
political 
campaign  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Served in a 
community 
board  
o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q How closely you follow national politics?  
o Very closely    
o Closely   
o Somewhat Closely   
o Not too closely   
o Not at all   
 
 
Q How closely you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?  
o Very closely     
o Closely   
o Somewhat Closely   
o Not too closely   







Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, 
national identity, and international politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which 
range from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully. 
 
Q The best way a state can ensure its national security is with the use of its military and security 
forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international challengers.  
o Strongly disagree    
o Disagree   
o Neither agree nor disagree    
o Agree    





Q The use of military force only makes problems worse.  
o Strongly agree    
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree   
o Strongly disagree  
 
 
Q Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an 
international crisis that is threatening vital national interests of your country.      
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree   




Q India needs to cooperate more with the United Nations in settling international disputes. 
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree    
o Strongly disagree   
 
 
Q India needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.    
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree    
o Disagree   





Q India should primarily focus its efforts to take care of the well-being of Indians and not get 
involved in other nations’ conflicts.   
o Strongly agree    
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree  
o Disagree   
o Strongly disagree   
 
Q India is militarily capable to safeguard its national interests?  
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree  





Q India should act unilaterally against any threat to its vital national interests?  
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree   




(Administered to all respondents) 
 
The following text concerns the decision of India’s leaders when faced with foreign threats and 
security challenges. You will read about a hypothetical but realistic situation that India has faced 
in the past and will likely face again in the future. Indian prime ministers have managed the 
situation in different ways. In the following lines, you will read about one approach the Indian 




Vignette 1: Pakistan No Comply -  Back Down 
Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police 
Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its 
soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to 
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attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan 
dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani 
prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the 
sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. Indian prime minister decided not to mobilize 
the army and continue with other diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis.         
To Summarize:        
● Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and 
punish the perpetrators.      
● The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his 
position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.       
● Indian prime minister decided not to mobilize the army and continue with other 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis.        
 
 
Vignette 2: Pakistan No Comply PM Win 
 
Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police 
Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its 
soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to 
attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan 
dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani 
prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the 
sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the 
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LOC and pushed back Pakistani military by 2 km. During the operation, India suffered 40 fatalities 
while Pakistan suffered 350 fatalities.         
To Summarize:        
● Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish 
the perpetrators.      
● The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his 
position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.       
● The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the LOC and pushed back Pakistani military by 
2 km. In the operation, India lost 40 of its soldiers, while Pakistan lost 350.         
 
 
Vignette 3: Pakistan No Comply PM Loss  
Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police 
Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its 
soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to 
attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan 
dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani 
prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the 
sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the 
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LOC. However, Pakistan retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the LOC. 
During the operation, India suffered 350 fatalities while Pakistan suffered 40 fatalities.         
To Summarize:        
● Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish 
the perpetrators.      
● The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his 
position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.       
● The Indian Army attacked but Pakistan retaliated and pushed back Indian military by 2 km 




Vignette 4: Pakistan No Comply PM Win Reversed Casualties  
 
Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police 
Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its 
soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to 
attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan 
dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani 
prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the 
sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the 
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LOC and pushed back the Pakistani military by 2 km. During the operation, India suffered 350 
fatalities while Pakistan suffered 40 fatalities.         
To Summarize:        
● Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and 
punish the perpetrators.       
● The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his 
position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.       
● The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along the LOC and pushed back Pakistani military by 
2 km. In the operation, India lost 350 of its soldiers, while Pakistan lost 40.      
 
 
Vignette 5: Pakistan No Comply PM Loss Reversed Casualties 
 
 
Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve Police 
Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir and killed 40 of its 
soldiers on February 14, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to 
attack Pakistan and punish the perpetrators. The prime minister also demanded that Pakistan 
dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader Masood Azhar to India. The Pakistani 
prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the 
sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked Pakistan along 
LOC. However, Pakistan retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the LOC. 
During the operation, India suffered 40 fatalities while Pakistan suffered 350 fatalities.  
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To Summarize:       
● Pakistan supported terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked a Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF) convoy in Pulwama district of India administered Kashmir.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack Pakistan and punish 
the perpetrators.      
● The Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan denied all the allegations and reinforced his 
position to defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.       
● The Indian Army attacked but Pakistan retaliated and pushed back Indian military by 2 km 






Vignette 6: Country A No Comply PM Back Down  
 
A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police 
convoy around and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that 
the country dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India. The country’s 
prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of 
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the country and mobilize the military. In response to that, the Indian prime minister decided not to 
mobilize the army, but to continue with diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully.        
To Summarize:        
● A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian 
police convoy.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the 
perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.       
● The country’s prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to 
defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.       
● In response to that the Indian prime minister suspended his plan to attack in reaction to the 
country’s compliance.     
 
 
Vignette 7: Country A No Comply PM Win 
 
A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police 
convoy and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country 
dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India. The country’s prime minister 
denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and 
mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked along the border and pushed back the country’s 
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military by 2 km. During the operation, India suffered 40 fatalities while the opposing country 
suffered 350 fatalities.         
To Summarize:        
● A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian 
police convoy.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the 
perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.       
● The country’s prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to 
defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.      
● The Indian Army attacked along the border and pushed back the country’s military by 2 




Vignette 8: Country A No Comply PM Loss T10 
 A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police 
convoy and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country 
dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India. The country’s prime minister 
denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and 
mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked the country along the border. However, the 
country’s armed forces retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the border. 
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During the operation, India suffered 350 fatalities while the opposing country suffered 40 
fatalities.         
To Summarize:        
● A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian 
police convoy around.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the 
perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.       
● The country’s prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to 
defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.       
● The Indian Army attacked the country along the border, but the country’s armed forces 
retaliated and pushed back Indian military by 2 km across the border. In the operation, 




Vignette 9: Country A No Comply PM Win Reversed Casualties  
A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police 
convoy and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country 
dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India.  The country’s prime minister 
denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and 
mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked along the border and pushed back the country’s 
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military by 2 km. During the operation, India suffered 350 fatalities while the opposing country 
suffered 40 fatalities.          
To Summarize:        
● A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian 
police convoy.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the 
perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.       
● The country’s prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to 
defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.        
● The Indian Army attacked along the border and pushed back the country’s military by 2 
km. In the operation, India lost 350 of its soldiers while the opposing country lost 40.    
 
 
Vignette 10: Country A No Comply PM Loss Reversed Casualties 
 
A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian police 
convoy and killed 40 of its policemen on January 29th, 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the perpetrators and demanded that the country 
dismantle the terrorist organization and handover its leader to India. The country’s prime minister 
denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to defend the sovereignty of the country and 
mobilize the military. The Indian Army attacked the country along the border. However, the 
country’s armed forces retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the border. 
During the operation, India suffered 40 fatalities, while the opposite country suffered 350 
fatalities.         
324 
 
To Summarize:        
● A terrorist group supported by a country sharing a border with India attacked an Indian 
police convoy around.       
● Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a military threat to attack and punish the 
perpetrators and demanded that the country dismantle the terrorist organization.        
● The country’s prime minister denied all the allegations and reinforced his position to 
defend the sovereignty of the country and mobilize the military.       
● The Indian Army attacked the country along the border, but the country’s armed forces 
retaliated and pushed back Indian military by 2 km across the border. In the operation, 




Next, you will be presented with a series of questions about the situation you just read. 
Please answer to the best of your ability. 
Q Do you approve, disprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way the Indian prime 
minister handled the situation?    
o Strongly Approve   
o Approve   
o Neither   
o Disapprove     




[The question below was presented only to the respondent receiving the Scenarios with Pakistan 
as the opposing country] 
 
Q As a result of the prime minister’s actions against Pakistan, how likely are you to vote for 
him?  
o Very likely     
o Likely    
o No change in my intentions to vote   
o Unlikely    
o Very Unlikely   
 
[The question below was presented only to the respondent receiving the Hypothetical Scenarios 
with Country A] 
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Q As a result of the prime minister’s actions against Country A how likely are you to vote for 
him?  
o Very likely    
o Likely   
o No change in my intentions to vote    
o Unlikely    
o Very Unlikely 
   
Q As a result of the prime minister’s actions against the aggressor country, how likely are you to 
vote for him?  
o Very Likely    
o Likely   
o No Change in my intentions to vote for him   
o Unlikely   





Q Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of the 
prime minister. Use the following scale to record your answers:   0 indicates not at all, and 100= I 

























































[The following questions were presented in a random order.] 
Q Enhancing the government’s ability to intercept phone calls and read private emails will help 
prevent future attacks of this kind.  
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree   
o Strongly disagree   
 
 
Q What do you think the prime minister’s actions did to India’s reputation as a global 
powerhouse?  
o Highly improved     
o Improved    
o Neither improved nor damaged   
o Damaged    




Q It is appropriate for the government to use interrogation techniques (such as waterboarding, 
sleep deprivation, humiliation, etc.) on captured soldiers in order to obtain information about future 
attacks. 
o Strongly agree    
o Agree    
o Neither agree nor disagree    
o Disagree    
o Strongly Disagree   
   
Q Did the Indian prime minister use the army?  
o Yes   
o No    
 
Q Did the text mention casualties? 
o Yes   








Pre-treatment questions  
 
Q How old are you? 
o 18-29    
o 30-39   
o 40-49    
o 50-59   
o 60+  
 
 
Q What is your gender? 
o Male   
o Female   





Q What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
o No formal School Education   
o Primary   
o Lower Secondary   
o Secondary   
o High School Degree   
o University Degree Bachelor Degree   
o Graduate Degree   





Q Do you agree or disagree with how the Indian government is managing the COVID-19 pandemic? 
This question is designed to ensure you are reading carefully. Please choose "Prefer not to say," 
below as a sign that you are paying attention". 
o Strongly Disagree      
o Somewhat Disagree     
o Slightly Disagree     
o Prefer Not To Say   
o Slightly Agree     
o Somewhat Agree    





Q In what language do you communicate at home? 
o Hindi   
o Bengali    
o Telugu   
o Marathi   
o Tamil   
o Other    
o English   
o Gujarati   
o Urdu    
o Kannada   
o Odia    
o Malayalam   
o Punjabi   
o Sanskrit   
 
 
Q To what extent can you say that the current economic situation in your country is Good or 
Bad. Please note that 1 = very bad and 7 indicates very good.  
o 1 - Very Good   
o 2   
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o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6   
o 7 - Very Bad    
 
 
Q Do you approve or disapprove of the way Narendra Modi is handling his job as prime 
minister?  1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly.  
o Not at all    
o Somewhat   
o Moderately   
o Very Much    
o Very Strongly   
 
 
Q What is your main occupation? 
o Never had a job   
o Student   
o Housewife / homemaker   
o Agriculture / farming / fishing / forestry   
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o Trader / hawker / vendor   
o Retail / Shop  
o Unskilled manual worker (e.g., cleaner, laborer, domestic help, unskilled manufacturing 
worker)   
o Artisan or skilled manual worker (e.g., trades like electrician, mechanic, machinist or skilled 
manufacturing worker)   
o Clerical or secretarial   
o Supervisor / Foreman / Senior Manager   
o Security services (police, army, private security)    
o Mid-level professional (e.g., teacher, nurse, mid-level government officer)   
o Upper-level professional (e.g., banker/finance, doctor, lawyer, engineer, accountant, 
professor, senior-level government officer)  




Q With which organized religion do you most identify with?  
o Hindu   
o Muslim   
o Christian   
o Sikhism   




o Zoroastrianism   
o Not Religious   
o Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion   
o Other   
o Hard to answer/Prefer not to answer   
 
 
Q How important is religion in your life? 
 Please indicate the importance of religion in your life on a scale of 1-10, 1 not at all important 
and 10 indicates very important. 
o 1 - Not at all important   
o 2   
o 3 
o 4   
o 5  
o 6  
o 7  
o 8   
o 9   





Q Among the political parties listed here, which party, if any, do you feel closest to?  
o Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)    
o Indian National Congress (INC)   
o National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)   
o United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC)   
o All India Trinamool Congress   
o Bahujan Samaj Party   
o Communist Party of India    
o Communist Party of India (Marxist)   




Q Considering the party you selected in the question above, please indicate the amount of 
support for it on a scale from 1 to 10. 1 Indicates low support 10 indicates high level of support.   
o 1 - Low support   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6 
o 7    
o 8   
o 9   












Never  One Time  Sometimes  Several 
Times  
On a regular 
basis  
Voting   






o  o  o  o  o  
Contacted a 
government 
official    







o  o  o  o  o  
Contacted the 
media, like 
calling a radio 
program or 
writing a 
letter to a 
newspaper  




do you follow 
national 
politics?  
o  o  o  o  o  
How closely 




world?   
o  o  o  o  o  
 
Instructions 
(Administered to all Respondents) 
 
Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, 
national identity, and India’s politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which 
range from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.  
 
Q The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security 
forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international threats such as terrorist 
groups and countries.  
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o Strongly agree     
o Agree    
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree    
o Strongly disagree    
 
 
Q The use of military force only makes problems worse.  
o Strongly disagree     
o Disagree    
o Neither agree nor disagree    
o Agree    
o Strongly agree  
 
Q Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an 
international crisis that is threatening vital national security interests of your country.   
o Strongly agree    
o Agree    
o Neither agree nor disagree    
o Disagree    




Q India needs to cooperate more with its partners in Asia and the United Nations in settling 
international disputes. 
o Strongly agree    
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree    
o Disagree   
o Strongly disagree   
 
 
Q India needs to play an active role in solving conflicts in Asia. 
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree   
o Strongly disagree   
 
Q India should primarily focus its efforts to take care of the well-being of Indians and not get 
involved in other nations’ conflicts.   
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree    
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o Disagree   
o Strongly disagree   
 
Vignette 1: Backing Down India  
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region of part of another country 
that shares a border with India. India's prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the 
attacking country continued to invade, he would send the Indian army to immediately engage to 
push out the attacking country’s military forces.   
After a few days, India's prime minister decided to back down and did not send the army against 
the aggressor country even though they continued to invade.   
 
 
Vignette 2: Engage Win India  
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that 
shares a border with India. India's prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the 
attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Indian army to immediately engage 
to push out the attacking country’s forces.       
After a few days, India's prime minister decides to follow up on the threat by deploying  the 
army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade.     
 
 
Vignette 3: Engage Lose India  
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that 
shares a border with India. India's prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the 
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attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Indian army to immediately engage 
to push out the attacking country’s forces.   
A few days after the invasion, India's prime minister decides to follow up on the threat and engage 
the aggressor country by sending the army against it, however, the military operation largely ended 
in failure for the Indian army.   
 
 
Vignette 4: Engage Win but more Casualties for India.  
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that 
shares a border with India. India's prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the 
attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Indian army to immediately engage 
to push out the attacking country’s forces. 
 
After a few days, India's prime minister decides to follow up on the threat  by deploying  the 
army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade. India's army attacked along the 
border region and pushed back the country’s military by 2 km. However, during the operation, 
India suffered 300 fatalities while the opposing country suffered 80 fatalities.   
 
 
Vignette 5: Engage Lose but less Casualties for India.  
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that 
shares a border with India. India’s prime minister then issues a public threat stating that if the 
attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Indian army to immediately engage 
to push out the attacking country’s forces. 
 
 After a few days, India's prime minister decides to follow up on the threat  by deploying  the 
army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade. However, the country’s armed 
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forces retaliated and pushed back the Indian military by 2 km across the border. During the 
operation, India suffered 80 fatalities, while the opposite country suffered 300 fatalities.  
 
Post treatment questions  
 
Q Do you approve or disapprove of the way India's prime minister handled the crisis? 
  
 Please indicate your approval or disapproval on a 1-11 scale. 1 indicates Strongly Disapprove, 
while 11 indicates Strongly Approve.  





2  3  4  5  6 - Neither 
Disapprove 
or Approve  










Q The prime minister's handling of the crisis damaged or improved India's reputation?  














o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q Based on the prime minister's handling of the crisis how likely is that you are going to vote for 




Use the 1-11 scale; 1 indicates Very Unlikely; 11 indicates Highly Likely.  
   
 
1 - Very 
Unlikely  





answer   
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 























the crisis?  



















for him  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q Did the text mention casualties or fatalities?      
o Yes   





Experiment 3 Nigeria 
 
Pre-treatment questions  
Q How old are you?  
351 
 
o 18-29   
o 30-39  
o 40-49   
o 50-59  
o 60+   
 
 
Q What is your gender? 
o Male   
o Female   
o Other   
 
 
Q What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
o No formal schooling   
o Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)   
o Some primary schooling   
o Primary school completed 
o Intermediate school or Some secondary school / high school   
o Secondary school / high school completed   
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o Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a 
polytechnic or college   
o Some university   
o University completed   
o Post-graduate   
 
 
Q Which ethnic groups do you belong to? Mark the space or spaces which apply to you.  
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o Hausa  
o Urhobo   
o Igbo   
o Idoma   
o Yoruba    
o Itsekiri   
o Efik   
o Ikwere   
o Ebira   
o Awori   
o Fulani   
o Tapa   
o Isoko   
o Kalabari   
o Ibibio   
o Birom    
o Kanuri   
o Shuwa-Arab   
o Tiv   
o Jukun   
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o Nupe    
o Gwari   
o Ijaw   
o Igala  
o Edo   
o Other   
 
 
Q To what extent can you say that the current economic situation in your country is Good or 
Bad. Please note that 1 = very bad and 7 indicates very good.  
o Very Bad 1    
o 2   
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6    




Q What is your main occupation? 
o Never had a job    
o Student   
o Housewife / homemaker   
o Agriculture / farming / fishing / forestry   
o Trader / hawker / vendor   
o Retail / Shop   
o Unskilled manual worker (e.g., cleaner, laborer, domestic help, unskilled manufacturing 
worker)   
o Artisan or skilled manual worker (e.g., trades like electrician, mechanic, machinist or skilled 
manufacturing worker)   
o Clerical or secretarial   
o Supervisor / Foreman / Senior Manager   
o Security services (police, army, private security)   
o Mid-level professional (e.g., teacher, nurse, mid-level government officer)   
o Upper-level professional (e.g., banker/finance, doctor, lawyer, engineer, accountant, 
professor, senior-level government officer)   
o Other   
 
 
Q With which organized religion do you most identify with?  
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o Christianity in general   
o Christianity - Pentecostal/Charismatic   
o Christianity - Anglican   
o Christianity - Methodist    
o Christianity - Catholic 
o Christianity – Non-denonational   
o Muslim   
o Traditional   
o Agnosticism   
o None/Non-religious   
o Other   
o Prefer not answer   
 
 
Q How important is religion in your life? 
 Please indicate the importance of religion in your life on a scale of 1-10, 1 indicates not at all 
important and 10 indicates very important. 
o 1 - Not at all important   
o 2   
o 3   
o 4  
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o 5   
o 6  
o 7  
o 8   
o 9   
o 10 - Very important   
 
Q Among the political parties listed here, which party, if any, do you feel closest to?  
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o All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)   
o All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)   
o All People’s Party (APP)   
o African Renaissance Party (ARP)   
o Conscience People’s Congress (CPC)   
o Community Party of Nigeria (CPN)   
o Democratic Alternative (DA)   
o Democratic People’s Party (DPP)   
o Democratic Socialist Movement (DSM)   
o Fresh Democratic Party (FDP)   
o Labour Party (LP)   
o Masses Movement of Nigeria (MMN)   
o National Conscience Party (NCP)   
o New Democrats (ND)  
o People’s Democratic Party (PDP)   
o Progressive People’s Alliance (PPA)   
o People's Progressive Party (PPP)   
o People’s Redemption Party (PRP)   
o People’s Salvation Party (PSP)   
o Social Democratic Mega Party   
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Q Considering the party you selected in the question above, please indicate the amount of 
support for it on a scale from 1 to 10. 1 Indicates low support 10 indicates high level of support.   
o 1 - Low Support   
o 2  
o 3   
o 4   
o 5   
o 6  
o 7   
o 8   
o 9   
o 10 - High Support   
 
 




Never  One Time  Sometimes  Several 
Times  
On a regular 
basis 
Voting   






o  o  o  o  o  
Contacted a 
government 
official   







o  o  o  o  o  
Contacted the 
media, like 
calling a radio 
program or 
writing a 
letter to a 
newspaper  




do you follow 
national 
politics?  
o  o  o  o  o  
How closely 




world?   
o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, 
national identity, and Nigeria's politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which 
ranges from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.  
 
Q The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security 
forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international threats such as terrorist 
groups and countries.  
o Strongly agree    
o Agree    
o Neither agree nor disagree    
o Disagree    




Q The use of military force only makes problems worse.  
o Strongly disagree     
o Disagree    
o Neither agree nor disagree    
o Agree     
o Strongly agree   
 
Q Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an 
international crisis that is threatening vital national security interests of your country.   
o Strongly agree   
o Agree    
o Neither agree nor disagree    
o Disagree    
o Strongly disagree   
 
Q Indicate your views on the following issues:  Seven (7) indicates strongly agree, and one (1) 
































use force to 
achieve what 
they want if 
they have the 
chance  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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The use of 
threat of 
nuclear 
weapons is a 
necessary 
instrument to 
survive as a 
state  








necessary   
















way for us to 
keep peace is 














o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q Nigeria needs to cooperate more with the African Union and United Nations in settling 
international disputes. 
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree   




Q Nigeria needs to play an active role in solving conflicts in Africa. 
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree   
o Strongly disagree   
 
Q Nigeria should primarily focus its efforts to take care of the well-being of Nigerians and not 
get involved in other nations’ conflicts.   
o Strongly agree   
o Agree   
o Neither agree nor disagree   
o Disagree  
o Strongly disagree   
 
 
Vignette 1: Back Down 
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region of part of another country 
that shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the 
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attacking country continued to invade, he would send the Nigerian army to immediately engage 
to push out the attacking country’s military  forces.     
● After a few days, Nigeria's president decided to back down and did not send the army 




Vignette 2: Engage 
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that 
shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the 
attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Nigerian army to immediately 
engage to push out the attacking country’s forces.    
● After a few days, Nigeria's president decides to follow up on the threat by deploying  the 




Vignette 3: Engage Lose  
 
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that 
shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the 
attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the  Nigerian army to immediately 
engage to push out the attacking country’s forces.      
● A few days after the invasion, Nigeria's president decides to follow up on the threat and 
engage the aggressor country by sending the army against it, however, the military 





Vignette 4: Engage Win but more Casualties for Nigeria.  
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that 
shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the 
attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Nigerian army to immediately 
engage to push out the attacking country’s forces.    
● After a few days, Nigeria's president decides to follow up on the threat  by deploying  the 
army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade.    
● Nigeria's army attacked along the border region and pushed back the country’s military 
by 2 km. However, during the operation, Nigeria suffered 350 fatalities while the 




Vignette 5: Engage Lose but less Casualties for Nigeria  
The aggressor country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that 
shares a border with Nigeria. Nigeria's president then issues a public threat stating that if the 
attacking country continued to invade, he would send in the Nigerian army to immediately 
engage to push out the attacking country’s forces.  
● After a few days, Nigeria's president decides to follow up on the threat  by deploying  the 
army against the aggressor country after it continued to invade.  
 
However, the country’s armed forces retaliated and pushed back the Nigerian military by 2 km 
across the border. During the operation, Nigeria suffered 40 fatalities, while the opposite country 







Post-treatment questions  
Q Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the three statements below using a 1-11 
































Do you approve 
or disapprove of 
the way Nigeria's 
president handled 
the crisis?   






reputation   
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Based on the 
president's 
handling of the 
crisis I will vote 
for him  




Q60 Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of 
the Nigerian president. Use the following scale to record your answers: 0 indicates not at all, and 
































Q Did the text you just read mention the army 
o Yes   




Experiments 4   
 
[Demographic questions] 









2. What is your gender?  
➢ Male  
➢ Female  
➢ Other  
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
➢ No formal school education   
➢ Primary   
➢ Lower secondary  
➢ Secondary  
➢ High School Degree 
➢ University Degree (Bachelor’s Degree) 
➢ Graduate Degree 
➢ Professional Degree 
 
4. Do you agree or disagree with how the Indian government is managing the country’s economy? 
If you are reading this question carefully, you need to click the neither agree nor disagree option.267 
 
267 All Indian respondent who did not select the correct answer were not allowed to finalize the survey. Using this 
measure allow me to largely control for the Indian Mechanical Turk respondents’ attentiveness and English language 
proficiency.   
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➢ Strongly Disagree  
➢ Somewhat Disagree  
➢ Slightly Disagree  
➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree  
➢ Slightly Agree 
➢ Somewhat Agree 
➢ Strongly Agree  
 
5.On what language do you communicate at home?268 




➢ Tamil  
➢ Other 
 
6. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Narendra Modi is handling his job as prime 
minister?  1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly. 
➢ Not at all  
➢ Somewhat  
➢ Moderately  
➢ Very Much  
➢ Very Strongly  
 
 
268 http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1.aspx  
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6.Could you indicate your annual income?269 
 
➢ Up to 10,000 Indian Rupees 
➢ 10,001 to 20,000 Indian Rupees 
➢ 20,001 to 50,000 Indian Rupees  
➢ 50,001 to 100,000 Indian Rupees 
➢ Over 100,000 Indian Rupees  
 
7.What is your religion?  
➢ Hindu 
➢ Muslim  
➢ Christian 
➢ Sikhism 
➢ Buddhism  
➢ Jainism  
➢ Zoroastrianism   
➢ Not Religious  
➢ Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion 
➢ Other 
➢ Hard to answer/refused  
 
 
8. Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?  
 






➢ Indian National Congress (INC) 
➢ National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
➢ United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC) 
➢ All India Trinamool Congress  
➢ Bahujan Samaj Party 
➢ Communist Party of India 
➢ Communist Party of India (Marxist)  
➢ Other  
 
9. For which party did you vote?  
 
➢ Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
➢ Indian National Congress (INC) 
➢ National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
➢ United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC) 
➢ All India Trinamool Congress  
➢ Bahujan Samaj Party 
➢ Communist Party of India 
➢ Communist Party of India (Marxist)  
➢ Other  
➢ I did not vote  
➢ Prefer not to answer 
 
11. Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.  
      Voting  
Organize to solve a community problem  
Contacted a government official  
Participated in a political protest  
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Participated in a political gathering or rally.  
Worked for a political campaign 
Donate money to a political campaign 
Served in a community board 
 
➢ Never  
➢ One time  
➢ Sometimes 
➢ Several times 
➢ On a regular basis270 
 
12.How closely you follow national politics?  
➢ Very Closely  
➢ Closely 
➢ Somewhat closely  
➢ Not too closely 
➢ Not at all  
 
13.How closely you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?   
➢ Very Closely 
➢ Closely  
➢ Somewhat closely 
➢ Not too closely  
➢ Not at all  
 
 
270 Verba et al (1993) 
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[Level of Military assertiveness]  
 
Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, 
national identity, and India’s politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which range 
from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.  
 
15: The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security 
forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international challengers.  
 
➢ Strongly agree  
➢ Agree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Disagree 
➢ Strongly disagree 
 
14: The use of military force only makes problems worse.  
➢ Strongly disagree  
➢ Disagree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Agree  




16: Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an 
international crisis that is threatening vital national interests of your country.   
  
➢ Strongly agree 
➢ Agree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Disagree 
➢ Strongly disagree 
 
[Level of Ethno-Nationalism] 
 
17. Which of the following are most important for your national identity. Five (5) indicates very 
important, and zero (0) indicates not important at all to your national identity.   
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Indian culture         
Ethnicity       
Religion        
Language        
    
 
[Levels of trust in the domestic political institutions and actors.] 
 
For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Five (5) indicate high level of 
trust, and zero (0) indicates no trust at all.  
 0 1 2  3  4 5 
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Prime Minister       
       
The national 
government  
      
       
Political Parties       
       
Parliament       
       
The army       
271 
 
Please indicate to what extent you think that each of the listed issue is a problem for India. Use the 
following scale to record your answers: 0 indicates not at all, while 100 indicates that it is a very 
big problem for the country.272  
Lack of Employment Opportunities  0-100  
Rising Prices 0-100  
Corrupt Government Officials 0-100  
Terrorism  0-100  
Crime  0-100  
China 0-100  
Pakistan 0-100  
USA 0-100  
Corrupt Businesspeople 0-100  
Gap between the Rich and the Poor 0-100  
Poor Quality Schools  0-100  
 
271 An alternative set of question capturing respondents trust are adopted and used by Kertzer and McGraw (2012) 
272 https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/25/a-sampling-of-public-opinion-in-india/ Note that the question on China, 
Pakistan, and US are added by the author.  
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People Leaving India for Jobs in Other 
Countries 
0-100  
Air Pollution  0-100  
Health Care 0-100  





The following text concerns the decision of India’s leaders when faced with foreign threats and 
security challenges. You will read about a hypothetical but realistic situation that India has faced 
in the past and will likely face again in the future. Indian prime ministers have managed the 
situation in different ways. In the following lines, you will read about one approach the Indian 
prime ministers have chosen to take, and we will ask whether you approve or disapprove of it.      
 
 
Engage Success Foreign Country No Cue 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military forces being 
pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along 




To summarize         
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.     
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.   
The prime minister sent the military to the region.     
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military 
forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested 
territory along the border.  
 
 
Engage Success Foreign Country Elite Cue Right 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military forces being 
pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along 
the border.  The Bharatiya Janata Party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime 
minister’s handling of the situation.         
 
To summarize         
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A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.  
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.    
The prime minister sent the military to the region.    
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military 
forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested 
territory along the border.    
The Bharatiya Janata Party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister’s handling 
of the situation.   
 
 
Engage Success Foreign Country Elite Cue Left 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military forces being 
pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along 
the border. The Indian National Congress party have urged Indians to unite and support the 




To summarize      
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military to the region.    
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military 
forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested 
territory along the border.   
The Indian National Congress party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister’s 
handling of the situation.  
 
 
Backing Down Foreign Country No Cue 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade. The Indian prime minister ordered the military not to engage and stay out of 
the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking 




To summarize      
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military to the region.    
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military not 
to engage and stay out of the conflict.     
The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country 
taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.    
 
 
Backing Down Foreign Country Elite Cue Support Right 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the 
military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, 
and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the 
border. The Bharatiya Janata Party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister’s 
handling of the situation.       
 
To summarize      
385 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage 
and stay out of the conflict.   
The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 
percent of the contested territory along the border.    
The Bharatiya Janata Party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister’s handling 
of the situation  
 
 
Backing Down Foreign Country Elite Cue Support Left 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the 
military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, 
and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the 
border. The Indian National Congress party have urged Indians to unite and support the prime 
minister’s handling of the situation.      
 
To summarize  
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
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The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage 
and stay out of the conflict.   
The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 
percent of the contested territory along the border.     
The Indian National Congress party has urged Indians to unite and support the prime minister’s 
handling of the situation.  
 
 
Stay Out Foreign Country No Cue 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the conflict. The 
attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking 
control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.       
 
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the border conflict.    
The attacking country continued to invade.   
The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested 






Stay Out Foreign Country Social Cue Oppose 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the conflict. The 
attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking 
control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll 
and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they 
disapprove of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.        
 
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the border conflict.    
The attacking country continued to invade.   
The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested 
territory along the border.   
For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views 








A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the conflict. The 
attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking 
control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll 
and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they 
approve of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.        
 
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the border conflict.    
The attacking country continued to invade.   
The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested 
territory along the border.   
For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views 
have indicated that they approve of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.   
 
 
Stay Out Foreign Country Elite Support 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the conflict. The 
attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking 
control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border. There is broad support for the 
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prime minister’s actions by both the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata 
Party.      
 
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that India would stay out of the border conflict.    
The attacking country continued to invade.   
The conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 percent of the contested 
territory along the border.   
There is broad support for the prime minister’s actions by both the Indian National Congress 
party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.  
 
 
Engage Failure Foreign Country Social Cue Oppose 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 
percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this 
survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they disapprove of 





A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.   
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  The prime minister sent the military 
to the region.    
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country 
taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.   
For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views 
have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.   
 
 
Engage Failure Foreign Country Social Cue Support 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 
percent of the contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this 
survey, the majority of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the 





A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.   
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military to the region.    
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country 
taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.   
For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views 




Engage Failure Foreign Country Elite Support 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 
percent of the contested territory along the border. There is broad support for the prime 





A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.   
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military to the region.   
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.   
The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country 
taking control of 20 percent of the contested territory along the border.   
There is broad support for the prime minister’s actions by both the Indian National Congress 




[Dependent variables.]  
Please answer the following questions. 
 
24: Do you approve, disprove, or neither approve nor disprove of the way Indian prime minister 
handled the situation? 
➢ Strongly Approve 
➢ Approve 
➢ Neither 
➢ Disagree  
➢ Strongly Disagree 
 
25: As a result of the prime minister’s actions against the rebels how likely you are to vote for him?  
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➢ Very likely  
➢ Likely  
➢ No change in my intentions to vote 
➢ Unlikely  
➢ Very Unlikely  
 
27. Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of the 
prime minister. Use the following scale to record your answers:  
1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
➢ Anger       
➢ Hatred      
➢ Contempt       
➢ Disgust      
➢ Fear       
➢ Disappointment      
➢ Shame       
➢ Sadness      
➢ Compassion       
➢ Relief      
➢ Admiration       
➢ Joy      
➢ Pride       
 
 
[The remaining questions will be presented in a random order.]   
 
30: “Enhancing the government’s ability to intercept phone calls and read private emails will help 




➢ Strongly agree 
➢ Agree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Disagree 
➢ Strongly disagree 
 
31. What do you think the prime minister’s actions did to India’s reputation?  
 
➢ Highly improved  
➢ Improved  
➢ Neither improved nor damaged 
➢ Damaged  
➢ Highly Damaged 
 
32: It is appropriate for the government to use interrogation techniques (such as waterboarding, 
sleep deprivation, humiliation, etc) on captured rebels in order to obtain information abou future 
attacks.  
 
➢ Strongly agree  
➢ Agree  
➢ Neither agree nor disagree  
➢ Disagree  
➢ Strongly Disagree  
 
 
33. Some of your friends are organizing to protest and express their opposition to how the prime 
minister has handled the security crisis. How likely you are to join this protest?  
 
➢ Very likely  
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➢ Likely  
➢ No opinion  
➢ Unlikely  
➢ Very Unlikely  
 
34. In the scenario you just read about, did the rebels remain in control of the villages?273 
➢ Yes  
➢ No  
 
35. In the text you read about, did the prime minister use the army? 
➢ Yes  






















2. What is your gender?  
➢ Male  
➢ Female  
➢ Other  
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
➢ No formal school education   
➢ Primary   
➢ Lower secondary  
➢ Secondary  
➢ High School Degree 
➢ University Degree (Bachelor’s Degree) 
➢ Graduate Degree 
➢ Professional Degree 
 
4. Do you agree or disagree with how the Indian government is managing the country’s economy? 
If you are reading this question carefully, you need to click the neither agree nor disagree option.274 
➢ Strongly Disagree  
➢ Somewhat Disagree  
➢ Slightly Disagree  
 
274 All Indian respondent who did not select the correct answer were not allowed to finalize the survey. Using this 
measure allow me to largely control for the Indian Mechanical Turk respondents’ attentiveness and English language 
proficiency.   
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➢ Neither Agree nor Disagree  
➢ Slightly Agree 
➢ Somewhat Agree 
➢ Strongly Agree  
 
5.On what language do you communicate at home?275 




➢ Tamil  
➢ Other 
 
6. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Narendra Modi is handling his job as prime 
minister?  1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly. 
➢ Not at all  
➢ Somewhat  
➢ Moderately  
➢ Very Much  
➢ Very Strongly  
 
6.Could you indicate your annual income?276 
 
 





➢ Up to 10,000 Indian Rupees 
➢ 10,001 to 20,000 Indian Rupees 
➢ 20,001 to 50,000 Indian Rupees  
➢ 50,001 to 100,000 Indian Rupees 
➢ Over 100,000 Indian Rupees  
 
7.What is your religion?  
➢ Hindu 
➢ Muslim  
➢ Christian 
➢ Sikhism 
➢ Buddhism  
➢ Jainism  
➢ Zoroastrianism   
➢ Not Religious  
➢ Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion 
➢ Other 
➢ Hard to answer/refused  
 
 
8. Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?  
 
➢ Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
➢ Indian National Congress (INC) 
➢ National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
➢ United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC) 
➢ All India Trinamool Congress  
➢ Bahujan Samaj Party 
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➢ Communist Party of India 
➢ Communist Party of India (Marxist)  
➢ Other  
 
9. For which party did you vote?  
 
➢ Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
➢ Indian National Congress (INC) 
➢ National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
➢ United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC) 
➢ All India Trinamool Congress  
➢ Bahujan Samaj Party 
➢ Communist Party of India 
➢ Communist Party of India (Marxist)  
➢ Other  
➢ I did not vote  
➢ Prefer not to answer 
 
11. Please indicate whether you have been involved in any of the listed activities.  
      Voting  
Organize to solve a community problem  
Contacted a government official  
Participated in a political protest  
Participated in a political gathering or rally.  
Worked for a political campaign 
Donate money to a political campaign 
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Served in a community board 
 
➢ Never  
➢ One time  
➢ Sometimes 
➢ Several times 
➢ On a regular basis277 
 
12.How closely you follow national politics?  
➢ Very Closely  
➢ Closely 
➢ Somewhat closely  
➢ Not too closely 
➢ Not at all  
 
13.How closely you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world?   
➢ Very Closely 
➢ Closely  
➢ Somewhat closely 
➢ Not too closely  
➢ Not at all  
 
[Level of Military assertiveness]  
 
 
277 Verba et al (1993) 
401 
 
Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, 
national identity, and India’s politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which range 
from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.  
 
15: The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security 
forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international challengers.  
 
➢ Strongly agree  
➢ Agree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Disagree 
➢ Strongly disagree 
 
14: The use of military force only makes problems worse.  
➢ Strongly disagree  
➢ Disagree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Agree  
➢ Strongly agree  
 
16: Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an 




➢ Strongly agree 
➢ Agree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Disagree 
➢ Strongly disagree 
 
[Level of Ethno-Nationalism] 
 
17. Which of the following are most important for your national identity. Five (5) indicates very 
important, and zero (0) indicates not important at all to your national identity.   
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Indian culture         
Ethnicity       
Religion        
Language        
    
 
[Levels of trust in the domestic political institutions and actors.] 
 
For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Five (5) indicate high level of 
trust, and zero (0) indicates no trust at all.  
 0 1 2  3  4 5 
Prime Minister       
       
The national 
government  
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Political Parties       
       
Parliament       
       
The army       
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Please indicate to what extent you think that each of the listed issue is a problem for India. Use the 
following scale to record your answers: 0 indicates not at all, while 100 indicates that it is a very 
big problem for the country.279  
Lack of Employment Opportunities  0-100  
Rising Prices 0-100  
Corrupt Government Officials 0-100  
Terrorism  0-100  
Crime  0-100  
China 0-100  
Pakistan 0-100  
USA 0-100  
Corrupt Businesspeople 0-100  
Gap between the Rich and the Poor 0-100  
Poor Quality Schools  0-100  
People Leaving India for Jobs in Other 
Countries 
0-100  
Air Pollution  0-100  
Health Care 0-100  
 
278 An alternative set of question capturing respondents trust are adopted and used by Kertzer and McGraw (2012) 
279 https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/25/a-sampling-of-public-opinion-in-india/ Note that the question on China, 
Pakistan, and US are added by the author.  
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The following text concerns the decision of India’s leaders when faced with foreign threats and 
security challenges. You will read about a hypothetical but realistic situation that India has faced 
in the past and will likely face again in the future. Indian prime ministers have managed the 
situation in different ways. In the following lines, you will read about one approach the Indian 
prime ministers have chosen to take, and we will ask whether you approve or disapprove of it.      
 
 
Backing Down Foreign Country No Cue 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that he ordered the 
military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, 
and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the 
border.      
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.   
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
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The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that he ordered the military not to engage 
and stay out of the conflict.   
The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 




Backing Down Foreign Country Social Cue Oppose 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the 
military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, 
and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the 
border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your 
political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister’s actions in this 
situation.       
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage 
and stay out of the conflict.   
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The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 
percent of the contested territory along the border.    
For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views 
have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.  
 
 
Backing Down Foreign Country Social Cue Support 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the 
military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, 
and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the 
border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your 
political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister’s actions in this 
situation.         
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage 
and stay out of the conflict.   
The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 
percent of the contested territory along the border.    
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For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views 




Backing Down Foreign Country Elite Support 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the 
military not to engage and stay out of the conflict. The attacking country continued to invade, 
and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 percent of the contested territory along the 
border. There is broad support for the prime minister’s actions by both the Indian National 
Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.       
To summarize         
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military, and shortly after that, he ordered the military not to engage 
and stay out of the conflict.   
The attacking country continued to invade, and the conflict ended with it controlling of 20 
percent of the contested territory along the border.    
There is broad support for the prime minister’s actions by both the Indian National Congress 






Engage Success Foreing Country No Cue 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military forces being 
pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along 
the border.       
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military to the region.    
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military 
forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested 






Engage Success Foreign Country Social Cue Oppose 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military forces being 
pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along 
the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your 
political views have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister’s actions in this 
situation.        
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  The prime minister sent the military 
to the region.    
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military 
forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested 
territory along the border.   
For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views 






Engage Success Foreign Country Social Cue Support 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region.  
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage. The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s 
military forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the 
contested territory along the border. For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority 
of Indians with your political views have indicated that they approve of the prime minister’s 
actions in this situation.           
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military to the region.    
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military 
forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested 
territory along the border.   
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For reference in a recent poll and in this survey, the majority of Indians with your political views 




Engage Success Foreign Country Elite Support 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military forces being 
pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested territory along 
the border. There is broad support for the prime minister’s actions by both the Indian National 
Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party.  
To summarize 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.    
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  The prime minister sent the military 
to the region.    
The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
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The operation was largely successful, and the conflict ended with the attacking country’s military 
forces being pushed back, while the country under attack regained full control of the contested 
territory along the border.   
There is broad support for the prime minister’s actions by both the Indian National Congress 





Engage Failure Foreign Country No Cue 
 
A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India. The Indian prime minister said that if the attacking country continued to 
invade, the Indian army would immediately engage and attempt to push out the attacking 
country’s forces. The prime minister sent the military to the region. The attacking country 
continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to engage. The operation 
was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country taking control of 20 
percent of the contested territory along the border.  
  
 To summarize 
 A country sent its military to take over a border region part of another country that shares a 
border with India.   
The Indian prime minister said that if the invading country continued its attack, the Indian army 
would engage its forces to protect the country under attack.  
The prime minister sent the military to the region.    
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The attacking country continued to invade, and the Indian prime minister ordered the military to 
engage its forces.    
The operation was largely unsuccessfully, and the conflict ended with the attacking country 




[Dependent variables.]  
Please answer the following questions. 
 
24: Do you approve, disprove, or neither approve nor disprove of the way Indian prime minister 
handled the situation? 
➢ Strongly Approve 
➢ Approve 
➢ Neither 
➢ Disagree  
➢ Strongly Disagree 
 
25: As a result of the prime minister’s actions against the rebels how likely you are to vote for him?  
➢ Very likely  
➢ Likely  
➢ No change in my intentions to vote 
➢ Unlikely  
➢ Very Unlikely  
 
27. Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of the 
prime minister. Use the following scale to record your answers:  




 1 2 3 4 5 
➢ Anger       
➢ Hatred      
➢ Contempt       
➢ Disgust      
➢ Fear       
➢ Disappointment      
➢ Shame       
➢ Sadness      
➢ Compassion       
➢ Relief      
➢ Admiration       
➢ Joy      
➢ Pride       
 
 
[The remaining questions will be presented in a random order.]   
 
30: “Enhancing the government’s ability to intercept phone calls and read private emails will help 
prevent future attacks of this kind.” 
 
➢ Strongly agree 
➢ Agree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Disagree 
➢ Strongly disagree 
 
31. What do you think the prime minister’s actions did to India’s reputation?  
 
➢ Highly improved  
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➢ Improved  
➢ Neither improved nor damaged 
➢ Damaged  
➢ Highly Damaged 
 
32: It is appropriate for the government to use interrogation techniques (such as waterboarding, 
sleep deprivation, humiliation, etc) on captured rebels in order to obtain information abou future 
attacks.  
 
➢ Strongly agree  
➢ Agree  
➢ Neither agree nor disagree  
➢ Disagree  
➢ Strongly Disagree  
 
 
33. Some of your friends are organizing to protest and express their opposition to how the prime 
minister has handled the security crisis. How likely you are to join this protest?  
 
➢ Very likely  
➢ Likely  
➢ No opinion  
➢ Unlikely  
➢ Very Unlikely  
 
34. In the scenario you just read about, did the rebels remain in control of the villages?280 
➢ Yes  
➢ No  
 




35. In the text you read about, did the prime minister use the army? 
➢ Yes  






























C.1 Sample, Covariates, and Randomization Checks 
 
 
Table 82: India Experiment 1 Sample description 







































 High School Degree 










Bharatiya Janata Party 
Indian National Congress 
National Democratic Alliance led by 
BJP 
United Progressive Alliance led by 
INC 
All India Trinamool Congress 
Bahujan Samaj Party 
Communist Party of India 





























Table 83: India Experiment 2 Sample description 







































 High School Degree 










Bharatiya Janata Party 
Indian National Congress 
National Democratic Alliance led by 
BJP 










All India Trinamool Congress 
Bahujan Samaj Party 
Communist Party of India 




















Table 84: Nigeria Experiment 3 Sample description 
























 Efik 3.3 
 Kanuri 2.6 
 Others 24.45 
 




          Note: number of respondents = 458  
 
 
Informal schooling only (including 
Koranic schooling) 
Some primary schooling   
Primary school completed 
Intermediate school or some 
secondary school / high school   
Secondary school / high school 
completed  
Post-secondary qualifications, other 
than university e.g. a diploma or 
degree from a polytechnic or college 


















All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP)   
All Progressives Grand Alliance 
(APGA)   
All People’s Party (APP)   
Conscience People’s Congress (CPC)   
Labour Party (LP) 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)   
Other 















C.2 List of Treatments 
 
Treatment groups – Experiment 1 India  
Treatment Group  Number of Respondents  
Backing Down  134 
Backing Down – BJP supports the 
Leader’s decision  
140 
Backing Down – INC supports 
Leader’s decision 
136 
Engage and Win  139 
Engage and Win – BJP supports 
the Leader’s decision 
137 
Engage and Win – INC supports 




Treatment groups – Experiment 2 India  
Treatment Group  Number of Respondents  
Backing Down  134 
Backing Down - Social Group 
Opposes  
140 
Backing Down - Social Group 
Supports 
136 
Backing Down - Bipartisan 
Supports 
139 
Engage Win  137 
Engage Win – Social Group 
Opposes  
139 
Engage Win – Social Group 
Supports 
135  
Engage Win – Bipartisan Support 137 
Engage Lose   141 
Engage Lose – Social Group 
Opposes  
136 
Engage Lose – Social Group 
Supports  
138 
Engage Lose – Bipartisan 
Support  
133 
Stay Out  135 
Stay Out – Social Group Opposes   134 
Stay Out – Social Group Supports  140 
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Stay Out -  Bipartisan Support  141 
 
Treatment groups – Experiment 3 Nigeria  
Treatment Group  Number of Respondents  
Backing Down  151 
Engage Win  155 




Table 85: Randomization Checks Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.023 1.129 1.006 
 (0.089) (0.110) (0.100) 
Gender  1.046 1.170 0.946 
 (0.141) (0.178) (0.148) 
Education 1.082 1.029 0.976 
 (0.070) (0.076) (0.071) 
Income  1.055* 0.977 1.037 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) 
Party Affiliation  0.900 1.186* 1.005 
 (0.071) (0.111) (0.092) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.034 0.991 1.011 
 (0.068) (0.074) (0.076) 
Militarism 1.273** 0.912 1.011 
 (0.147) (0.118) (0.133) 
Nationalism  0.923 0.879 0.981 
 (0.079) (0.084) (0.097) 
Political Engagement 1.119 1.054 1.025 
 (0.084) (0.091) (0.088) 
Trust in the Government 0.872 0.839* 1.061 
 (0.082) (0.089) (0.116) 
Constant 0.217*** 0.102*** 0.252** 
 (0.115) (0.063) (0.151) 
    
Observations 1,307 1,307 1,307 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00951 0.0111 0.00178 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 86: Randomization Checks Main Effects Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.159 1.077 0.971 
 (0.141) (0.153) (0.135) 
Gender  0.943 1.295 0.967 
 (0.151) (0.235) (0.176) 
Education 1.103 1.128 0.969 
 (0.088) (0.107) (0.084) 
Income  0.994 0.961 1.047 
 (0.040) (0.045) (0.048) 
Party Affiliation  0.869 1.226* 0.965 
 (0.078) (0.135) (0.099) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.085 1.015 0.991 
 (0.087) (0.093) (0.089) 
Militarism 1.138 0.827 1.011 
 (0.167) (0.138) (0.167) 
Nationalism  0.909 0.939 0.926 
 (0.100) (0.119) (0.115) 
Political Engagement 1.108 1.026 1.013 
 (0.106) (0.114) (0.109) 
Trust in the Government 0.878 0.846 1.041 
 (0.100) (0.110) (0.135) 
Constant 0.212** 0.048*** 0.335 
 (0.137) (0.037) (0.238) 
    
Observations 886 886 886 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00857 0.0138 0.00186 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 87: Randomization Checks Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.075 1.271** 1.089 
 (0.115) (0.151) (0.133) 
Gender  1.079 1.191 1.048 
 (0.202) (0.256) (0.227) 
Education 1.056 0.888 0.989 
 (0.091) (0.088) (0.097) 
Income  1.045 1.011 1.041 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) 
Party Affiliation  0.922 1.294* 0.857 
 (0.105) (0.180) (0.113) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.058 0.983 1.080 
 (0.093) (0.100) (0.110) 
Militarism 1.283* 1.119 0.824 
 (0.187) (0.186) (0.138) 
Nationalism  1.015 0.880 1.050 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.128) 
Political Engagement 1.129 1.087 1.108 
 (0.115) (0.129) (0.130) 
Trust in the Government 0.802* 0.722** 1.068 
 (0.098) (0.101) (0.152) 
Constant 0.217** 0.154** 0.206* 
 (0.155) (0.126) (0.167) 
    
Observations 723 723 723 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0101 0.0256 0.00795 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 88: Randomization Checks Hindu 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.007 0.954 0.998 
 (0.104) (0.111) (0.115) 
Gender  1.128 1.359* 0.875 
 (0.176) (0.233) (0.159) 
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Education 1.078 1.003 1.033 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.092) 
Income  1.089** 0.995 1.038 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) 
Party Affiliation  0.982 1.118 1.124 
 (0.095) (0.125) (0.130) 
Prime Minister Approval  0.995 0.980 0.946 
 (0.077) (0.084) (0.084) 
Militarism 1.206 0.960 0.868 
 (0.166) (0.146) (0.134) 
Nationalism  0.923 0.913 0.968 
 (0.098) (0.106) (0.118) 
Political Engagement 1.169* 1.000 0.980 
 (0.105) (0.100) (0.098) 
Trust in the Government 0.858 0.818 1.240 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.173) 
Constant 0.162*** 0.152*** 0.179** 
 (0.103) (0.108) (0.129) 
    
Observations 975 975 975 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0105 0.0114 0.00749 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 89: Randomization Checks BJP Support 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 0.956 1.061 1.079 
 (0.115) (0.139) (0.140) 
Gender  1.092 1.412* 0.843 
 (0.196) (0.273) (0.175) 
Education 1.118 1.075 0.983 
 (0.109) (0.115) (0.105) 
Income  1.170*** 0.993 1.063 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.050) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.044 1.005 0.998 
 (0.095) (0.101) (0.102) 
Militarism  0.918 0.914 0.761 
 (0.147) (0.162) (0.135) 
Nationalism  0.867 0.804 0.987 
 (0.107) (0.109) (0.138) 
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Political Engagement 1.292** 1.038 1.089 
 (0.137) (0.122) (0.127) 
Trust in the Government  0.719** 0.742* 1.109 
 (0.106) (0.117) (0.186) 
Constant 0.098*** 0.104*** 0.244* 
 (0.075) (0.086) (0.205) 
    
Observations 760 760 760 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0280 0.0224 0.00898 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 90: Randomization Checks INC Support 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.057 1.423* 0.728 
 (0.188) (0.292) (0.171) 
Gender  0.726 0.818 1.231 
 (0.193) (0.270) (0.380) 
Education 1.027 0.983 1.026 
 (0.111) (0.125) (0.135) 
Income  0.925 1.075 1.084 
 (0.063) (0.087) (0.087) 
Prime Minister Approval 0.917 1.066 1.023 
 (0.123) (0.174) (0.161) 
Militarism  1.754** 1.083 1.583* 
 (0.394) (0.285) (0.419) 
Nationalism  0.992 0.845 0.971 
 (0.156) (0.156) (0.184) 
Political Engagement 1.017 1.204 1.049 
 (0.161) (0.238) (0.201) 
Trust in the Government  0.914 0.893 0.878 
 (0.161) (0.189) (0.182) 
Constant 1.051 0.112* 0.172 
 (0.981) (0.128) (0.202) 
    
Observations 314 314 314 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0243 0.0205 0.0228 
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 91: Randomization Checks BJP Support Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.084 1.187 1.213 
 (0.126) (0.153) (0.162) 
Gender  1.181 1.522* 0.966 
 (0.245) (0.350) (0.241) 
Education 1.135 0.882 0.958 
 (0.117) (0.102) (0.114) 
Income  1.067 0.996 1.043 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.055) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.094 0.995 1.127 
 (0.108) (0.112) (0.131) 
Militarism  1.193 1.224 0.817 
 (0.198) (0.232) (0.159) 
Nationalism  0.958 0.859 1.037 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.148) 
Political Engagement 1.155 1.004 1.255* 
 (0.132) (0.131) (0.170) 
Trust in the Government  0.812 0.784 1.066 
 (0.116) (0.126) (0.183) 
Constant 0.101*** 0.185* 0.162* 
 (0.089) (0.179) (0.165) 
    
Observations 590 590 590 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0128 0.0220 0.0148 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 92: Randomization Checks INC Support Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.213 1.414** 1.019 
 (0.171) (0.223) (0.173) 
Gender  0.822 0.945 0.967 
 (0.207) (0.277) (0.284) 
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Education 1.191 0.945 0.955 
 (0.135) (0.121) (0.119) 
Income  0.969 0.952 0.982 
 (0.054) (0.061) (0.065) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.062 1.066 0.984 
 (0.122) (0.144) (0.132) 
Militarism  1.193 1.173 0.912 
 (0.237) (0.268) (0.211) 
Nationalism  0.962 0.827 1.225 
 (0.135) (0.131) (0.207) 
Political Engagement 1.147 1.099 1.017 
 (0.160) (0.177) (0.168) 
Trust in the Government  0.885 0.718* 1.094 
 (0.146) (0.137) (0.214) 
Constant 0.179* 0.131* 0.533 
 (0.167) (0.137) (0.547) 
    
Observations 390 390 390 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0153 0.0304 0.0100 
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 93: Randomization Checks Main Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.163* 0.959 0.941 
 (0.098) (0.096) (0.094) 
Gender  1.009 1.044 0.901 
 (0.136) (0.162) (0.141) 
Education 1.039 0.941 1.069 
 (0.074) (0.076) (0.088) 
Income  0.983 0.999 1.020 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.036) 
Party Affiliation  0.932 0.984 0.960 
 (0.072) (0.088) (0.085) 
Prime Minister Approval  0.983 1.144* 0.881* 
 (0.063) (0.085) (0.064) 
Militarism 0.982 0.880 1.064 
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 (0.107) (0.109) (0.133) 
Nationalism  1.081 1.006 1.090 
 (0.090) (0.094) (0.105) 
Political Engagement 0.885* 0.962 0.909 
 (0.065) (0.081) (0.076) 
Trust in the Government 0.982 0.800** 1.097 
 (0.091) (0.085) (0.117) 
Constant 0.345* 0.240** 0.320* 
 (0.192) (0.154) (0.205) 
    
Observations 1,312 1,312 1,312 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00648 0.00796 0.00514 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 94: Randomization Checks Main Effects Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.152 0.951 0.917 
 (0.109) (0.106) (0.103) 
Gender  1.034 1.165 0.898 
 (0.158) (0.202) (0.160) 
Education 1.072 0.945 1.199* 
 (0.084) (0.082) (0.113) 
Income  1.006 0.977 1.027 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.041) 
Party Affiliation  0.900 0.990 0.942 
 (0.077) (0.097) (0.092) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.027 1.199** 0.839** 
 (0.075) (0.102) (0.070) 
Militarism 1.029 0.796 1.173 
 (0.127) (0.110) (0.168) 
Nationalism  1.059 0.957 1.083 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.117) 
Political Engagement 0.911 0.908 0.884 
 (0.078) (0.089) (0.086) 
Trust in the Government 0.952 0.874 1.065 
 (0.102) (0.107) (0.130) 
Constant 0.240** 0.194** 0.191** 
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 (0.150) (0.137) (0.139) 
    
Observations 1,034 1,034 1,034 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00655 0.0110 0.0123 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 95: Randomization Checks Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.111 1.036 0.862 
 (0.118) (0.126) (0.109) 
Gender  1.246 1.176 0.978 
 (0.238) (0.257) (0.218) 
Education 1.169 0.887 1.154 
 (0.113) (0.096) (0.127) 
Income  0.972 0.983 1.036 
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.047) 
Party Affiliation  0.981 1.041 0.908 
 (0.113) (0.140) (0.119) 
Prime Minister Approval  0.934 1.167 0.913 
 (0.082) (0.120) (0.092) 
Militarism 0.896 0.853 1.126 
 (0.124) (0.134) (0.180) 
Nationalism  1.062 0.969 0.993 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.119) 
Political Engagement 0.934 1.000 0.877 
 (0.097) (0.119) (0.104) 
Trust in the Government 0.955 0.768* 1.155 
 (0.119) (0.110) (0.168) 
Constant 0.143** 0.235* 0.190* 
 (0.112) (0.205) (0.169) 
    
Observations 719 719 719 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0106 0.0116 0.00824 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 96: Randomization Checks Hindu 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.193* 0.978 0.982 
 (0.116) (0.113) (0.112) 
Gender  0.950 0.998 0.788 
 (0.150) (0.185) (0.146) 
Education 1.025 0.939 1.100 
 (0.086) (0.092) (0.107) 
Income  0.986 1.027 1.004 
 (0.036) (0.043) (0.041) 
Party Affiliation  1.016 1.055 0.986 
 (0.097) (0.120) (0.106) 
Prime Minister Approval  0.980 1.110 0.926 
 (0.073) (0.098) (0.078) 
Militarism 0.964 0.756* 1.104 
 (0.121) (0.108) (0.161) 
Nationalism  1.111 1.073 1.072 
 (0.110) (0.122) (0.123) 
Political Engagement 0.912 0.979 0.917 
 (0.076) (0.097) (0.087) 
Trust in the Government 0.913 0.793* 1.081 
 (0.106) (0.108) (0.145) 
Constant 0.309* 0.197** 0.245* 
 (0.203) (0.152) (0.184) 
    
Observations 992 992 992 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00699 0.0111 0.00499 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 97: Randomization Checks BJP Support 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.241* 0.967 1.083 
 (0.138) (0.128) (0.137) 
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Gender  1.058 0.838 0.921 
 (0.188) (0.174) (0.189) 
Education 1.074 0.987 1.123 
 (0.106) (0.112) (0.128) 
Income  0.996 0.984 1.014 
 (0.040) (0.045) (0.046) 
Prime Minister Approval  0.965 1.078 0.903 
 (0.082) (0.107) (0.087) 
Militarism 0.840 0.796 1.064 
 (0.128) (0.138) (0.188) 
Nationalism  1.117 1.093 0.999 
 (0.136) (0.150) (0.138) 
Political Engagement 0.912 0.995 0.897 
 (0.088) (0.111) (0.098) 
Trust in the Government 1.004 0.736* 1.176 
 (0.146) (0.120) (0.198) 
Constant 0.196** 0.303 0.148** 
 (0.147) (0.261) (0.127) 
    
Observations 775 775 775 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0107 0.00936 0.00642 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 98: Randomization Checks INC Support 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.007 0.948 0.605** 
 (0.177) (0.194) (0.142) 
Gender  0.991 1.430 0.992 
 (0.264) (0.423) (0.304) 
Education 0.934 0.945 1.025 
 (0.120) (0.136) (0.161) 
Income  1.022 0.972 1.047 
 (0.072) (0.078) (0.085) 
Prime Minister Approval  0.756** 1.032 0.758* 
 (0.103) (0.158) (0.117) 
Militarism 1.313 0.971 0.873 
 (0.283) (0.232) (0.210) 
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Nationalism  0.947 0.920 1.425* 
 (0.162) (0.174) (0.284) 
Political Engagement 0.856 0.942 1.111 
 (0.133) (0.170) (0.201) 
Trust in the Government 1.214 0.841 0.993 
 (0.209) (0.161) (0.192) 
Constant 1.723 0.245 0.929 
 (1.750) (0.286) (1.104) 
    
Observations 312 312 312 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0187 0.0146 0.0405 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 99: Randomization Checks BJP Support Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.145 1.099 0.927 
 (0.133) (0.146) (0.128) 
Gender  1.103 1.084 1.120 
 (0.230) (0.262) (0.268) 
Education 1.220* 0.844 1.235* 
 (0.135) (0.104) (0.157) 
Income  0.988 0.989 1.024 
 (0.043) (0.050) (0.052) 
Prime Minister Approval  0.910 1.135 0.934 
 (0.086) (0.128) (0.102) 
Militarism 0.803 0.924 1.025 
 (0.126) (0.165) (0.186) 
Nationalism  1.085 1.034 0.963 
 (0.129) (0.137) (0.132) 
Political Engagement 0.989 0.904 0.886 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.117) 
Trust in the Government 0.941 0.765* 1.140 
 (0.131) (0.123) (0.187) 
Constant 0.120** 0.373 0.067*** 
 (0.104) (0.360) (0.067) 
    
Observations 591 591 591 
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Pseudo R-squared 0.0143 0.0139 0.00891 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 100: Randomization Checks INC Support Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Backing Down  Engage BJP Support INC Support 
    
Age 1.147 0.904 0.880 
 (0.160) (0.155) (0.152) 
Gender  1.272 1.023 1.044 
 (0.313) (0.303) (0.306) 
Education 1.247* 1.008 1.083 
 (0.164) (0.152) (0.162) 
Income  0.984 0.971 1.002 
 (0.056) (0.066) (0.069) 
Prime Minister Approval  0.916 1.118 0.841 
 (0.103) (0.150) (0.112) 
Militarism 1.008 0.826 0.854 
 (0.186) (0.179) (0.190) 
Nationalism  1.087 1.040 1.100 
 (0.160) (0.176) (0.200) 
Political Engagement 0.932 0.985 1.007 
 (0.132) (0.164) (0.171) 
Trust in the Government 0.933 0.755 1.295 
 (0.149) (0.141) (0.254) 
Constant 0.089** 0.184 0.293 
 (0.092) (0.217) (0.347) 
    
Observations 389 389 389 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0149 0.0127 0.0118 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 101: Randomization Checks Main Effects 









    
Militarism  -0.0790 0.122 -0.0446 
 (0.163) (0.166) (0.162) 
Political Engagement 0.112 -0.00435 -0.110 
 (0.127) (0.129) (0.129) 
Party Affiliation  -0.00519 -0.00600 0.0114 
 (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0143) 
Age Categorical -0.296* 0.110 0.173 
 (0.178) (0.169) (0.169) 
Education 0.0944 0.00973 -0.0934 
 (0.0838) (0.0790) (0.0768) 
Leader Approval -0.0827 -0.00930 0.0850 
 (0.0908) (0.0889) (0.0858) 
Income 0.0884 -0.0678 -0.0244 
 (0.150) (0.152) (0.150) 
Constant -0.868 -0.674 -0.615 
 (0.743) (0.715) (0.705) 
    
Observations 397 397 397 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 102: Randomization Checks Main Effects Manipulation Checks 







    
Militarism  -0.0835 0.179 -0.0904 
 (0.198) (0.205) (0.192) 
Political Engagement 0.0469 0.144 -0.182 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.159) 
Party Affiliation  -0.00492 -0.00933 0.0165 
 (0.0174) (0.0166) (0.0172) 
Age Categorical -0.268 0.245 -0.00599 
 (0.205) (0.193) (0.192) 
Education 0.191* -0.0915 -0.0601 
 (0.111) (0.0943) (0.0918) 
Leader Approval -0.219* 0.0303 0.144 
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 (0.124) (0.112) (0.105) 
Income -0.146 -0.0973 0.210 
 (0.194) (0.194) (0.184) 
Constant -1.065 -0.111 -1.160 
 (0.963) (0.860) (0.856) 
    
Observations 261 261 261 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 103: Randomization check among the followers of Nigeria’s current ruling party 







    
Militarism  -0.0489 0.174 -0.142 
 (0.226) (0.218) (0.222) 
Political Engagement 0.202 -0.0722 -0.135 
 (0.180) (0.176) (0.186) 
Age Categorical -0.400 0.0389 0.345 
 (0.280) (0.266) (0.270) 
Education 0.126 0.0705 -0.192 
 (0.139) (0.129) (0.133) 
Leader Approval -0.00813 0.0680 -0.0754 
 (0.158) (0.151) (0.167) 
Income 0.163 -0.161 0.00253 
 (0.220) (0.213) (0.225) 
Constant -1.542 -0.964 0.378 
 (1.081) (1.012) (1.028) 
    
Observations 209 209 209 
Standard errors in parentheses 




C.3 Tables with Results 
 
 













Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Engage Win 2.168* 0.961 6.761*** 6.875*** 3.056*** 2.477*** 
 (0.981) (0.465) (3.760) (3.626) (0.965) (0.859) 
Engage Lose  NA  NA 1.630 4.183*** 2.690*** 1.566 
   (0.665) (1.914) (0.856) (0.561) 
Stay Out Attempt Negotiations NA NA 0.838 1.150 NA NA 
   (0.313) (0.469)   
Militarism  1.239 1.229 1.375 2.213*** 1.128 1.220 
 (0.525) (0.582) (0.343) (0.604) (0.210) (0.265) 
Political Awareness 1.675** 1.845** 1.791*** 2.381*** 0.892 0.607*** 
 (0.441) (0.557) (0.317) (0.480) (0.129) (0.109) 
Party Affiliation 0.992 1.363 1.215 1.284 0.989 0.978 
 (0.279) (0.394) (0.230) (0.252) (0.015) (0.016) 
Age 0.836 0.889 0.765 1.103 1.027 1.005 
 (0.260) (0.276) (0.137) (0.246) (0.192) (0.211) 
Education 1.043 1.409 1.089 1.009 1.054 0.904 
 (0.241) (0.333) (0.181) (0.194) (0.092) (0.086) 
Prime Minister Approval  2.042*** 2.539*** 1.391** 1.835*** 1.263** 1.102 
 (0.414) (0.585) (0.194) (0.285) (0.119) (0.119) 
Income 1.028 0.828 0.784*** 0.842** 1.027 1.616** 
 (0.111) (0.096) (0.057) (0.066) (0.171) (0.315) 
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Constant 0.541 0.064 2.259 0.396 0.100*** 0.273 
 (0.955) (0.115) (2.743) (0.550) (0.081) (0.238) 
       
Observations 219 209 437 424 361 311 
Pseudo R-squared 0.175 0.257 0.211 0.294 0.0529 0.0667 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 

















Baseline: Backing Down and 
Initiate Negotiations 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Engage Win 2.771* 0.549 10.080*** 5.545*** 2.364** 1.806 
 (1.660) (0.379) (7.828) (3.423) (0.922) (0.752) 
Engage Lose  NA  NA 1.737 9.827*** 2.918*** 1.498 
   (0.998) (6.644) (1.107) (0.628) 
Stay Out Attempt Negotiations NA NA 1.007 1.656 NA NA 
   (0.510) (0.847)   
Militarism  2.978* 2.425 1.358 3.470*** 1.221 1.415 
 (1.716) (1.488) (0.526) (1.276) (0.274) (0.368) 
Political Awareness 1.424 1.671 2.326*** 3.343*** 0.980 0.662* 
 (0.514) (0.742) (0.579) (0.936) (0.177) (0.142) 
Party Affiliation 0.974 1.124 1.290 1.010 0.996 0.982 
 (0.346) (0.430) (0.328) (0.257) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age 0.902 0.635 0.727 1.134 1.071 0.948 
 (0.443) (0.308) (0.193) (0.420) (0.225) (0.222) 
Education 1.138 1.319 0.892 0.637 1.115 0.919 
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 (0.335) (0.414) (0.232) (0.201) (0.122) (0.108) 
Prime Minister Approval  2.684*** 3.262*** 1.274 1.762*** 1.298** 1.026 
 (0.797) (1.226) (0.244) (0.350) (0.153) (0.137) 
Income 0.902 0.709* 0.669*** 1.020 1.052 1.692** 
 (0.144) (0.142) (0.073) (0.114) (0.221) (0.402) 
Constant 0.178 0.336 23.251* 7.469 0.046*** 0.269 
 (0.392) (0.777) (43.865) (16.110) (0.047) (0.286) 
       
Observations 151 149 306 304 242 218 
Pseudo R-squared 0.266 0.314 0.302 0.329 0.0577 0.0574 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 106: Rebels Main Effects BJP Endorsement 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage and Win 1.490 1.271 10.242 10.468 
 (0.734) (0.661) (9.303) (9.968) 
Party Affiliation 1.102 0.943 14.985** 11.986* 
 (0.330) (0.312) (6.356) (6.810) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.296 2.525*** 3.090 10.046* 
 (0.334) (0.723) (5.135) (5.502) 
Militarism 1.252 2.450** -1.714 -4.094 
 (0.491) (1.056) (7.680) (8.229) 
Trust in the government  1.428 1.540 8.881 6.778 
 (0.471) (0.531) (5.715) (6.123) 
Constant 25.289 7.943 35.848 32.356 
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 (52.472) (18.266) (35.036) (37.540) 
     
Observations 219 203 36 36 
R-squared   0.662 0.677 
Pseudo R-squared 0.169 0.331   
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 107: Rebels Main Effects INC Endorsement 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage and Win 3.717*** 2.899** 8.967 10.253 
 (1.708) (1.359) (9.179) (9.114) 
Party Affiliation 0.805 1.537 -1.089 -1.689 
 (0.249) (0.469) (6.417) (6.371) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.540* 1.274 -4.291 -0.361 
 (0.359) (0.322) (4.810) (4.776) 
Militarism 1.285 1.330 11.806 9.321 
 (0.433) (0.458) (7.558) (7.504) 
Trust in the government  1.167 1.754 21.049*** 20.268*** 
 (0.412) (0.609) (6.798) (6.749) 
Constant 1.676 5.383 106.329*** 104.791*** 
 (3.159) (9.517) (31.287) (31.064) 
     
Observations 217 202 37 37 
R-squared   0.409 0.452 
Pseudo R-squared 0.189 0.227   
Standard Errors in parentheses 
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Table 108: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels Manipulation Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage  2.275*** 2.027** 9.416 7.994 
 (0.705) (0.633) (5.911) (5.735) 
BJP Endorse  1.528 1.231 -2.099 1.722 
 (0.554) (0.470) (6.858) (6.653) 
INC Endorse  0.687 0.544* 1.539 3.607 
 (0.204) (0.170) (6.960) (6.752) 
Party Affiliation  1.147 1.587*** 8.715** 6.789* 
 (0.172) (0.243) (3.536) (3.431) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.286** 1.228 -5.502* -0.300 
 (0.159) (0.155) (3.214) (3.118) 
Militarism  1.421* 1.802*** 13.252** 11.687** 
 (0.290) (0.390) (5.324) (5.165) 
Trust in the Government  1.281 1.673*** 5.924 9.035** 
 (0.212) (0.291) (3.808) (3.694) 
Constant 17.719*** 6.946* 65.660*** 57.531** 
 (18.582) (7.143) (24.355) (23.628) 
     
Observations 748 728 109 109 
Pseudo R-squared 0.180 0.250   
R-squared   0.227 0.313 
443 
 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 109: Experiment 1 Main Effects – Support for the Leader in Domestic Security Crises Among Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Back Down281  Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage  2.827*** 1.731* 7.552 6.546 
 (0.865) (0.531) (5.137) (4.894) 
BJP Endorse 1.110 1.019 -5.187 -5.005 
 (0.353) (0.358) (5.970) (5.687) 
INC Endorse 0.759 0.736 0.834 -0.624 
 (0.238) (0.245) (6.158) (5.866) 
Party Affiliation  1.180 1.383* 7.679** 5.582* 
 (0.189) (0.231) (3.263) (3.109) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.249* 1.486*** -1.142 2.201 
 (0.151) (0.184) (2.360) (2.248) 
Militarism  1.133 1.741*** 7.350* 6.879* 
 (0.216) (0.366) (4.044) (3.852) 
Trust in the Government  1.371* 1.633*** 7.741** 10.689*** 
 (0.228) (0.287) (3.126) (2.978) 
Constant 2.318 0.925 72.188*** 72.924*** 
 (2.289) (0.938) (19.342) (18.426) 
     
Observations 601 547 166 166 
Pseudo R-squared 0.129 0.220   
R-squared   0.200 0.319 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
 
281 Table 2 presents the result from a subset of the sample excluding the Tamils respondents.  
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Table 110: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels Non-Tamils Manipulation Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage  4.138*** 2.390** 13.833** 11.818** 
 (1.659) (0.894) (5.710) (5.521) 
BJP Endorse  1.510 0.887 -9.932 -6.369 
 (0.610) (0.366) (6.535) (6.319) 
INC Endorse  0.634 0.522* -1.864 0.911 
 (0.232) (0.201) (6.824) (6.598) 
Party Affiliation  1.130 1.546** 10.647*** 8.895** 
 (0.208) (0.291) (3.522) (3.405) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.255 1.461*** -1.446 2.057 
 (0.178) (0.210) (2.802) (2.710) 
Militarism  1.353 1.684** 7.409 5.326 
 (0.306) (0.410) (4.490) (4.341) 
Trust in the Government  1.166 1.586** 4.687 7.728** 
 (0.230) (0.319) (3.475) (3.360) 
Constant 7.784* 1.148 67.290*** 66.087*** 
 (9.492) (1.350) (22.113) (21.380) 
     
Observations 465 432 135 135 
Pseudo R-squared 0.162 0.259   
R-squared   0.255 0.350 
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Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 111: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels Hindu 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage  2.347*** 2.149*** 2.989 3.670 
 (0.663) (0.636) (5.344) (5.310) 
BJP Endorse  1.297 1.534 7.389 3.717 
 (0.399) (0.529) (6.248) (6.209) 
INC Endorse  0.553** 0.695 2.187 0.696 
 (0.152) (0.208) (5.910) (5.873) 
Party Affiliation  1.109 1.279 3.001 1.545 
 (0.172) (0.200) (3.501) (3.479) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.239* 1.363** 1.205 3.074 
 (0.144) (0.165) (2.477) (2.462) 
Militarism  1.197 1.813*** 0.277 -0.805 
 (0.227) (0.373) (4.469) (4.441) 
Trust in the Government  1.345* 1.852*** 9.733*** 8.833** 
 (0.228) (0.347) (3.463) (3.442) 
Constant 15.996*** 7.718* 83.473*** 88.599*** 
 (15.729) (8.132) (19.931) (19.806) 
     
Observations 824 799 136 136 
Pseudo R-squared 0.123 0.205   
R-squared   0.158 0.192 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 112: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels Hindu Manipulation Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage  2.090** 2.626** 2.069 4.971 
 (0.742) (1.060) (6.572) (6.818) 
BJP Endorse 1.604 2.152 4.073 4.547 
 (0.691) (1.115) (8.157) (8.462) 
INC Endorse 0.482** 0.544* 1.376 5.869 
 (0.164) (0.200) (7.379) (7.655) 
Party Affiliation  1.002 1.557** 4.658 2.493 
 (0.203) (0.304) (3.965) (4.113) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.209 1.129 -4.565 -0.502 
 (0.182) (0.181) (3.770) (3.911) 
Militarism  1.294 1.878** 5.735 2.588 
 (0.336) (0.516) (6.596) (6.842) 
Trust in the Government  1.228 1.694** 6.813 5.419 
 (0.275) (0.416) (4.723) (4.900) 
Constant 108.177*** 16.097** 70.701*** 61.766** 
 (147.114) (21.943) (25.142) (26.082) 
     
Observations 555 551 77 77 
Pseudo R-squared 0.160 0.218   
R-squared   0.144 0.149 
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 113: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels BJP Supporters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and 
Initiate Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage  2.180** 2.165** 0.651 0.576 
 (0.728) (0.796) (5.670) (5.705) 
BJP Endorse 1.012 1.095 13.922** 10.158 
 (0.363) (0.438) (6.867) (6.910) 
INC Endorse 0.644 0.717 0.878 -2.059 
 (0.219) (0.261) (6.658) (6.699) 
Party Affiliation  1.214 1.334* 3.923 4.917* 
 (0.181) (0.206) (2.808) (2.825) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.197 1.670* -2.450 -0.348 
 (0.285) (0.441) (5.139) (5.171) 
Militarism  1.633** 1.533* 8.332* 9.099** 
 (0.356) (0.361) (4.259) (4.286) 
Constant 4.781 5.275 80.676*** 97.778*** 
 (5.649) (6.932) (25.681) (25.840) 
     
Observations 654 642 109 109 
Pseudo R-squared 0.130 0.142   
R-squared   0.144 0.184 
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 114: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels INC Supporters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and 
Initiate Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage  2.540** 1.163 20.633* 22.309** 
 (1.206) (0.624) (11.601) (9.608) 
BJP Endorse 1.475 5.428** -22.248 -26.291** 
 (0.792) (4.187) (14.650) (12.133) 
INC Endorse 2.034 1.421 2.187 0.292 
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 (1.171) (0.885) (11.848) (9.812) 
Party Affiliation  1.879*** 2.056*** -10.002* -11.168** 
 (0.373) (0.449) (5.715) (4.733) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.506 2.670*** 14.947* 13.183** 
 (0.428) (0.959) (7.602) (6.296) 
Militarism  1.636** 2.259*** 12.457** 14.556*** 
 (0.395) (0.609) (5.887) (4.876) 
Constant 13.967* 20.061* 166.085*** 163.663*** 
 (21.170) (34.813) (35.676) (29.546) 
     
Observations 257 244 37 37 
Pseudo R-squared 0.269 0.480   
R-squared   0.600 0.685 
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 115: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels  BJP Supporters Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and 
Initiate Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Engage  3.630*** 1.569 9.046 6.618 
 (1.327) (0.516) (5.524) (5.308) 
BJP Endorse 1.035 0.919 -4.029 -3.330 
 (0.366) (0.338) (6.356) (6.107) 
INC Endorse 0.700 0.836 -1.289 -1.355 
 (0.260) (0.317) (6.611) (6.353) 
Party Affiliation  1.211 1.576*** 2.495 4.923* 
 (0.162) (0.213) (2.658) (2.554) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.116 1.886*** 5.645 5.379 
 (0.247) (0.459) (4.559) (4.381) 
Militarism  1.565** 1.795*** 5.020 8.767*** 
 (0.305) (0.361) (3.439) (3.304) 
Constant 3.840 0.577 65.246*** 73.177*** 
 (4.555) (0.681) (22.187) (21.319) 
     
Observations 497 467 143 143 
Pseudo R-squared 0.137 0.213   
R-squared   0.128 0.261 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
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Table 116: Experiment 1 Main Effects Rebels INC Supporters Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and 
Initiate Negotiations  
Approval Voting Country282 Prime Minister 
     
Engage  2.738** 1.648 18.309*** 13.933** 
 (1.218) (0.721) (6.493) (6.224) 
BJP Endorse 1.388 1.018 -13.810* -8.485 
 (0.632) (0.496) (7.570) (7.256) 
INC Endorse 1.711 0.943 -9.278 -5.159 
 (0.864) (0.475) (7.588) (7.273) 
Party Affiliation  1.602*** 2.040*** 1.870 4.089 
 (0.258) (0.350) (3.011) (2.886) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.209 1.780** 8.574* 6.379 
 (0.317) (0.510) (4.957) (4.751) 
Militarism  1.364 1.676** 5.051 7.772** 
 (0.327) (0.411) (3.932) (3.768) 
Constant 10.713* 1.380 93.480*** 93.364*** 
 (15.194) (1.944) (23.246) (22.281) 
     
Observations 326 299 111 111 
Pseudo R-squared 0.219 0.323   
R-squared   0.249 0.331 
Standard Errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
282 Across the tables models 3 and 4 rely on OLS as the reputation of the prime minister and that of the country were 




Table 117: Main Effects Experiment 2 - Support for the Prime Minister in Domestic Security Crises Among Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  0.991 0.842 -3.718 -9.616* 
 (0.358) (0.354) (5.216) (5.359) 
Engage and Lose 3.720*** 3.440*** 4.198 0.119 
 (1.477) (1.486) (4.356) (4.475) 
Engage and Win  9.268*** 6.862*** 8.246 7.257 
 (4.849) (3.619) (5.251) (5.394) 
Bipartisan Elite Endorse 3.768*** 1.998** 5.099 5.489 
 (1.219) (0.656) (3.411) (3.504) 
Party Affiliation  1.129 1.596** 2.406 3.368* 
 (0.228) (0.315) (1.875) (1.927) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.358* 1.481** 3.367** 3.008** 
 (0.228) (0.270) (1.482) (1.522) 
Militarism  1.251 1.565* 6.948*** 8.393*** 
 (0.290) (0.409) (2.535) (2.604) 
Trust in the Government 1.647** 2.276*** 11.907*** 9.459*** 
 (0.376) (0.529) (2.360) (2.425) 
Constant 1.400 0.853 38.074*** 24.326* 
 (1.914) (1.298) (12.418) (12.758) 
     
Observations 514 491 251 251 
Pseudo R-squared 0.256 0.390   
R-squared   0.391 0.349 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 118: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out and Attempt Negotiations  0.988 1.819 -5.811 -15.401*** 
 (0.415) (0.748) (5.956) (5.851) 
Engage and Lose 1.875 2.971*** 0.742 -3.982 
 (0.844) (1.230) (4.894) (4.808) 
Engage and Win  2.775** 2.582** 2.136 0.326 
 (1.349) (1.099) (5.999) (5.893) 
Bipartisan Elite Endorse 2.617*** 1.811* 3.677 4.099 
 (0.885) (0.558) (3.782) (3.715) 
Party Affiliation  1.273 1.298 -0.120 3.480* 
 (0.252) (0.230) (2.014) (1.978) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.287 1.414** 1.985 2.263 
 (0.230) (0.227) (1.740) (1.710) 
Militarism  0.620 1.589* 6.709** 5.326* 
 (0.184) (0.427) (3.043) (2.990) 
Trust in the Government 2.382*** 2.206*** 12.931*** 9.523*** 
 (0.581) (0.490) (2.727) (2.680) 
Constant 19.705* 2.628 54.384*** 37.763*** 
 (30.501) (3.809) (14.204) (13.955) 
     
Observations 611 605 189 189 
Pseudo R-squared 0.283 0.291   
R-squared   0.353 0.360 
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 119: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Manipulation Check Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  0.957 0.853 -3.230 -12.591** 
 (0.409) (0.416) (5.869) (5.995) 
Engage and Lose 3.835*** 3.422** 5.136 -1.895 
 (1.831) (1.705) (4.750) (4.852) 
Engage and Win  9.058*** 4.451*** 6.933 5.144 
 (5.438) (2.557) (5.917) (6.044) 
Bipartisan Elite Endorse 4.947*** 2.396** 3.980 4.315 
 (2.005) (0.930) (3.726) (3.806) 
Party Affiliation  1.095 1.825*** 1.674 3.084 
 (0.258) (0.413) (1.963) (2.006) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.248 1.330 2.524 2.751* 
 (0.251) (0.281) (1.579) (1.613) 
Militarism  0.957 1.564 7.131** 6.973** 
 (0.267) (0.476) (2.779) (2.838) 
Trust in the Government 2.450*** 2.739*** 12.370*** 8.882*** 
 (0.688) (0.746) (2.546) (2.601) 
Constant 5.152 1.047 27.967** 19.231 
 (8.942) (1.891) (13.167) (13.450) 
     
Observations 421 412 208 208 
Pseudo R-squared 0.318 0.422   
R-squared   0.373 0.351 
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 120: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Hindu 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.035 1.046 -5.952 -12.153** 
 (0.380) (0.426) (5.229) (5.134) 
Engage and Lose 1.571 2.368** 2.915 1.411 
 (0.610) (1.004) (4.610) (4.526) 
Engage and Win  2.857** 2.320* 5.144 3.558 
 (1.302) (1.013) (5.524) (5.424) 
Bipartisan Elite Endorse 2.225*** 1.341 4.339 6.407* 
 (0.660) (0.408) (3.698) (3.631) 
Party Affiliation  1.194 1.100 -0.795 1.678 
 (0.227) (0.222) (2.062) (2.025) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.354* 1.419** 3.430** 2.839* 
 (0.212) (0.238) (1.488) (1.461) 
Militarism  0.985 1.787** 4.651* 7.258*** 
 (0.241) (0.448) (2.625) (2.577) 
Trust in the Government 1.472* 2.127*** 13.283*** 13.202*** 
 (0.317) (0.466) (2.418) (2.373) 
Constant 4.199 18.764* 64.312*** 50.371*** 
 (5.666) (28.432) (13.123) (12.883) 
     
Observations 671 649 219 219 
Pseudo R-squared 0.153 0.237   
R-squared   0.359 0.384 
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 121: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Hindu Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  0.952 1.603 -8.654 -19.265*** 
 (0.465) (0.818) (6.430) (6.070) 
Engage and Lose 1.935 3.844** 0.554 -4.471 
 (1.113) (2.219) (5.731) (5.410) 
Engage and Win  3.899** 2.607* 1.371 1.663 
 (2.570) (1.434) (6.917) (6.529) 
Bipartisan Elite Endorse 2.244** 2.081* 3.992 4.644 
 (0.915) (0.835) (4.412) (4.165) 
Party Affiliation  1.283 0.999 -0.984 3.053 
 (0.338) (0.271) (2.413) (2.277) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.103 1.289 2.007 1.599 
 (0.236) (0.272) (1.878) (1.773) 
Militarism  0.450* 1.353 4.395 5.320 
 (0.186) (0.512) (3.474) (3.280) 
Trust in the Government 2.072** 1.769* 10.947*** 9.661*** 
 (0.654) (0.516) (3.262) (3.079) 
Constant 48.902** 14.637 71.273*** 58.199*** 
 (95.362) (29.193) (15.501) (14.632) 
     
Observations 470 461 146 146 
Pseudo R-squared 0.251 0.200   
R-squared   0.270 0.321  
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 122: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects No Cue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  0.906 1.440 -11.096* -20.878*** 
 (0.342) (0.624) (5.980) (6.084) 
Engage and Lose 1.833 5.499*** 7.261 -0.307 
 (0.767) (2.725) (4.540) (4.620) 
Engage and Win  6.776*** 8.070*** 13.765** 6.482 
 (3.771) (4.526) (6.122) (6.228) 
Party Affiliation  1.145 1.181 0.221 2.355 
 (0.225) (0.250) (1.877) (1.910) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.152 1.225 2.533* 1.963 
 (0.196) (0.227) (1.510) (1.536) 
Militarism  1.322 2.129*** 7.809*** 9.736*** 
 (0.334) (0.622) (2.529) (2.573) 
Trust in the Government 1.563* 2.631*** 15.172*** 12.914*** 
 (0.361) (0.660) (2.510) (2.554) 
Constant 2.427 1.260 49.503*** 40.213*** 
 (3.288) (1.957) (12.737) (12.959) 
     
Observations 433 419 207 207 
Pseudo R-squared 0.221 0.342   
R-squared   0.480 0.464 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 123: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects BJP Supporters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.247 1.169 -8.149 -14.426** 
 (0.569) (0.540) (5.977) (5.842) 
Engage and Lose 3.213** 8.598*** 3.967 0.651 
 (1.796) (5.990) (5.097) (4.982) 
Engage and Win  7.183*** 4.341** 7.923 0.241 
 (4.588) (2.599) (6.191) (6.051) 
Bipartisan Elite Endorse 3.340*** 2.089* 3.712 4.244 
 (1.368) (0.843) (4.065) (3.973) 
Party Affiliation  1.156 1.191 1.905 3.623** 
 (0.238) (0.236) (1.646) (1.609) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.101 1.763* 7.053** 7.561*** 
 (0.362) (0.595) (2.882) (2.817) 
Trust in the Government   1.089 2.313*** 11.516*** 9.566*** 
 (0.344) (0.658) (3.220) (3.147) 
Constant 3.166 2.144 72.563*** 63.866*** 
 (5.340) (3.896) (15.413) (15.064) 
     
Observations 513 496 172 172 
Pseudo R-squared 0.230 0.230   
R-squared   0.298 0.310 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 124: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects INC Supporters 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  3.431 6.721** 15.281 1.320 
 (2.609) (5.793) (11.910) (13.202) 
Engage and Lose 24.278*** 3.377 15.773* -3.544 
 (23.245) (2.586) (9.344) (10.358) 
Engage and Win  19.002*** 9.140*** 9.510 6.252 
 (17.437) (7.546) (10.320) (11.440) 
Bipartisan Elite Endorse 3.443* 1.672 12.599* 1.989 
 (2.279) (0.957) (7.415) (8.220) 
Party Affiliation  2.294** 2.350** 7.597** 1.164 
 (0.850) (0.841) (3.568) (3.955) 
Prime Minister Approval  0.895 3.034** 1.871 7.566 
 (0.399) (1.522) (5.735) (6.357) 
Trust in the Government   4.466*** 3.572*** 5.241 0.231 
 (2.107) (1.495) (4.244) (4.705) 
Constant 0.227 0.383 25.700 26.104 
 (0.542) (0.883) (20.435) (22.652) 
     
Observations 209 210 61 61 
Pseudo R-squared 0.473 0.557   
R-squared   0.543 0.389 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 125: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects BJP Supporters Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.255 0.806 -3.667 -8.993 
 (0.522) (0.373) (5.488) (5.712) 
Engage and Lose 6.943*** 5.939*** 8.873* 3.478 
 (3.380) (3.103) (4.563) (4.750) 
Engage and Win  26.951*** 6.654*** 11.129** 8.910 
 (19.385) (3.897) (5.587) (5.815) 
Bipartisan Elite Endorse 5.945*** 2.648** 5.506 4.347 
 (2.484) (1.039) (3.700) (3.852) 
Party Affiliation  1.414* 1.520** 2.987* 3.112* 
 (0.282) (0.307) (1.551) (1.615) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.135 1.782** 8.527*** 8.598*** 
 (0.305) (0.500) (2.631) (2.738) 
Trust in the Government   2.406*** 2.936*** 11.657*** 9.356*** 
 (0.652) (0.780) (2.404) (2.502) 
Constant 2.592 1.326 44.840*** 36.292*** 
 (4.185) (2.338) (12.454) (12.963) 
     
Observations 439 425 219 219 
Pseudo R-squared 0.360 0.401   
R-squared   0.378 0.326 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 126: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects INC Supporters Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Country Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.380 1.040 5.366 -1.052 
 (0.751) (0.647) (7.583) (7.937) 
Engage and Lose 7.673*** 2.853* 12.021** 7.355 
 (4.491) (1.655) (6.013) (6.294) 
Engage and Win  19.116*** 3.501* 16.456** 21.507*** 
 (15.125) (2.306) (7.467) (7.816) 
Bipartisan Elite Endorse 4.846*** 1.713 3.144 -3.285 
 (2.628) (0.780) (4.804) (5.029) 
Prime Minister Approval  1.357 1.267 5.028*** 4.381** 
 (0.343) (0.305) (1.919) (2.009) 
Militarism  1.193 1.858* 5.076 6.866** 
 (0.387) (0.671) (3.300) (3.454) 
Trust in the Government 2.777*** 3.418*** 11.430*** 7.477** 
 (0.954) (1.166) (2.843) (2.976) 
Constant 1.828 10.053 19.864 21.089 
 (3.631) (21.522) (14.450) (15.126) 
     
Observations 277 276 141 141 
Pseudo R-squared 0.373 0.482   
R-squared   0.468 0.416 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 127: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Elite Endorse 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations  
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.237 1.272 4.134 4.917 
 (0.688) (0.675) (8.771) (8.700) 
Engage and Lose  1.685 1.032 -0.678 3.636 
 (0.905) (0.506) (8.823) (8.752) 
Engage and Win  2.192 1.268 1.970 8.265 
 (1.238) (0.629) (8.309) (8.242) 
Party Affiliation  0.953 1.178 -1.793 -0.781 
 (0.260) (0.268) (4.237) (4.203) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.721** 1.768*** 7.596** 7.727** 
 (0.406) (0.366) (3.457) (3.429) 
Militarism  0.729 1.804** -2.779 -5.781 
 (0.251) (0.538) (6.265) (6.215) 
Trust in the Government  2.125** 2.067*** 9.780** 8.006* 
 (0.646) (0.544) (4.699) (4.661) 
Constant 71.400** 7.371 38.634 -0.780 
 (140.181) (12.602) (25.502) (25.298) 
     
Observations 432 421 79 79 
Pseudo R-squared 0.267 0.356   
R-squared   0.341 0.314 
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 128: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Elite Endorse Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.041 0.590 0.260 -6.681 
 (0.529) (0.354) (6.801) (7.073) 
Engage and Lose  3.447** 1.341 3.927 -0.467 
 (1.846) (0.735) (5.406) (5.621) 
Engage and Win  14.916*** 2.825 10.545 10.974 
 (11.428) (1.820) (6.692) (6.959) 
Party Affiliation  1.143 1.875** 0.180 2.670 
 (0.308) (0.488) (2.355) (2.449) 
Prime Minister Approval 1.646** 1.521* 6.683*** 5.991*** 
 (0.398) (0.368) (1.908) (1.985) 
Militarism  0.985 1.380 3.921 3.662 
 (0.301) (0.465) (3.144) (3.269) 
Trust in the Government  1.871** 2.470*** 9.519*** 6.920** 
 (0.551) (0.767) (2.978) (3.097) 
Constant 6.976 1.779 21.985 11.983 
 (13.396) (3.598) (15.004) (15.603) 
     
Observations 328 321 151 151 
Pseudo R-squared 0.317 0.450   
R-squared   0.419 0.374 
Standard Errors in parentheses 







Table 129: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Oppose 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  0.767 0.706 -7.090 -7.358 
 (0.286) (0.284) (8.441) (7.553) 
Engage and Lose  0.930 0.774 -10.160 -6.797 
 (0.350) (0.306) (9.128) (8.168) 
Engage and Win  1.697 2.054* -2.163 -7.264 
 (0.683) (0.889) (8.605) (7.699) 
Party Affiliation  1.498** 1.967*** 7.067 8.115** 
 (0.268) (0.359) (4.317) (3.863) 
Prime minister Approval  1.225 1.493*** 3.764 5.333* 
 (0.170) (0.210) (3.409) (3.050) 
Militarism  1.211 1.741** 3.859 3.467 
 (0.293) (0.470) (5.288) (4.731) 
Political Engagement  2.300*** 2.348*** 2.019 1.333 
 (0.413) (0.438) (3.688) (3.300) 
Trust in the Government 1.189 1.218 7.734* 10.986*** 
 (0.223) (0.228) (4.154) (3.717) 
Constant 1.066 0.360 67.746** 54.188** 
 (1.212) (0.429) (29.458) (26.359) 
     
Observations 414 420 81 81 
R-squared   0.414 0.570 
Pseudo R-squared 0.201 0.286   
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 130: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  2.942** 3.218** 1.776 3.999 
 (1.262) (1.602) (8.293) (8.131) 
Engage and Lose  3.182*** 1.727 2.735 3.878 
 (1.340) (0.793) (8.141) (7.983) 
Engage and Win  8.263*** 3.847*** 20.358** 19.787** 
 (4.293) (1.961) (8.472) (8.308) 
Party Affiliation  1.302 1.092 4.251 2.738 
 (0.260) (0.244) (4.532) (4.444) 
Prime minister Approval  1.448** 1.392* 0.687 2.817 
 (0.241) (0.259) (3.650) (3.579) 
Militarism  1.305 2.215*** -0.487 0.426 
 (0.353) (0.680) (5.395) (5.290) 
Political Engagement  1.338 1.475* -3.137 -3.591 
 (0.269) (0.331) (3.704) (3.632) 
Trust in the Government 1.612** 2.932*** 13.294** 11.515* 
 (0.370) (0.791) (6.198) (6.077) 
Constant 3.219 28.204** 8.562 -5.497 
 (4.694) (46.073) (38.105) (37.364) 
     
Observations 449 420 81 81 
R-squared   0.317 0.346 
Pseudo R-squared 0.220 0.355   
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 131: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Oppose Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.249 0.878 -3.927 -7.352 
 (0.420) (0.351) (5.428) (5.452) 
Engage and Lose  2.394*** 1.592 1.097 2.876 
 (0.808) (0.625) (4.422) (4.442) 
Engage and Win  7.745*** 2.536** 8.905* 8.398 
 (3.375) (1.093) (5.106) (5.129) 
Party Affiliation  1.093 1.871*** 2.847 2.530 
 (0.188) (0.337) (2.130) (2.139) 
Prime minister Approval  1.431*** 1.584*** 5.285*** 4.938*** 
 (0.193) (0.236) (1.754) (1.761) 
Militarism  1.198 1.634** 2.168 2.610 
 (0.245) (0.387) (2.777) (2.789) 
Political Engagement  1.770*** 1.546** 1.458 1.947 
 (0.296) (0.287) (1.949) (1.958) 
Trust in the Government 1.364* 1.847*** 7.141*** 8.127*** 
 (0.248) (0.363) (2.521) (2.532) 
Constant 3.269 0.467 36.087** 22.314 
 (3.873) (0.626) (14.269) (14.333) 
     
Observations 521 513 224 224 
R-squared   0.341 0.362 
Pseudo R-squared 0.235 0.389   
Standard Errors in parentheses 






Table 132: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Support Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.996** 1.377 0.357 -1.703 
 (0.669) (0.544) (5.343) (5.317) 
Engage and Lose  3.257*** 1.871 5.014 7.223 
 (1.089) (0.721) (4.523) (4.500) 
Engage and Win  12.425*** 3.680*** 14.687*** 14.689*** 
 (5.776) (1.593) (5.318) (5.291) 
Party Affiliation  1.077 1.595*** 1.112 0.566 
 (0.182) (0.282) (2.090) (2.080) 
Prime minister Approval  1.355** 1.632*** 6.074*** 5.231*** 
 (0.189) (0.251) (1.758) (1.749) 
Militarism  1.101 1.424 2.107 2.976 
 (0.222) (0.318) (2.649) (2.636) 
Political Engagement  1.768*** 1.666*** 1.341 1.834 
 (0.289) (0.305) (1.885) (1.876) 
Trust in the Government 1.587** 1.677*** 7.307*** 8.537*** 
 (0.301) (0.337) (2.565) (2.552) 
Constant 8.225* 0.990 32.856** 20.745 
 (10.335) (1.414) (14.243) (14.173) 
     
Observations 551 529 225 225 
R-squared   0.341 0.367 
Pseudo R-squared 0.240 0.356   
Standard Errors in parentheses 




Table 133: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Social Group Cue Oppose – Non-Tamils 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.249 0.878 -3.927 -7.352 
 (0.420) (0.351) (5.428) (5.452) 
Engage and Lose  2.394*** 1.592 1.097 2.876 
 (0.808) (0.625) (4.422) (4.442) 
Engage and Win  7.745*** 2.536** 8.905* 8.398 
 (3.375) (1.093) (5.106) (5.129) 
Party Affiliation  1.093 1.871*** 2.847 2.530 
 (0.188) (0.337) (2.130) (2.139) 
Prime minister Approval  1.431*** 1.584*** 5.285*** 4.938*** 
 (0.193) (0.236) (1.754) (1.761) 
Militarism  1.198 1.634** 2.168 2.610 
 (0.245) (0.387) (2.777) (2.789) 
Political Engagement  1.770*** 1.546** 1.458 1.947 
 (0.296) (0.287) (1.949) (1.958) 
Trust in the Government 1.364* 1.847*** 7.141*** 8.127*** 
 (0.248) (0.363) (2.521) (2.532) 
Constant 3.269 0.467 36.087** 22.314 
 (3.873) (0.626) (14.269) (14.333) 
     
Observations 521 513 224 224 
R-squared   0.341 0.362 
Pseudo R-squared 0.235 0.389   
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 134: Experiment 2 Rebels Main Effects Elite Endorse Manipulation Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline: Backing Down and Initiate 
Negotiations 
Approval Voting Reputation Prime Minister 
     
Stay Out  1.551 0.923 -1.772 -5.925 
 (0.541) (0.383) (5.223) (5.199) 
Engage and Lose  2.625*** 1.562 1.986 2.448 
 (0.916) (0.625) (4.275) (4.256) 
Engage and Win  10.166*** 3.605*** 12.448** 11.008** 
 (4.813) (1.661) (5.065) (5.042) 
Party Affiliation  1.198 1.923*** 2.774 3.099 
 (0.211) (0.354) (2.075) (2.066) 
Prime minister Approval  1.526*** 1.856*** 6.691*** 6.172*** 
 (0.227) (0.303) (1.700) (1.692) 
Militarism  1.021 1.497* 0.977 1.282 
 (0.216) (0.355) (2.669) (2.657) 
Political Engagement  1.694*** 1.487** 1.510 1.775 
 (0.294) (0.287) (1.854) (1.846) 
Trust in the Government 1.520** 1.727*** 5.503** 6.562*** 
 (0.292) (0.355) (2.534) (2.523) 
Constant 2.856 0.381 31.914** 18.113 
 (3.629) (0.551) (13.829) (13.766) 
     
Observations 547 533 233 233 
R-squared   0.326 0.349 
Pseudo R-squared 0.238 0.400   
Standard Errors in parentheses 





Table 135: Experiment 3 Rebels Main Effects Nigeria 
Baseline: Backing Down 
and Initiate Negotiations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 




     
Engage and Win 1.117*** 0.907*** 1.580*** 1.303*** 
 (0.316) (0.347) (0.412) (0.386) 
Engage and Lose 0.989*** 0.449 0.655 0.533 
 (0.318) (0.358) (0.437) (0.420) 
Militarism  0.120 0.199 0.541** 0.338 
 (0.186) (0.218) (0.257) (0.243) 
Political Engagement  -0.114 -0.499*** -0.422** -0.385** 
 (0.144) (0.179) (0.200) (0.192) 
Party Affiliation  -0.0106 -0.0221 -0.0228 0.00439 
 (0.0153) (0.0167) (0.0180) (0.0193) 
Age  0.0263 0.00496 -0.245 -0.267 
 (0.187) (0.210) (0.276) (0.274) 
Education 0.0524 -0.100 -0.0882 0.0113 
 (0.0874) (0.0948) (0.107) (0.112) 
Prime Minister Approval 0.233** 0.0968 0.400*** 0.224** 
 (0.0941) (0.108) (0.111) (0.115) 
Income 0.0265 0.480** 0.469** 0.174 
 (0.167) (0.195) (0.215) (0.216) 
Constant -2.303*** -1.297 -2.365** -2.825*** 
 (0.811) (0.870) (1.001) (1.054) 
     
Observations 361 311 325 326 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 136: Experiment 3 Rebels Main Effects Nigeria Manipulation Checks 
Baseline: Backing Down 
and Initiate Negotiations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 




     
Engage and Win 0.860** 0.591 1.269** 1.012** 
469 
 
 (0.390) (0.416) (0.507) (0.512) 
Engage and Lose 1.071*** 0.404 0.887* 1.158** 
 (0.380) (0.419) (0.522) (0.516) 
Militarism  0.199 0.347 0.954*** 0.837** 
 (0.224) (0.260) (0.355) (0.340) 
Political Engagement  -0.0199 -0.413* -0.379 -0.493* 
 (0.180) (0.214) (0.245) (0.255) 
Party Affiliation  -0.00434 -0.0186 -0.0314 0.0147 
 (0.0186) (0.0198) (0.0216) (0.0246) 
Age  0.0683 -0.0536 -0.603* -0.380 
 (0.210) (0.235) (0.351) (0.335) 
Education 0.109 -0.0841 -0.0583 0.0383 
 (0.109) (0.117) (0.138) (0.154) 
Prime Minister Approval 0.261** 0.0260 0.364*** 0.219 
 (0.118) (0.133) (0.137) (0.148) 
Income 0.0505 0.526** 0.680** 0.381 
 (0.210) (0.237) (0.281) (0.289) 
Constant -3.084*** -1.314 -2.250* -3.843*** 
 (1.021) (1.063) (1.243) (1.431) 
     
Observations 242 218 221 225 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 137: Experiment 3 Rebels Main Effects Nigeria Supporters of the Ruling Party 
Baseline: Backing Down 
and Initiate Negotiations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 





     
Engage and Win 1.066** 0.770 0.890 0.783 
 (0.441) (0.495) (0.602) (0.555) 
Engage and Lose 0.772* 0.143 0.309 -0.352 
 (0.424) (0.491) (0.601) (0.617) 
Militarism  0.178 0.173 0.804** 0.445 
 (0.243) (0.284) (0.397) (0.354) 
Political Engagement  -0.162 -0.415* -0.368 -0.472 
 (0.205) (0.252) (0.316) (0.307) 
Party Affiliation  -0.149 -0.350 -0.780 -1.396** 
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 (0.301) (0.371) (0.557) (0.596) 
Age  -0.137 -0.208 -0.266 -0.0110 
 (0.145) (0.173) (0.204) (0.202) 
Education -0.0710 -0.0943 0.240 0.124 
 (0.174) (0.201) (0.204) (0.204) 
Prime Minister Approval 0.198 0.405 0.396 0.614* 
 (0.240) (0.289) (0.326) (0.334) 
Constant -0.522 -0.0194 -0.238 -1.287 
 (1.139) (1.332) (1.586) (1.603) 
     
Observations 195 167 170 173 
Standard errors in parentheses 






C.4 Questionaire and Vignettes 
 
[Demographic questions] 







2. What is your gender?  
➢ Male  
➢ Female  
➢ Other  
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
➢ No formal school education   
➢ Primary   
➢ Lower secondary  
➢ Secondary  
➢ High School Degree 
➢ University Degree (Bachelor’s Degree) 
➢ Graduate Degree 




4.Please read the following short text about house security in the country.  
Twenty-four houses collapsed and at least 20 people were injured when a sudden storm having 
high wind speed swept through a village in the Ecotech Sector 3 area here Thursday night, police 
said. 
The incident took place in Ali Bardipur village at around 8:30 pm, Ecotech-3 police station in-
charge Inspector Anita Chauhan said. 
The injured are undergoing treatment at various hospitals in Greater Noida, she said, adding that 
the condition of four victims was stated to be critical. 
 
Question: Please point at what the text is describing:  
 
➢ The effect of a storm and the collapse of four houses 
➢ Military operations against another country  
➢ Sport events  
➢ Foreing policy  
 
5.On what language do you communicate at home?283 
On what language do you communicate at home?284 




➢ Tamil  
➢ Other 
 
283 http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement1.aspx  




6.Could you indicate your annual income?285 
 
➢ Up to 5,000 Indian Rupees  
➢ 5,001 to 7500 Indian Rupees 
➢ 7,501 to 10,000 Indian Rupees 
➢ 10,001 to 20,000 Indian Rupees 
➢ 20,001 to 50,000 Indian Rupees  
➢ 50,001 to 100,000 Indian Rupees 
➢ Over 100,000 Indian Rupees  
 
7.What is your religion?  
➢ Hindu 
➢ Muslim  
➢ Christian 
➢ Sikhism 
➢ Buddhism  
➢ Jainism  
➢ Zoroastrianism   
➢ Not Religious  
➢ Believe in God but do not belong to a particular religion 
➢ Other 








8. Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?  
 
➢ Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
➢ Indian National Congress (INC) 
➢ National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
➢ United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC) 
➢ All India Trinamool Congress  
➢ Bahujan Samaj Party 
➢ Communist Party of India 
➢ Communist Party of India (Marxist)  
➢ Other  
 
9. For which party did you vote?  
 
➢ Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
➢ Indian National Congress (INC) 
➢ National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
➢ United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress party (INC) 
➢ All India Trinamool Congress  
➢ Bahujan Samaj Party 
➢ Communist Party of India 
➢ Communist Party of India (Marxist)  
➢ Other  
➢ I did not vote  
➢ Prefer not to answer 
 
 




Organize to solve a community problem  
Contacted a government official  
Participated in a political protest  
Participated in a political gathering or rally.  
Worked for a political campaign 
Donate money to a political campaign 
Served in a community board 
 
➢ Never  
➢ One time  
➢ Sometimes 
➢ Several times 
➢ On a regular basis286 
 
12.How closely you follow national politics? 5 indicates very closely while 1 not at all.  
➢ 5 
➢ 4 




13.How closely you follow major events in foreign countries/ the world? 5 indicates very closely 
while 1 not at all.  
 
286 Verba et al (1993) 
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➢ 5  
➢ 4  
➢ 3  
➢ 2 
➢ 1  
 
[Level of Military assertiveness]  
 
Next you will be presented with a set of questions, asking for your views about the military, 
national identity, and India’s politics. You can indicate only one answer per question which range 
from Strongly agree to Strongly Disagree. Please answer each question carefully.  
 
14: The use of military force only makes problems worse.  
➢ Strongly disagree  
➢ Disagree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Agree  
➢ Strongly agree  
 
15: The best way a state can ensure its internal security is with the use of its military and security 
forces to discourage current and potential domestic and international challengers.  
 




➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Disagree 
➢ Strongly disagree 
 
16: Going to war can be unfortunate, however, in many cases it is the only solution to an 
international crisis that is threatening vital national interests of your country.   
  
➢ Strongly agree 
➢ Agree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Disagree 
➢ Strongly disagree 
 
[Level of Ethno-Nationalism] 
 
17. Which of the following are most important for your national identity. Five (5) indicates very 
important, and zero (0) indicates not important at all to your national identity.   
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Indian culture         
Ethnicity       
Religion        
Language        




[Levels of trust in the domestic political institutions and actors.]  
 
For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them? Five (5) indicate high level of 
trust, and zero (0) indicates no trust at all.  
 0 1 2  3  4 5 
Prime Minister       
The national 
government  
      
Political Parties       
Parliament       
The army       
287 
 
Please indicate to what extent you think that each of the listed issue is a problem for India. Use the 
following scale to record your answers: 0 indicates not at all, while 100 indicates that it is a very 
big problem.288  
Lack of Employment Opportunities  0-100  
Rising Prices 0-100  
Corrupt Government Officials 0-100  
Terrorism  0-100  
Crime  0-100  
China 0-100  
Pakistan 0-100  
USA 0-100  
Corrupt Business People 0-100  
 
287 An alternative set of question capturing respondents trust are adopted and used by Kertzer and McGraw (2012) 
288 https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/25/a-sampling-of-public-opinion-in-india/ Note that the question on China, 
Pakistan, and US are added by the author.  
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Gap between the Rich and the Poor 0-100  
Poor Quality Schools  0-100  
People Leaving India for Jobs in Other 
Countries 
0-100  
Air Pollution  0-100  
Health Care 0-100  




The following questions concern the decision of India’s leaders when faced with domestic security 
challengers. You will read about a situation that India has faced in the past and will likely face 
again in the future. Indian leaders have managed the situation in different ways. In the following 
lines you will read about one approach Indian leaders have chosen to take and ask whether you 




In north India rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control of several villages. 
Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police, civilians, and local government 
personal. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the 
army. The army started operations against the rebels. The army successfully pushed back the 
rebels and took control of the villages. 
 
[Blank // 
 For reference in a recent poll and this in survey about 75% of Indians with your political views 
have indicated that they approve of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.   
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// For reference in a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views 
have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.   
// Leaders of the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party together with 
their coalition partners expressed support for the prime minister’ actions in this difficult situation.  
 
To Summarize:   
➢ Rebels in the central part of India have taken control over several villages.  
➢ The prime minister stated that the Indian government will by sending the army  
➢ The army was sent and engaged the rebels.  
➢ The rebels remained in control of the city and took control of several villages. 
➢ [In a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views approve 
how the prime minister handled the situation// In a recent poll and in this survey about 75% 
of Indians with your political views disapprove how the prime minister handled the 
situation // The Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata party support 
how the prime minister’s has handled the situation  
 
 
[No Engagement condition] 
 
In central India, rebels have pushed back local security forces and taken control of several villages. 
Reports indicate that there are casualties among the police, civilians, and local government 
personal. The prime minister has stated that the Indian government will respond by sending the 
army. However, the prime minister backed down and did not send the army to retake the villages 
from the rebels. The prime minister announced that the government will start peace negotiations. 





 For reference in a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views 
have indicated that they approve of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.   
// For reference in a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views 
have indicated that they disapprove of the prime minister’s actions in this situation.   
// Leaders of the Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata Party together with 
their coalition partners expressed support for the prime minister’ actions in this difficult situation.  
 
To Summarize:  
➢ Rebels in the central part of India have taken control of several villages.  
➢ The prime minister stated that the Indian government will by sending the army  
➢ However, the prime minister backed down and did not sent the army while announcing that 
the government will start peace negotiations.  
➢ The rebels remained in control of several villages.  
➢ [In a recent poll and in this survey about 75% of Indians with your political views approve 
how the prime minister handled the situation // In a recent poll and in this survey about 
About 75% of Indians with your political views disapprove how the prime minister handled 
the situation // The Indian National Congress party and the Bharatiya Janata party support 
how the prime minister’s has handled the situation. 
 
[Dependent variables.]  
Please answer the following questions. 
24: Do you approve, disprove, or neither approve nor disprove of the way Indian prime minister 
handled the situation? 
➢ Strongly Approve 
➢ Approve 
➢ Neither 
➢ Disagree  




25: As a result of the prime minister’s actions against the rebels how likely you are to vote for him?  
➢ Very likely  
➢ Likely  
➢ No change in my intentions to vote 
➢ Unlikely  
➢ Very Unlikely  
 
27. Please indicate to what extent you felt the listed emotions after reading about the actions of the 
prime minister. Use the following scale to record your answers:  
1 = not at all, 2 = somewhat, 3 = moderately, 4 =very much, 5= very strongly  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
➢ Anger       
➢ Hatred      
➢ Contempt       
➢ Disgust      
➢ Fear       
➢ Disappointment      
➢ Shame       
➢ Sadness      
➢ Compassion       
➢ Relief      
➢ Admiration       
➢ Joy      
➢ Pride       
 
 




30: “Enhancing the government’s ability to intercept phone calls and read private emails will help 
prevent future attacks of this kind.” 
 
➢ Strongly agree 
➢ Agree 
➢ Neither agree nor disagree 
➢ Disagree 
➢ Strongly disagree 
 
31. What do you think the prime minister’s actions did to India’s reputation?  
 
➢ Highly improved  
➢ Improved  
➢ Neither improved nor damaged 
➢ Damaged  
➢ Highly Damaged 
 
32: It is appropriate for the government to use interrogation techniques (such as waterboarding, 
sleep deprivation, humiliation, etc) on captured rebels in order to obtain information abou future 
attacks.  
 
➢ Strongly agree  
➢ Agree  
➢ Neither agree nor disagree  
➢ Disagree  
➢ Strongly Disagree  
 
 
33. Some of your friend are organizing to protest and express their opposition to how the prime 




➢ Very likely  
➢ Likely  
➢ No opinion  
➢ Unlikely  
➢ Very Unlikely  
 
34. In the scenario you just read about, did the rebels remain in control of the villages?  
➢ Yes  
➢ No  
 
35. In the text you read about, did the prime minister use the army?  
➢ Yes  
➢ No  
 
36. Which caste group do you belong to?  
➢ Brahmin 
➢ Kshatriyas 
➢ Vaishyas  
➢ Shudras 






APPENDIX D: IRB APPROVAL 
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